Preventing the Misuse of Religious Institutions in India: A Legal Analysis

Preventing the Misuse of Religious Institutions in India: A Legal Analysis

Introduction

Religious institutions hold a position of profound significance in the socio-cultural fabric of India, serving not only as places of worship but also as centers for community, charity, and spiritual guidance. However, their influence and resources also render them susceptible to misuse, whether for political purposes, financial aggrandizement, promoting disharmony, or other activities antithetical to their spiritual objectives. The Indian legal system, cognizant of these potential abuses, has evolved a framework aimed at preventing such misuse while endeavoring to uphold the constitutional guarantees of religious freedom. This article undertakes a scholarly analysis of the legal mechanisms in India designed to prevent the misuse of religious institutions. It examines the delicate balance between the fundamental rights to freedom of religion, as enshrined in Articles 25 and 26 of the Constitution of India, and the legitimate regulatory powers of the State. The primary legislative tool, the Religious Institutions (Prevention of Misuse) Act, 1988, will be critically assessed alongside pertinent judicial pronouncements that have shaped the contours of this complex legal domain.

Constitutional Moorings: Balancing Religious Freedom and State Regulation

The Constitution of India guarantees the freedom of religion as a fundamental right. Article 25(1) secures to all persons the freedom of conscience and the right freely to profess, practise and propagate religion. Article 26 grants every religious denomination or any section thereof the right (a) to establish and maintain institutions for religious and charitable purposes; (b) to manage its own affairs in matters of religion; (c) to own and acquire movable and immovable property; and (d) to administer such property in accordance with law. The Supreme Court in Commissioner, Hindu Religious Endowments, Madras v. Sri Lakshmindra Thirtha Swamiar of Sri Shirur Mutt (1954 AIR SC 282) (hereinafter Shirur Mutt) extensively deliberated upon the scope of these rights, clarifying that "matters of religion" in Article 26(b) encompass religious practices, rituals, and ceremonies, which are essential to the religion.

However, these rights are not absolute. Article 25(1) itself subjects religious freedom to public order, morality, health, and other provisions of Part III of the Constitution. Furthermore, Article 25(2)(a) empowers the State to make any law regulating or restricting any economic, financial, political or other secular activity which may be associated with religious practice. This distinction between the religious and secular aspects of religious institutions is pivotal. The judiciary has consistently upheld the State's power to regulate secular activities to prevent maladministration and misuse. In Durgah Committee, Ajmer, And Another v. Syed Hussain Ali And Others (1961 AIR SC 1402), the Supreme Court affirmed state intervention in the management of the Durgah Endowment, emphasizing that the administration of religious endowments has traditionally been under state-appointed officers and such regulation did not infringe upon fundamental religious rights, particularly when historical practices aligned with state involvement. This principle was reiterated in cases like Pannalal Bansilal Pitti And Others v. State Of A.P And Another (1996 SCC 2 498), where the abolition of hereditary trusteeship was upheld for efficient management, and Sri Adi Visheshwara Of Kashi Vishwanath Temple, Varanasi And Others v. State Of U.P And Others (1997 SCC 4 606), which upheld a state act for temple management by distinguishing between religious and administrative functions.

The concept of "essential religious practices," as evolved by the judiciary, limits the scope of protection under Articles 25 and 26 to those practices that are fundamental to the religion. As held in A.S Narayana Deekshitulu v. State Of A.P And Others (1996 SCC 9 548), "the protection must be confined to such religious practices as are an essential and an integral part of it and no other." This allows the State greater latitude in regulating non-essential or secular aspects, thereby preventing misuse. The overarching principle of secularism, recognized as a basic feature of the Constitution in S.R Bommai And Others v. Union Of India And Others (1994 SCC 3 1), further underpins the State's duty to ensure that religious affairs do not transgress into realms that could undermine public order or the secular fabric of the nation.

The Religious Institutions (Prevention of Misuse) Act, 1988: A Core Legislative Instrument

The Religious Institutions (Prevention of Misuse) Act, 1988 (hereinafter "the 1988 Act") is a specific enactment aimed at curbing the misuse of religious premises. Section 2(f) of the Act defines a "religious institution" broadly to mean an institution for the promotion or propagation of any religion or persuasion, including any mutt, temple, gurdwara, mosque, church, place of worship, or other place used for religious worship or promotion of religion.

