Preventive Justice and Procedural Safeguards under Section 107 Cr.P.C.

Preventive Justice and Procedural Safeguards under Section 107 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973

1. Introduction

Section 107 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (hereinafter “Cr.P.C.”) empowers an Executive Magistrate to require a person to execute a bond for keeping the peace when there is information that such person is likely to commit a breach of the peace or disturb the public tranquillity.[1] The provision forms the keystone of India’s preventive justice architecture, balancing the State’s duty to avert disorder with the individual’s fundamental rights under Articles 14, 19 and 21 of the Constitution. This article undertakes a critical analysis of Section 107, tracing its historical evolution, elucidating its procedural mechanics, examining constitutional scrutiny, and interrogating contemporary jurisprudence that seeks to curb misuse.

2. Historical Evolution and Legislative Context

The preventive chapters of the Cr.P.C. descend from colonial policing imperatives. Originally enacted in the 1882 Code, Section 107 was amplified in 1973 by adding “disturb the public tranquillity,”[2] reflecting an expanded concern with communal harmony. Post-Constitution, preventive powers were constitutionally contested; yet the Supreme Court in Madhu Limaye v. SDM, Monghyr upheld their validity, provided strict procedural compliance is ensured.[3]

The 1973 Code also transferred such powers from Judicial to Executive Magistrates (Chapter XI), aligning with Article 50’s mandate of judicial–executive separation while retaining judicial character for the inquiry.[4]

3. Conceptual Framework: Preventive versus Punitive Justice

Preventive justice aims to avert threatened harm; punitive justice responds after the offence. Section 107 belongs to the former category. The Supreme Court, invoking “settled possession” doctrine in Puran Singh v. State of Punjab,[5] reminded that where citizens legitimately defend property, criminal liability may be negated; conversely, Section 107 enables the State to intervene before private violence escalates. Thus preventive orders supplement, not supplant, the private right of defence codified in Sections 96–106 IPC.

4. Procedural Architecture of Section 107

4.1 Triggering Jurisdiction

An Executive Magistrate must (i) receive information of an apprehended breach and (ii) form an “opinion that there is sufficient ground for proceeding.”[1] Courts stress that such opinion requires some judicially-verifiable material; bald police reports are insufficient.[6]

4.2 Preliminary Order under Section 111

The Magistrate shall issue a written order setting forth the substance of the information, the bond amount, period (≤ 1 year), and nature of sureties. Non-compliance vitiates the entire proceeding (Siya Nand Tyagi).[6]

4.3 Service, Appearance and Inquiry (Sections 113–116)

  • Service through summons/warrant if respondent absent (S. 113).
  • On appearance, contents of the order must be read over or explained (S. 112).
  • An inquiry—quasi-judicial and inquisitorial—follows (S. 116). Evidence may be recorded as in summons-cases; the respondent may cross-examine witnesses. Failure to conduct a bona fide inquiry invites quashment (Bejoy K.V.).[7]

4.4 Interim Bond (Section 116(3))

In cases of “emergency,” an interim bond may be demanded pending inquiry. However, the Bombay High Court has held that such power does not extend to Section 107 proceedings, being confined to Sections 108–110.[8]

4.5 Final Order and Duration (Section 117)

Only upon proof of necessity may the Magistrate order execution of the bond. The order is appealable (S. 373) and revisable (S. 397). Bonds lapse after one year, guarding against indefinite restraint.

5. Constitutional Dimensions

5.1 Article 19 Reasonableness

In Madhu Limaye, a Constitutional Bench upheld Section 107, emphasising built-in safeguards: written reasons, opportunity to contest, limited duration, and judicial scrutiny.[3] The Court rejected the U.S. “preferred-position doctrine,” holding that preventive restrictions are valid if proportionate to public order concerns.

5.2 Article 21 Due Process

Since deprivation of personal liberty occurs without conviction, strict adherence to “procedure established by law” is imperative. Delhi High Court dubbed the inquiry “inquisitorial” yet judicial,[9] demanding transparency in grant of legal aid and bail.

