Plea of Ownership and Adverse Possession in Indian Law

Mutually Destructive or Permissibly Alternate? The Dichotomy of Pleading Ownership and Adverse Possession in Indian Law

Introduction

In the intricate realm of Indian property law, the pleas of ownership and adverse possession present a compelling jurisprudential paradox. On one hand, a plea of ownership is an assertion of a pre-existing, valid title. On the other, a plea of adverse possession is a confession and avoidance; it implicitly concedes the title of the 'true owner' but asserts that this title has been extinguished by the claimant's continuous, open, and hostile possession for the statutory period prescribed under the Limitation Act, 1963. The fundamental opposition between these two stances has led to the development of the "mutually destructive" doctrine, which posits that a litigant cannot simultaneously maintain both pleas. This article critically analyzes this doctrine, tracing its judicial evolution in India. It examines the stringent requirements for a plea of adverse possession, the rationale behind its perceived incompatibility with a claim of title, and the emerging nuances that permit these pleas to be raised in the alternative, thereby challenging the rigidity of the traditional rule.

The Foundational Principles of Adverse Possession

To comprehend the conflict, one must first understand the nature of adverse possession. It is a legal doctrine rooted in the principle that the law assists the vigilant, not those who sleep on their rights. Article 65 of the Limitation Act, 1963, provides a twelve-year period for a suit for possession of immovable property based on title, with the limitation period commencing "when the possession of the defendant becomes adverse to the plaintiff." This implies that if a true owner fails to eject a trespasser within twelve years of the possession becoming adverse, their right to recover the property is extinguished under Section 27 of the Act, and the possessor acquires a prescriptive title.

The Supreme Court of India has consistently held that the burden of proving adverse possession is onerous. The possession must be 'nec vi, nec clam, nec precario'—peaceful, open, and without permission (DADAN PRASAD v. THE STATE OF MADHYA PRADESH, 2024). The claimant must establish several facts:

The essential element is animus possidendi—the intention to possess the property as one's own, to the exclusion of all others, including the rightful owner (L.N Aswathama And Another v. P. Prakash, 2009). Mere long possession does not ripen into title; it must be coupled with a clear and unequivocal hostile intent (T. Anjanappa And Others v. Somalingappa And Another, 2006). The plea is not viewed with equity, as it seeks to defeat the rights of the true owner, and therefore, the facts constituting it must be pleaded and proved with precision (Harbans Kaur And Ors. v. Bhola Nath And Anr., 1994).

The Doctrine of Mutually Destructive Pleas

The Core Inconsistency

The central conflict arises from the inherent contradiction in the pleas. A claim of ownership is based on a derivative title (e.g., through sale, inheritance, or grant), implying the claimant holds the property rightfully. Conversely, a claim of adverse possession begins with a wrongful act—disseisin of the true owner. As the Delhi High Court observed in Bharat Bhushan Jain & Anr. v. Uoi & Ors. (2014), "the plea of ownership by purchase and the plea of ownership by adverse possession are not inconsistent stands but mutually destructive stands." The evidence required to prove one plea would necessarily disprove the other. To prove ownership by a sale deed, one affirms the validity of the transfer; to prove adverse possession, one must assert a possession hostile to the title of the transferor (or the true owner).

Judicial Affirmation of the Doctrine

Indian courts have frequently affirmed this doctrine. In Karnataka Board Of Wakf v. Government Of India And Others (2004), the Supreme Court held that the pleas of title and adverse possession are mutually exclusive. The Wakf Board could not claim the property as its own by dedication and simultaneously argue that it had acquired title by adverse possession against the government. Similarly, in Banarsi Dass v. Neel Kanth And Ors. (2008), the Punjab & Haryana High Court held that a plea of ownership based on a Will and a plea of adverse possession are "mutually destructive of each other." The court reasoned that in a plea of adverse possession, the ownership of the true owner is admitted, whereas a claim based on a Will asserts ownership devolving from the testator.

This principle also extends to situations where possession originates from a lawful arrangement. In Dagadabai (Dead) By Legal Representatives v. Abbas Alias Gulab Rustum Pinjari (2017), the defendant claimed ownership as an adopted son and, in the alternative, by adverse possession. The Supreme Court scrutinized both claims separately, highlighting the difficulty in reconciling a claim based on a legal right (inheritance) with one based on wrongful possession. Similarly, a person who enters possession permissively, such as a tenant or licensee, cannot claim their possession is adverse unless they can prove an "overt act" that demonstrates a clear and hostile repudiation of the owner's title from a specific date (D. THANIKKACHALAM v. M. KANNAIYA PADAYACHI, 2023; Deepak Kumar Mishra And Another v. Hemlata Bhutada, 2022).