The Act lays down several prohibitions:

  • Section 3: Prohibits the use of any funds or properties of a religious institution for the benefit of any political party or for any political purpose or for the promotion of, or in support of, any candidate for any election.
  • Section 4: Prohibits any religious institution or its manager from allowing the use of its premises for harbouring any person accused or convicted of an offence under any law.
  • Section 5: Prohibits the use of premises of a religious institution for storing any arms or ammunition.
  • Section 6: Prohibits any religious institution or its manager from allowing any activity within its premises which promotes or attempts to promote disharmony or feelings of enmity, hatred or ill-will between different religious, racial, language or regional groups or castes or communities, or which is prejudicial to national integrity or public order.

Section 7 of the 1988 Act prescribes penalties for contravention of Sections 3, 4, 5, or 6. It states that "the manager and every person connected with such religious institution" who contravenes these provisions shall be punishable with imprisonment for a term which may extend to five years and with fine which may extend to ten thousand rupees. The interpretation of "manager and every person connected" has been subject to judicial scrutiny. For instance, in DEVANANDA v. STATE OF KARNATAKA (Karnataka High Court, 2019) and DADDALA BASANAGOUDA v. THE STATE OF KARNATAKA (Karnataka High Court, 2022), proceedings under Section 7 were quashed where the accused were not found to be managers or persons in charge of the religious institution but were, for example, candidates visiting the premises. This indicates that mere presence or participation in an event at a religious institution may not automatically attract liability under Section 7 unless a direct connection to the management and the prohibited act is established.

The significance of the 1988 Act is underscored by its linkage to other laws. For example, Lok Prahari Through Its General Secretary, S.N. Shukla v. Election Commission Of India And Others (2018 SCC 18 114) notes that Section 8(1)(h) of the Representation of the People Act, 1951, provides for disqualification of a person convicted of an offence under Section 7 of the 1988 Act. Similarly, Pravasi Bhalai Sangathan v. Union Of India And Others (2014 SCC 11 477) lists Sections 3 and 6 of the 1988 Act among statutory provisions available to combat hate speech and actions promoting communal disharmony.

Judicial Scrutiny of Misuse and Administrative Malpractices

The Indian judiciary has played a crucial role in interpreting laws related to religious institutions and adjudicating on instances of alleged misuse. Its approach has generally been to uphold legitimate state regulation aimed at preventing malpractices while safeguarding genuine religious freedoms.

Financial Mismanagement and Misuse of Property

A significant area of concern has been the financial administration and management of properties belonging to religious institutions. Courts have supported state measures aimed at ensuring transparency and accountability. The Supreme Court in Durgah Committee, Ajmer (1961) upheld the state's authority to manage the Durgah Endowment. In Pannalal Bansilal Pitti (1996) and A.S Narayana Deekshitulu (1996), the Court upheld the abolition of hereditary rights of trustees and archakas respectively, viewing such measures as necessary for efficient administration and preventing the entrenchment of vested interests that could lead to misuse. The Court reasoned that appointment to such positions was a secular act regulatable by the State. Similarly, in Sri Adi Visheshwara (1997), the U.P. Act providing for state management of the Kashi Vishwanath Temple was upheld to ensure efficient administration and protect temple properties.

The State's power to intervene in cases of financial irregularities is also recognized. The snippet from Govt. Of A.P And Others v. G.V.K Girls High School (Supreme Court Of India, 2000), though pertaining to educational institutions, illustrates a general principle where government intervention is permissible if an institution "is guilty of falsification of registers, of misuse of funds for purposes other than those for which they are collected." The Delhi High Court in Mool Chand Khairati Ram Trust Petitioner v. Union Of India (Delhi High Court, 2014) emphasized that land allotted to charitable institutions at special rates should be used for the specified purpose, and conditions should be insisted upon "to prevent any possible abuse," such as restricting residential buildings.

However, the state's power is not unbridled. As affirmed in Shirur Mutt (1954) and reiterated in MUBEEN FAROOQI v. STATE OF PUNJAB AND OTHERS (Punjab & Haryana High Court, 2020), citing Ratilal Panachand Gandhi v. State of Bombay (1954 AIR SC 388), a law which takes away the right of administration from the hands of a religious denomination altogether and vests it in any other authority would amount to a violation of Article 26(d). The state can regulate administration and control wasteful expenditure but must leave the right of administration to the religious denomination itself, in accordance with law.

