Pendente Lite Purchasers under Indian Law: Doctrine, Rights, and Procedural Dynamics

Pendente Lite Purchasers under Indian Law: Doctrine, Rights, and Procedural Dynamics

Introduction

The expression “pendente lite purchaser” denotes a transferee who acquires an interest in immovable property while litigation concerning that property is pending. Such purchasers occupy a liminal position: the transfer in their favour is inter se valid, yet—by force of the doctrine of lis pendens embodied in Section 52 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882 (“TPA”)—it remains subordinate to the ultimate adjudication in the pending action. Indian courts have grappled with the precise contours of the rights, obligations and procedural status of pendente lite purchasers for over a century. This article offers a critical analysis of that jurisprudence, drawing upon recent Supreme Court authority (Vidur Impex, Thomson Press, Raj Kumar, Nawab John) and salient High Court decisions, while situating them within the broader statutory matrix of the TPA, the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (“CPC”), and the Specific Relief Act, 1963 (“SRA”).

Doctrinal Foundations: Section 52 TPA and Public Policy

Section 52 TPA codifies the Roman-law maxim ut lite pendente nihil innovetur, prohibiting parties from alienating property in dispute so as to prejudice the outcome of the litigation.[1] The provision does not render the transfer void; rather, it “subordinates” the transferee’s title to the decree in the suit (Nagubai v. Shama Rao, AIR 1956 SC 593). Consistent with its status as a rule of public policy, neither good faith nor consideration can immunise a transferee from its operation.[2]

Statutory Interface

  • CPC – Order 1 Rule 10 & Order 22 Rule 10: govern impleadment and devolution of interest.
  • CPC – Section 146: enables proceedings “by or against any person claiming under” a party, the principal gateway invoked by pendente lite purchasers seeking procedural standing.[3]
  • Specific Relief Act – Section 19(b): shields bona fide purchasers without notice from specific performance, thereby indirectly conditioning the effect of Section 52 in suits for specific performance.[4]
  • Order 21 Rules 98–102 CPC: regulate resistance in execution; a pendente lite transferee is treated as a judgment-debtor and cannot obstruct delivery of possession.[5]

Status and Rights of Pendente Lite Purchasers

Binding Effect of Decree

In Jayaram Mudaliar v. Ayyaswami (1972) 2 SCC 200 the Supreme Court reaffirmed that all forms of alienation—voluntary or involuntary—are fettered by Section 52.[6] Later cases, including T.G. Ashok Kumar v. Govindammal (2010) 14 SCC 370, reiterated that a pendente lite transferee acquires no independent right to resist the decree but may work out equities only at the stage of partition or in separate proceedings.[7]

Right of Impleadment

A doctrinal divergence persists as to whether impleadment is a matter of right. The governing principles can be synthesised as follows:

  1. The purchaser is a representative-in-interest of the transferor (Order 22 Rule 10 CPC) and may be joined at the court’s discretion (Amit Kumar Shaw v. Farida Khatoon, 2005 11 SCC 403).[8]
  2. Supreme Court’s “preponderance of opinion” favours liberal impleadment so that the purchaser may protect his investment (Nawab John v. V.N. Subramaniyam, 2012 7 SCC 738).[9]
  3. Where the transaction violates an injunction or is demonstrably clandestine, courts refuse impleadment as a matter of policy (Vidur Impex, 2012 8 SCC 384; Thomson Press, 2013 5 SCC 397).[10]

Procedural Capacities Once Impleaded

  • Defence on Merits: A pendente lite transferee may raise all defences available to his transferor (P. Saraswathi v. C. Subramaniam, 2013 Mad HC).[11]
  • Setting Aside Ex Parte Decree: In Raj Kumar v. Sardari Lal (2004) 2 SCC 601 the Supreme Court invoked Section 146 to confer locus to move an application under Order 9 Rule 13.[12]
  • Leading Evidence: High Courts have occasionally curtailed an impleaded transferee’s right to adduce independent evidence when the original defendant has elected to rest his case (Vijayalakshmi Leather Industries v. Narayanan, 2003 Mad HC).[13]