Nuances and Alternate Pleas: A Divergent View?

While the "mutually destructive" doctrine is well-entrenched, its application is not absolute. Jurisprudence reveals a more nuanced approach, particularly when a claim of ownership is based on a defective or invalid title. The question arises: if a person takes possession under the bona fide belief of being the owner through a faulty instrument, is their possession permissive or hostile?

Possession Under an Invalid Title

The courts have recognized that possession under an invalid or void document of title can be adverse from its very inception. In such a scenario, the person possesses the property with the requisite animus possidendi, believing themselves to be the owner. If the document is later found to be invalid, their possession does not automatically become permissive; rather, it is considered hostile to the true owner. This allows for the pleading of ownership and adverse possession as alternative, rather than mutually destructive, claims. A litigant can plead: "I am the owner based on this sale deed. In the alternative, should this deed be found invalid, my open, continuous, and hostile possession since the date of the deed has perfected into title by adverse possession."

This approach finds support in cases like THE CORPORATION OF THE CITY OF BANGALORE v. SYED IQBAL HUSSAIN (2023), where the Karnataka High Court, referencing L.N. Ashwathamma, noted that a person claiming ownership under an invalid title can acquire title by adverse possession and that these can be alternate pleas. The possession is not based on the permission of the true owner but on a color of title, which provides the necessary hostile intent. This contrasts with the possession of a person under an agreement to sell who has not fulfilled their contractual obligations, as seen in Mohan Lal (Deceased) Through His Lrs. Kachru And Others v. Mirza Abdul Gaffar And Another (1996), where the nature of possession remains permissive until there is a clear repudiation.

Pleading Requirements and Adverse Possession as a "Sword"

The procedural rigor for pleading adverse possession is non-negotiable, regardless of whether it is a primary or alternative plea. The claimant must specify the exact date their possession became adverse, as this marks the starting point of the limitation period (Janatha Dal Party, Bangalore v. The Indian National Congress, 2013). Vague assertions of long possession are insufficient (Brundaban Ghanta & Another v. Nirasa Pati, 2018).

This procedural strictness is amplified by the landmark Supreme Court decision in Ravinder Kaur Grewal And Others v. Manjit Kaur And Others (2019). Overruling previous judgments, the Court held that adverse possession can be used not only as a "shield" by a defendant to protect their possession but also as a "sword" by a plaintiff to seek a declaration of title. A person who has perfected their title by adverse possession acquires a full and complete ownership right and can sue to eject even the erstwhile true owner. This development elevates the status of a title acquired by prescription, making it an affirmative cause of action. It reinforces the idea that an alternative plea of adverse possession is not merely a defensive tactic but a legitimate claim to title that can be adjudicated on its own merits if the primary plea of ownership fails.

However, this does not dilute the "mutually destructive" principle in its core context. A plaintiff cannot, for instance, claim to be the owner through inheritance from 'A' and simultaneously claim to have acquired title by adversely possessing against 'A'. The nuance lies in the context of a failed transactional basis for ownership, where the character of possession itself becomes the foundation for the alternative plea.

Conclusion

The relationship between a plea of ownership and a plea of adverse possession is a testament to the dynamic nature of property law. While the general rule that the two are "mutually destructive" remains a cornerstone of Indian jurisprudence, its application is not dogmatic. The courts have pragmatically distinguished between inconsistent pleas and permissible alternative pleas. A litigant cannot simultaneously claim a valid, pre-existing title and a title acquired by wrongful possession against the same person for the same period. However, a plea of ownership based on a specific transaction (like a sale or gift) can be pleaded in the alternative to a plea of adverse possession, especially where the transaction is found to be void or invalid. In such cases, the failed transaction provides the very evidence of animus possidendi required to establish hostile possession from the outset.

The evolution of adverse possession from a mere defense to a cause of action, as affirmed in Ravinder Kaur Grewal, further solidifies its status as a mode of acquiring title. Litigants must, however, navigate this complex terrain with precise pleadings, clearly demarcating their primary and alternative claims. The judiciary, in turn, must continue its careful balancing act, upholding the sanctity of true ownership while recognizing the legal consequences of long, undisturbed, and hostile possession, thereby ensuring that legal principles serve the ends of certainty, finality, and justice.