Preventing Misuse of Sacred Spaces: A Critical Appraisal of the Religious Institutions (Prevention of Misuse) Act, 1988

Preventing Misuse of Sacred Spaces: A Critical Appraisal of the Religious Institutions (Prevention of Misuse) Act, 1988

1. Introduction

Enacted in the aftermath of rising concerns that places of worship were being exploited for political, commercial and criminal purposes, the Religious Institutions (Prevention of Misuse) Act, 1988 (“RIPMA” or “the Act”) attempts to insulate sacred spaces from secular manipulation by criminalising specified forms of misuse. Although the legislative text is brief, its interface with Part III of the Constitution, the criminal law, and election law has generated significant interpretive questions. This article critically analyses the Act, situating it within the constitutional jurisprudence on religious freedom and State regulation, and evaluates its judicial application, particularly by the High Courts of Karnataka and the Supreme Court of India.

2. Legislative Background and Purpose

The Statement of Objects and Reasons attached to the Bill emphasised the need to prevent “desecration of the sanctity” of religious premises by prohibiting their use for “political, communal, unethical or other objectionable activities”. The Act therefore reflects a civil-order paradigm rather than a theological one: it is designed to protect public order, morality and the equal enjoyment of religious freedom guaranteed under Articles 25 and 26 of the Constitution.[1]

3. Statutory Architecture

3.1 Core Provisions

  • Section 3: Prohibits conversion of a religious institution into a venue for political activity, armed forces storage, communal disharmony, etc.
  • Section 4: Forbids utilisation for harbouring criminals or storing offensive weapons.
  • Section 5: Bans receipt of foreign contributions for activities contrary to the institution’s religious character.
  • Section 6: Disallows any form of canvassing for votes or political propaganda within or near the premises.
  • Section 7: Prescribes punishment—imprisonment up to five years and fine up to ten thousand rupees—for the manager and every person connected with the institution who contravenes Sections 3-6.

3.2 Interface with Other Statutes

(a) Disqualification for legislators under Section 8(1)(h) of the Representation of the People Act, 1951, is triggered upon conviction under Section 7 RIPMA, underscoring the Act’s electoral significance.[2]
(b) Sections 153-A, 295-A and 505 of the Indian Penal Code remain concurrently applicable where the prohibited acts also incite hatred or desecrate religious sites.[3]

4. Constitutional Context: Balancing Autonomy and Regulation

4.1 Doctrinal Foundations

The Supreme Court’s religious-freedom jurisprudence has consistently distinguished between essential religious practices—constitutionally immune from State interference—and secular or regulatory aspects of religion that remain amenable to legislation. Landmark pronouncements in Ratilal v. State of Bombay[4], Seshammal v. State of Tamil Nadu[5] and Church of God (Full Gospel) in India v. K.K.R. Majestic Colony[6] reaffirm that Articles 25 and 26 are subject to “public order, morality and health” and to “other provisions of this Part”. RIPMA squarely falls within this regulatory window.

4.2 Legitimate State Interest

The Act’s objectives—preventing communal disharmony, electoral malpractice and criminal misuse of sacred sites—constitute compelling State interests. The Supreme Court in Church of God upheld restrictions on loudspeakers within churches on similar grounds, holding that religious rights are not absolute and must yield to “reasonable regulations” protecting neighbourhood tranquility.[6] By analogy, RIPMA’s restraints on political canvassing inside temples, mosques and gurdwaras survive constitutional scrutiny as proportionate means to safeguard public order and electoral integrity.

5. Judicial Application and Emerging Trends

5.1 Supreme Court Endorsement: Lok Prahari v. Election Commission

In Lok Prahari the Court cited Section 7 RIPMA while interpreting statutory disqualifications for electoral candidates, implicitly acknowledging the Act’s role in maintaining the purity of the electoral process.[2]

5.2 Karnataka High Court’s Corrective Jurisprudence

A cluster of recent decisions reveals prosecutorial overreach in invoking Section 7 against political candidates or supporters who are not “managers” or otherwise “connected with” the religious institution as required by the Act. In Devananda v. State of Karnataka[7], Daddala Basanagouda v. State of Karnataka[8], Smt. Laxmi R. Hebbalkar v. State of Karnataka[9], Sri Ravi v. State of Karnataka[10] and Harsha @ Harishgouda v. State of Karnataka[11], the High Court quashed criminal proceedings on the ground that the accused were mere visitors or political actors; none had administrative authority over the institution. These rulings clarify that the mens legis is directed at custodians of religious sites rather than incidental users, thereby circumscribing the Act’s scope and preventing its misuse against lay worshippers or political rivals.