5.3 Article 14 Non-Arbitrariness

Unequal or mala fide invocation invites writ intervention. The Gauhati High Court annulled proceedings where essential statutory steps (reading of order, recording of evidence) were skipped, terming it a “grave miscarriage of justice.”[10]

6. Jurisprudential Trends and Key Doctrines

6.1 Strict Compliance Doctrine

Multiple High Courts reiterate that Chapter VIII procedure is mandatory. Failure to specify the “substance of information” (Kerala),[7] to take sworn statements (Punjab & Haryana),[11] or to apply judicial mind (Delhi)[12] vitiates proceedings.

6.2 Misuse in Property and Tenancy Disputes

Courts caution that Section 107 is not a tool to coerce parties in civil disputes. In Chandrabhan Rama Dhengle, the Bombay High Court quashed proceedings where no public tranquillity issue arose.[5] Similarly, Delhi High Court intervened where landlords and tenants sought to leverage police Kalandaras for strategic advantage.[12]

6.3 Absence of Power to Grant Possession

Jharkhand High Court held that Magistrates cannot deliver possession under Section 107; doing so conflates the provision with Section 145 (disputes as to land or water).[13]

6.4 Interface with Executive Preventive Regimes

Kerala High Court recognised that proceedings under Section 107 do not bar externment under special statutes (e.g., KAAPA) since objects differ: the former seeks a bond; the latter expels habitual offenders.[14]

6.5 Police Practice of Registering FIRs

Andhra Pradesh High Court deprecated registration of FIRs for Section 107 action, clarifying that Chapter VIII proceedings are non-penal and commence with a report, not an FIR.[15]

7. Critique and Reform Proposals

  • Codified Thresholds: Define “likelihood” of breach through objective indicia—prior convictions, credible threats—reducing subjectivity.
  • Mandatory Speaking Orders: Digital templates requiring insertion of factual matrices would curb mechanical orders.
  • Time-Bound Inquiry: Statutory limit (e.g., 60 days) for completion of inquiry to avoid prolonged pendency.
  • Legal Aid & Bail Protocol: Automatic offer of legal aid and liberal grant of personal bond, aligning with jurisprudence in Sunil Batra letters and Aldanish Rein.[9]
  • Police Training: Incorporate judicial precedents into police manuals to deter Section 107 “harassment” tactics.

8. Conclusion

Section 107 Cr.P.C. exemplifies the delicate equilibrium between collective security and individual liberty. Judicial vigilance has fortified procedural safeguards, yet recurring misuse—particularly in civil disputes and indiscriminate police action—calls for legislative fine-tuning and administrative sensitisation. Preventive justice must remain a narrowly tailored, evidence-based mechanism, else it risks eroding the very constitutional values it purports to protect.

Footnotes

  1. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, s. 107(1).
  2. M. Krishnamurthy v. Arunachalam, 2017 (2) Mad LJ (Crl) 241 (Madras HC).
  3. Madhu Limaye v. Sub-Divisional Magistrate, Monghyr, (1970) 3 SCC 746.
  4. See Statement of Objects & Reasons to the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973; also Devi v. Executive Magistrate, 2020 (2) Mad LJ (Crl) 480 (Madras HC).
  5. Puran Singh & Others v. State of Punjab, (1975) 4 SCC 518.
  6. Siya Nand Tyagi v. State of U.P., 1992 Cri LJ 3282 (All HC).
  7. Bejoy K.V. v. State of Kerala, 2015 SCC OnLine Ker 28010.
  8. State of Maharashtra v. Mangali Dewaiyya Pupalla, 1992 Cri LJ 3908 (Bom HC).
  9. Aldanish Rein v. State (NCT of Delhi), 2018 (252) DLT 121.
  10. Kadir Ali Dewan v. Wahab Ali, 1979 Cri LJ 865 (Gau HC).
  11. Jarnail Singh v. Khushbakht Rai Kora, 2009 Cri LJ 3366 (P&H HC).
  12. Ram Prakash v. State, 1996 SCC OnLine Del 314.
  13. Sukhlal Biruly v. State of Jharkhand, 2022 SCC OnLine Jhar 1041.
  14. Thejas v. Inspector General of Police, 2015 (4) KHC 425 (Ker HC).
  15. Vommi Ananda Rao v. State of Andhra Pradesh, 2022 SCC OnLine AP 3852.