Procedural Mandates and Constitutional Dimensions of Notice under Section 107 CrPC

Procedural Mandates and Constitutional Dimensions of Notice under Section 107 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973

1. Introduction

Section 107 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (“CrPC”) empowers Executive Magistrates to require persons, who are likely to breach the peace, to execute bonds for keeping the peace. Although the provision is preventive in nature, it directly engages the fundamental right to personal liberty under Article 21 of the Constitution. The Supreme Court has repeatedly emphasised that any curtailment of liberty under preventive provisions must strictly follow “the manner hereinafter provided” in the Code[1]. Central to that manner is the notice—the written order contemplated by Section 111 (corresponding to former Section 112 of the 1898 Code) that sets the preventive jurisdiction of the Magistrate in motion. This article critically analyses the statutory, constitutional and jurisprudential contours of such notice, drawing on prominent decisions across a century of Indian case-law.

2. Statutory Architecture

  • Section 107: Authorises the Magistrate to require a person, “in the manner hereinafter provided”, to show cause why he should not be ordered to execute a bond for keeping the peace for a period not exceeding one year.
  • Section 111: Mandates that the Magistrate “shall make an order in writing” setting forth (i) the substance of the information received; (ii) the amount, period and conditions of the proposed bond; and (iii) the number, character and class of sureties, if any.
  • Sections 112-114: Prescribe modes of service—reading over to a person present (s. 112); personal service or proclamation where absent (s. 113-114).
  • Section 116: Governs the ensuing inquiry; sub-section (3) permits interim bonds only where “immediate measures are necessary” and specifically bars such orders in proceedings solely under Section 107.
  • Section 117: Authorises final orders after inquiry.

The Code therefore establishes a tightly sequenced procedure: opinion → written order (notice) → service/read-over → inquiry → final bond. Each step is jurisdictional; omission or substantial deviation vitiates the entire proceeding.

3. The Constitutional Context: Preventive Justice and Article 21

In Madhu Limaye v. Sub-Divisional Magistrate, Monghyr[2] the Supreme Court sustained the constitutional validity of Section 107 but underscored that its reasonableness under Articles 19(1) and 21 depends on scrupulous adherence to the statutory safeguards, particularly notice. Any dilution converts a preventive measure into punitive detention, offending the “procedure established by law” requirement of Article 21.

4. Commencement of Proceedings: When Does Section 107 Begin to Operate?

The Madras High Court in Nagireddy Konda Reddy[3] clarified over a century ago that a Magistrate “cannot be said to have taken proceedings under Section 107 until he issues notice to the person charged.” The decision rejects the notion that mere police reference or administrative endorsement constitutes cognisance; jurisdiction crystallises only upon issuance of the Section 111 order. The Supreme Court in Balraj Madhok[4] adopted the same view: without the written order being prepared and read over, the Magistrate lacks even the power to remand the person to custody under Section 117(3).

5. Mandatory Contents and Form of the Notice

5.1 Substantive Particulars

Case-law illustrates recurring non-compliance with Section 111’s mandatory particulars:

  • Siya Nand Tyagi v. State of U.P.[5] struck down a notice that omitted material facts and relied on a stereotype template, terming such practice “a dead letter.”
  • Kamla Yadav v. State of U.P.[6] reprimanded Magistrates for signing printed pro-formas mechanically, holding that application of mind must appear ex facie in the order.
  • M. Ganapathy v. State[7] and M.R. Gunapala Poojary v. State[8] quashed notices that failed to set forth the information received or the particulars of the proposed bond.

5.2 Service and Read-Over

Section 112 requires that, where the person is present in Court, the order must be read over and, if desired, explained. In Balraj Madhok, the Supreme Court held that the Magistrate’s power to detain under Section 117(3) does not vest until compliance with this ritual. Non-service or defective service thus nullifies both interim and final orders.

5.3 Judicial Versus Executive Function

While Section 144 orders are executive in nature and amenable to writ review as held in Gulam Abbas v. State of U.P.[9], proceedings under Section 107—by virtue of the mandatory judicial inquiry under Section 116—are treated as judicial acts. The Madras High Court recently reaffirmed that position, insisting on “due process” in Subbulakshmi v. S.D.M.[10].

6. Interim Bonds under Section 116(3): Abuse and Correctives

The proviso to Section 116(3) prohibits demand of a good-behaviour bond in pure Section 107 proceedings and insists that conditions be no more onerous than those in the Section 111 order. Nevertheless, Executive Magistrates often require surety bonds as a matter of routine. The Bombay High Court in Rajesh Nayak[11] and earlier in State of Maharashtra v. Mangali Dewaiyya Pupalla denounced this trend, warning that wrongful custody for failure to furnish such illegal bonds would attract compensation under Article 21. Similar strictures appear in Chandrabhan Dhengle[12] and M. Krishnamurthy[13].

