Perjury and the Administration of Justice: A Critical Analysis of Section 191 of the Indian Penal Code

Perjury and the Administration of Justice: A Critical Analysis of Section 191 of the Indian Penal Code

Introduction

Section 191 of the Indian Penal Code (IPC), 1860, provides the statutory definition of “giving false evidence.” Although only forty-nine words in length, the provision underpins the integrity of India’s justice system by criminalising deliberate falsehoods uttered under oath. Recent judicial pronouncements illustrate both the doctrinal complexity and the practical difficulties in prosecuting perjury. Drawing upon leading Supreme Court cases—including Baban Singh v. Jagdish Singh[1], Sachida Nand Singh v. State of Bihar[2], and Iqbal Singh Marwah v. Meenakshi Marwah[3]—this article undertakes a critical examination of Section 191 IPC, its interaction with cognate provisions (Sections 192–199 IPC) and procedural gateways under the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (CrPC), notably Sections 195 and 340.

Statutory Framework

The Text and Essential Ingredients

Section 191 IPC punishes a person who, “being legally bound by an oath or by an express provision of law to state the truth, makes any statement which is false and which he either knows or believes to be false or does not believe to be true.” The provision therefore contemplates three cumulative elements:

  • Legal Binding to Speak Truth – arising from oath, affirmation, or statutory obligation;
  • False Statement of Fact – a factual assertion, not opinion;
  • Mens rea – knowledge of falsity or absence of belief in the statement’s truth.

Punishment is prescribed under Section 193 IPC (imprisonment up to seven years and fine). Fabrication of evidence is addressed by Section 192 IPC and is equally punishable under Section 193. The procedural filter is supplied by Section 195(1)(b)(i) CrPC, which bars courts from taking cognisance save on a complaint by the court where the offence is committed.

Affidavits as “Evidence”

Both the Supreme Court and several High Courts have consistently affirmed that an affidavit qualifies as “evidence” for the purpose of Section 191 IPC[4]. Consequently, a false statement in an affidavit filed in judicial proceedings attracts criminal liability, subject to the Section 195/340 gateway.

Doctrinal Concerns and Judicial Interpretation

Relationship with Sections 192–199 IPC

The Supreme Court in Baban Singh clarified that where an affidavit is sworn, the offence ordinarily falls under Sections 191 and 192, not Section 199 IPC, because the deponent is “legally bound” to state the truth.[1] This distinction determines both the applicable punishment and the procedural route for prosecution (Section 479-A CrPC, now Section 195/340).

Procedural Prerequisites under Sections 195 and 340 CrPC

The prophylactic purpose of Section 195 CrPC—preventing vexatious private prosecutions—has spawned substantial litigation. Sachida Nand Singh and Iqbal Singh Marwah together establish a bright-line temporal test: the bar applies only when the forgery or false evidence is committed after the document enters “custodia legis.”[2][3] Accordingly, pre-litigation perjury may be prosecuted by private complaint; once committed in court, a complaint by that court is indispensable. The corollary is that perjury within proceedings demands a preliminary inquiry under Section 340 CrPC, as reaffirmed in Pritish v. State of Maharashtra[5].

Affidavit-Based Perjury and Contempt Nexus

In R. Karuppan, Advocate, In re, the Supreme Court resorted to suo motu contempt jurisdiction to punish a litigant for filing a false affidavit, while simultaneously directing prosecution under Section 193 IPC[6]. The judgment underscores the judiciary’s dual arsenal—contempt and perjury—to safeguard the truth-finding function.

Analysis of Select Reference Materials

Baban Singh v. Jagdish Singh (1966)

The Court held that prosecution for false affidavits must proceed under the special mechanism of Section 479-A CrPC (now Section 195/340), rendering a prosecution under the general Section 476 CPC invalid. The decision illustrates the jurisprudential preference for procedure-specific channels when false evidence is alleged in ongoing litigation.[1]

Sachida Nand Singh (1998) and Iqbal Singh Marwah (2005)

These decisions narrowed the reach of Section 195(1)(b)(ii) CrPC, thereby permitting private prosecutions where the forgery or falsehood predates court proceedings. The judgments balance the need to protect judicial proceedings from harassment against the imperative of providing redress to victims of pre-litigation fraud.[2][3]

Pritish v. State of Maharashtra (2001)

The Supreme Court clarified that an alleged perjurer is not entitled to a pre-complaint hearing during the Section 340 inquiry; natural justice is satisfied at the stage of trial before the Magistrate.[5] The ruling accelerates the initiation of perjury prosecutions but has been critiqued for potential over-reliance on judicial discretion.

High Court Perspectives

  • Madras High Court. In Sugesan Finance Investment v. Mulji Metha & Sons, the Court emphasised the necessity of prompt action under Section 340 to deter perjury, citing Karuppan.[7]
  • Bombay High Court. New World Resources v. Mahesh Parekh reiterates that the Section 340 inquiry is limited to deciding expediency of prosecution and does not conclude guilt.[8]

Contemporary Challenges

Evidentiary Complexity and Technological Advances

Digital affidavits, electronic signatures, and remote testimonies raise novel issues about administering oaths and verifying authenticity, thereby complicating the mens rea analysis under Section 191 IPC.

Under-Enforcement and Judicial Reluctance

Despite stern dicta, empirical studies reveal low conviction rates for perjury in India. Courts often prefer to decide civil or criminal liability on merits rather than initiate collateral criminal proceedings. This reluctance may stem from concerns about prolonging litigation and burdening dockets.

Policy Considerations

  • Deterrence versus Judicial Economy. Excessive use of perjury prosecutions risks transforming every factual dispute into parallel criminal proceedings.
  • Codification of Guidelines. A structured checklist—possibly via High Court rules—could harmonise the exercise of discretion under Section 340 CrPC.
  • Alternative Sanctions. Monetary penalties and adverse cost orders may serve as intermediate measures before resorting to criminal law.

Conclusion

Section 191 IPC occupies a pivotal—but under-utilised—space in Indian criminal jurisprudence. The provision’s effectiveness is contingent on the judiciary’s willingness to deploy the procedural machinery of Sections 195 and 340 CrPC. Landmark rulings from Baban Singh to Iqbal Singh Marwah delineate a nuanced framework that seeks to balance access to justice with the sanctity of truth in judicial proceedings. Going forward, clear institutional guidelines and judicious yet firm enforcement can revitalise Section 191 as a potent guardian of veracity in India’s courts.

Footnotes

  1. Baban Singh and Anr v. Jagdish Singh & Ors., AIR 1967 SC 68.
  2. Sachida Nand Singh & Anr v. State of Bihar & Anr., (1998) 2 SCC 493.
  3. Iqbal Singh Marwah & Anr v. Meenakshi Marwah & Anr., (2005) 4 SCC 370.
  4. In re Suo Motu Proceedings against R. Karuppan, Advocate, (2001) 5 SCC 289; see also Plachem Industries v. Premo Leasing, (2005) Guj HC.
  5. Pritish v. State of Maharashtra & Ors., (2002) 1 SCC 253.
  6. Supra note 4.
  7. Sugesan Finance Investment v. Mulji Metha & Sons, 1989 Mad HC.
  8. New World Resources v. Mahesh S. Parekh, 2019 Bom HC.