Case Title: Ghulam Hassan Beigh V. Mohammad Maqbool Magrey & Ors.
The Supreme Court stated that a trial court could not acquit the accused of murder based solely on a post-mortem report identifying "cardio-respiratory failure" as the cause of death.
"The post-mortem report does not, by itself, amount to substantial evidence. The only substantial evidence is the doctor's testimony in court," Justices AM Khanwilkar, Abhay S.Oka, and JB Pardiwala made this observation on the bench.
The Trial Court acquitted the defendant of the charge of murder on the grounds that the cause of death listed in the post-mortem report—"cardio-respiratory failure"—cannot be connected in any way to the alleged attack that was levelled against the victim. The Jammu and Kashmir High Court maintained this ruling and dismissed the initial complainant's revision plea. The trial court then charged the defendant with culpable homicide, a crime punishable under Section 304 of the IPC.
The Apex Court evaluated the legal position regarding the applicability of Sections 227 and 228 CrPC in the complainant's appeal. Referring to a number of past rulings, the bench noted:
"The trial court is enjoined with the duty to apply its mind at the time of framing of charge and should not act as a mere post office. The endorsement on the charge sheet presented by the police as it is without applying its mind and without recording brief reasons in support of its opinion is not countenanced by law. However, the material which is required to be evaluated by the Court at the time of framing charge should be the material which is produced and relied upon by the prosecution. The sifting of such material is not to be so meticulous as would render the exercise a mini-trial to find out the guilt or otherwise of the accused. All that is required at this stage is that the Court must be satisfied that the evidence collected by the prosecution is sufficient to presume that the accused has committed an offence. Even a strong suspicion would suffice. Undoubtedly, apart from the material that is placed before the Court by the prosecution in the shape of the final report in terms of Section 173 of CrPC, the Court may also rely upon any other evidence or material which is of sterling quality and has a direct bearing on the charge laid before it by the prosecution."
The bench noted that it would be necessary to make a determination based on the oral testimony of the eyewitnesses and the medical officer in question, or the expert witness who may be cross-examined by the prosecution as one of its witnesses, regarding whether the "cardio-respiratory failure" had any connection to the incident in question.
"The post-mortem report of the doctor is his previous statement based on his examination of the dead body. It is not substantive evidence. The doctor's statement in court is alone the substantive evidence. The post-mortem report can be used only to corroborate his statement under Section 157, to refresh his memory under Section 159, or to contradict his statement in the witness box under Section 145 of the Evidence Act, 1872. A medical witness called in as an expert to assist the Court is not a witness of fact and the evidence given by the medical officer is really of an advisory character given on the basis of the symptoms found on examination. The expert witness is expected to put before the Court all materials inclusive of the data which induced him to come to the conclusion and enlighten the Court on the technical aspect of the case by explaining the terms of science so that the Court although, not an expert may form its own judgment on those materials after giving due regard to the expert's opinion because once the expert's opinion is accepted, it is not the opinion of the medical officer but of the Court.", the bench said.
The bench added these observations while upholding the appeal:
“The prosecution would then not be able to present any additional evidence beyond the charge as framed after the trial court decides to absolve an accused of the offence punishable under Section 302 of the IPC and moves to frame the lesser charge for the offence punishable under Section 304 Part II of the IPC. Or, to put it another way, the prosecution will therefore be forced to act as though it only needs to make the case for culpable homicide, not murder. However, even if the trial court moves forward with charging the defendant under Section 302 IPC in accordance with the evidence presented by the prosecution, the accused would still have the opportunity to convince the court at the conclusion of the trial that the case only qualifies as culpable homicide punishable under Section 304 of the IPC. In these situations, and given the facts of the current case, it would be more sensible to let the prosecution submit pertinent evidence in line with the charge sheet's initial assertions. Such a trial court strategy occasionally could turn out to be more sensible and wiser.”