5.3 Comparative Insight: Property-Centric Statutes

Contrast may be drawn with eviction-oriented enactments such as the Punjab Religious Premises Eviction Act dealt with in Harbhajan Singh v. State of Punjab[12], where the legislature addresses unauthorised occupation rather than functional misuse. While both regimes regulate religious property, RIPMA uniquely targets the nature of activities, reflecting a functional rather than proprietary emphasis.

6. Critical Assessment

6.1 Strengths

  • Narrow tailoring: By confining penal liability to managers and connected persons, the Act respects congregational liberties and avoids over-criminalisation.
  • Electoral integrity: Alignment with the Representation of the People Act fosters cleaner electoral processes by deterring vote-solicitation in sacred precincts.
  • Complementarity: Operates harmoniously with IPC provisions and environmental regulations (e.g., noise-control rules affirmed in Church of God).

6.2 Weaknesses and Ambiguities

  • Definition of “connected with”: The term remains undefined, creating interpretive uncertainty that has facilitated misguided prosecutions, as evidenced in Karnataka cases.
  • Enforcement asymmetry: Sparse convictions and frequent quashings suggest that police lack clear operational guidelines, undermining deterrence.
  • Overlapping jurisdictions: Potential duplication with IPC Sections 153-A, 295-A and 505 may produce forum-shopping and selective prosecution.

6.3 Suggested Reforms

  1. Introduce an explanatory amendment defining “manager”, “person connected with” and “premises”, mirroring clarity found in the Punjab legislation examined in Harbhajan Singh.
  2. Incorporate a graded penalty structure recognising varying degrees of culpability (e.g., first-offence warnings, civil penalties) to promote proportionality.
  3. Mandate prior sanction by a designated magistrate for prosecution to minimise frivolous charges—a safeguard analogous to Section 196 CrPC for certain speech offences.

7. Conclusion

The Religious Institutions (Prevention of Misuse) Act, 1988 represents a constitutionally sound attempt to preserve the sanctity of places of worship against secular exploitation. Grounded in the “public order” and “morality” exceptions to Articles 25-26, it complements the broader statutory mosaic aimed at preventing communal disharmony and electoral impropriety. Yet, judicial experience demonstrates that the Act itself can be misapplied unless its terminology is construed narrowly and enforcement is disciplined. Legislative refinement and administrative guidelines—building on the interpretive insights of the Karnataka High Court—are therefore imperative to ensure that a statute designed to prevent misuse is not itself misused.

Footnotes

  1. Constitution of India, Arts. 25-26.
  2. Lok Prahari v. Election Commission of India, (2018) 18 SCC 114.
  3. Pravasi Bhalai Sangathan v. Union of India, (2014) 11 SCC 477.
  4. Ratilal Panachand Gandhi v. State of Bombay, AIR 1954 SC 388.
  5. Seshammal and Others v. State of Tamil Nadu, (1972) 2 SCC 11.
  6. Church of God (Full Gospel) in India v. K.K.R. Majestic Colony, (2000) 7 SCC 282.
  7. Devananda v. State of Karnataka, Crl.P 2077/2019 (Karnataka HC, 2019).
  8. Daddala Basanagouda v. State of Karnataka, Crl.P 1969/2021 (Karnataka HC, 2022).
  9. Smt. Laxmi R. Hebbalkar v. State of Karnataka, Crl.P 6712/2022 (Karnataka HC, 2023).
  10. Sri Ravi v. State of Karnataka, Crl.P 6950/2023 (Karnataka HC, 2023).
  11. Harsha @ Harishgouda v. State of Karnataka, Crl.P 201599/2024 (Karnataka HC, 2025).
  12. Harbhajan Singh v. State of Punjab, (2019) SC (unreported extract cited).