7. Inquiry under Section 116: Commencement, Adjournment and Delay

Two recurrent issues arise: (i) whether the inquiry commences only after cause is shown, and (ii) whether proceedings lapse on expiry of the bond period. The Patna High Court in Sitaram Singh[14] held that the Magistrate is deemed to have decided to inquire once the person appears, even if evidence is adjourned. The Supreme Court in Ram Narain Singh v. State of Bihar[15] rejected the argument that expiry of the bond period renders the proceeding nugatory, permitting continuation where apprehension persists. Delay, however, may render the proceeding stale; see Kamlesh Kumari Jain[16] where a two-year-old proceeding lacking fresh material was quashed.

8. Proper Forum for Land-Related Breach of Peace

When the apprehended breach arises out of land disputes, Gauhati High Court precedents mandate recourse to Section 145 rather than Section 107. In Kadir Ali Dewan[17] the Court characterised Section 107 proceedings over land disputes as “abuse of process.” This demarcation prevents Executive Magistrates from converting what is essentially a possessory conflict into a preventive custody proceeding.

9. Safeguards Against Arbitrary Preventive Action

The composite jurisprudence conveys four overarching safeguards:

  1. Jurisdictional Notice: Absence or defect nullifies the proceeding (Nagireddy, Balraj Madhok).
  2. Reasoned Satisfaction: Printed or vague formats evince non-application of mind and are invalid (Siya Nand Tyagi, Kamla Yadav).
  3. Proportional Interim Measures: Interim bonds in Section 107 cases are exceptional; surety demands violate the proviso to Section 116(3) (Rajesh Nayak).
  4. Timely, Focused Inquiry: Prolonged or aimless proceedings infringe Article 21 and warrant quashing (Kamlesh Kumari Jain).

10. Inter-relation with Other Preventive Powers

Section 107 must be read alongside kindred preventive powers—Sections 108-110 (habitual offenders) and Section 144 (urgent public order). The Supreme Court in Madhu Limaye adopted concentric-circle reasoning to balance public order and individual liberty, declining to adopt the American “preferred-position” doctrine but insisting upon reasonableness. The Court’s earlier pronouncement in Ramji Lal Modi v. State of U.P.[18] upholding Section 295-A IPC illustrates the same balancing ethos in the realm of speech: specificity and narrow tailoring justify restriction. Preventive powers under Section 107 similarly survive constitutional scrutiny only when narrowly exercised.

11. Emerging Concerns and Recommendations

  • Digital Templates with Mandatory Fields: Instead of unthinking printed pro-formas, electronic templates could force Magistrates to populate factual particulars before signature, ensuring demonstrable application of mind.
  • Statutory Time-Limits: Legislative or High Court rules may impose outer limits for concluding Section 116 inquiries, reducing the risk of stale proceedings.
  • Training and Accountability: Judicial academies should emphasise the constitutional significance of notice under Section 111; disciplinary action may follow persistent misuse of interim bonds.
  • Judicial Review: High Courts should continue to entertain petitions under Articles 226 and 227 expeditiously, given the preventive (not punitive) character of the jurisdiction.

12. Conclusion

The notice contemplated by Section 111 is not a procedural nicety but the sine qua non of the Magistrate’s jurisdiction under Section 107. Indian courts—from the pre-Independence Nagireddy ruling to the contemporary decisions of the Allahabad, Bombay, Karnataka and Madras High Courts—have been remarkably consistent: failure to issue a proper, reasoned, and duly served notice vitiates the entire proceeding. The preventive purpose of Section 107 cannot justify shortcuts; indeed, because liberty is curtailed without trial, procedural fidelity becomes the constitutional price of that preventive power. Ensuring that every notice complies with Section 111 is therefore indispensable to reconciling public order with the constitutional promise of personal liberty.

Footnotes

  1. Madhu Limaye v. Sub-Divisional Magistrate, Monghyr, (1970) 3 SCC 746 at ¶36.
  2. Ibid.
  3. Nagireddy Konda Reddy v. King-Emperor, Madras High Court, 1917.
  4. Balraj Madhok v. Union of India, Supreme Court, 1966.
  5. Siya Nand Tyagi v. State of U.P., 1992 Cri LJ 1298 (All).
  6. Kamla Yadav v. State of U.P., 2019 (Allahabad HC).
  7. M. Ganapathy v. State, 2017 SCC OnLine Mad 10351.
  8. M.R. Gunapala Poojary v. State, 2018 (Karnataka HC).
  9. Gulam Abbas v. State of U.P., (1982) 1 SCC 71.
  10. Subbulakshmi v. Sub-Divisional Magistrate, 2023 (Madras HC).
  11. Rajesh s/o Suryabhan Nayak v. State of Maharashtra, 2006 (Bombay HC).
  12. Chandrabhan Rama Dhengle v. Indirabai Dhengle, 1997 (Bombay HC).
  13. M. Krishnamurthy v. Arunachalam, 2017 (Madras HC).
  14. Sitaram Singh v. Ram Autar Singh, 1979 SCC OnLine Pat 168.
  15. Ram Narain Singh v. State of Bihar, AIR 1972 SC 2225.
  16. Kamlesh Kumari Jain v. State of Bihar, 2012 SCC OnLine Pat 828.
  17. Kadir Ali Dewan v. Wahab Ali, 1979 (Gauhati HC).
  18. Ramji Lal Modi v. State of U.P., AIR 1957 SC 620.