Misuse for Political Ends

The prohibition of using religious institutions for political purposes, as mandated by Section 3 of the 1988 Act, is a critical safeguard for secular democracy. The Supreme Court's decision in Abhiram Singh v. C.D Commachen (Dead) By Legal Representatives And Others (2017 SCC 2 629), interpreting Section 123(3) of the Representation of the People Act, 1951, broadly held that any appeal to voters on grounds of religion, race, caste, community, or language of the candidate or their rival constitutes a corrupt electoral practice. This judgment reinforces the principle that religion should be insulated from the electoral process, thereby preventing its misuse for political leverage, which can indirectly involve religious institutions.

Promoting Communal Disharmony

Section 6 of the 1988 Act directly addresses the misuse of religious institutions for activities that promote disharmony or ill-will. This provision complements various sections of the Indian Penal Code, 1860, such as Sections 153A, 153B, 295A, and 505, which penalize acts promoting enmity between groups and outraging religious feelings. The Supreme Court in Pravasi Bhalai Sangathan (2014) acknowledged the existence of these statutory provisions, including those in the 1988 Act, as tools to combat hate speech and divisive activities.

Internal Governance and Discriminatory Practices

While the primary focus of "prevention of misuse" often relates to external manifestations like political use or financial fraud, internal governance and practices can also come under scrutiny if they violate constitutional principles or public order. In N. Adithayan v. Travancore Devaswom Board And Others (2002 SCC 8 106), the Supreme Court upheld the appointment of a non-Brahmin priest, emphasizing merit and proper training over caste, thereby supporting state action aimed at social reform and preventing discriminatory practices within religious institutions. The challenge in Indian Young Lawyers Association And Others Petitioner(S) v. The State Of Kerala And Others (S). (2018 SCC ONLINE SC 1690) (Sabarimala case) against rules restricting entry of women to the temple, though complex, also touched upon whether certain practices within religious institutions could be deemed discriminatory and violative of fundamental rights, and thus a form of institutional failing if not misuse in the traditional sense.

Challenges and Limitations in Preventing Misuse

Despite the existing legal framework, preventing the misuse of religious institutions presents several challenges. Defining "misuse," "political purpose," or an activity "prejudicial to national integrity" can be complex and context-dependent, leading to difficulties in enforcement and potential for arbitrary action. Evidentiary burdens in proving such misuse, particularly covert activities, can be substantial.

A crucial challenge lies in striking the right balance between necessary state regulation and the constitutionally guaranteed autonomy of religious denominations to manage their own affairs in matters of religion (Article 26(b)). Overzealous state intervention can be perceived as an infringement on religious freedom, as cautioned in Shirur Mutt (1954) and Pannalal Bansilal Pitti (1996). The Andhra Pradesh High Court's observation in A.S Narayana Deekshitulu (1996) (snippet 2 from reference materials) highlights that acts regulating religious institutions often contain provisions (e.g., Sections 13, 142 of the A.P. Act) enjoining authorities not to interfere with forms, usages, ceremonies, and practices appropriate to the institution, underscoring this delicate balance.

The effectiveness of the 1988 Act also depends on the precise identification and accountability of the "manager and every person connected with such religious institution." As seen in several Karnataka High Court judgments (DEVANANDA (2019), SRI. RAVI v. STATE OF KARNATAKA (2023 KHC 30401), DODDANAGOUDA H PATIL v. STATE OF KARNATAKA (2023 KHC 30396)), if the accused do not fall squarely within this definition, prosecutions may fail. Furthermore, as highlighted in Shyamal Ranjan Mukherjee v. Nirmal Ranjan Mukherjee & Ors. (Allahabad High Court, 2007), religious institutions also face threats from external elements aiming to grab their properties, necessitating protective measures beyond merely preventing internal misuse.

Conclusion

The legal framework in India for preventing the misuse of religious institutions is multifaceted, rooted in constitutional principles of religious freedom and secularism, and operationalized through specific statutes like the Religious Institutions (Prevention of Misuse) Act, 1988, and broader regulatory laws concerning endowments and public order. The judiciary has played a vital role in interpreting these provisions, generally upholding the State's power to regulate secular aspects of religious institutions to curb financial malfeasance, political exploitation, and activities detrimental to communal harmony, while simultaneously striving to protect essential religious practices and the autonomy of religious denominations in their spiritual affairs.

The distinction between religious and secular activities remains the cornerstone of this regulatory paradigm. While the State is empowered to intervene decisively to prevent misuse of funds, property, and premises for proscribed activities, it must tread carefully to avoid encroaching upon the core religious freedoms guaranteed by the Constitution. The ongoing challenge lies in the effective and impartial enforcement of these laws, ensuring that religious institutions remain true to their spiritual and charitable purposes, free from exploitation and misuse, thereby contributing positively to the diverse and pluralistic society of India.