Execution-Stage Resistance

Order 21 Rule 102 CPC squarely bars a transferee pendente lite from resisting or obstructing execution, treating him as tantamount to a judgment-debtor.[14] The Supreme Court in Usha Sinha v. Dina Ram (2008) 7 SCC 144 emphasised that lis pendens renders such resistance legally untenable.[15]

Good-Faith Purchasers and the “Bona Fide” Exception

Section 19(b) SRA immunises purchasers who buy “in good faith and for value without notice” from decrees for specific performance. The Supreme Court reconciled this with Section 52 TPA in Thomson Press: where notice (actual or constructive) exists, the purchaser cannot claim the benefit. Conversely, Hardev Singh v. Gurmail Singh (2007) 2 SCC 404 applied Section 43 TPA to protect a bona fide purchaser misled by the transferor’s representation, illustrating that statutory estoppel may, in limited situations, trump the rigours of lis pendens.[16]

Effect of Injunctions and Contumacious Conduct

Transactions executed in the teeth of a subsisting injunction attract judicial opprobrium. In Vidur Impex, the Supreme Court held that transferees who defy injunctions are neither “necessary” nor “proper” parties and may even be subjected to appointment of a receiver to neutralise the alienation.[17] Thomson Press extended this logic, adding the transferee as a defendant to bind him by the decree but signalling that the sale was susceptible to being set aside on grounds of bad faith.[18]

Limitation and Adverse Possession

While Section 52 stays the hands of alienating parties, it does not suspend limitation periods. Rajender Singh v. Santa Singh (1973) 2 SCC 705 clarified that lis pendens does not toll limitation for adverse possession; thus, a co-sharer in peaceful, hostile possession may perfect title notwithstanding pending litigation.[19]

Emerging Trends in High Courts

  • The Karnataka High Court has underscored that Section 52 is “principle of public policy” and therefore knowledge or good faith is irrelevant (Sri C. Mahesh Kumar v. Bhagyavathi Narayan, 2018 KAR HC).[20]
  • The Telangana High Court in Dr. R. Pawan v. Bodda Jagadamba (2015) refused impleadment where the purchaser violated restraint orders, reiterating the punitive facet of the doctrine.[21]
  • Conversely, some benches continue to prefer liberal impleadment to avoid multiplicity and ensure representation (e.g., Lebaka Vijaya Bhaskar Reddy, 2013 AP HC).[22]

Critical Evaluation

Judicial treatment of pendente lite purchasers reveals a delicate balancing act between two competing objectives: (i) preserving the efficacy of the court’s process, and (ii) safeguarding transactional stability in the property market. The Supreme Court’s recent trajectory—particularly Thomson Press and Vidur Impex—leans towards a stricter, deterrence-oriented posture in the face of wilful defiance of injunctions. At the same time, decisions such as Nawab John espouse a pro-purchaser orientation grounded in procedural fairness. The reconciliation lies in a fact-sensitive approach: bona fide purchasers without notice are afforded protective mechanisms (e.g., Section 19(b) SRA, Section 43 TPA), whereas purchasers complicit in defeating the court’s jurisdiction are denied audience or substantive relief.

Recommendations for Law and Practice

  • Statutory reform could consider mandating registration of lis pendens notices, analogous to Section 64 of the Kerala Registration Act, thereby injecting transparency into the land records system.
  • Trial courts should consistently require disclosure of pending litigation in sale deeds executed during suit, reducing later factual disputes on notice.
  • Uniform procedural guidelines—perhaps as High Court rules—could clarify the stage and scope of evidence a pendente lite purchaser may lead once impleaded, mitigating inconsistencies illustrated by Vijayalakshmi Leather.

Conclusion

The jurisprudence on pendente lite purchasers underscores the Indian judiciary’s commitment to both procedural integrity and equitable justice. Section 52 TPA remains a cornerstone of property litigation, yet its interaction with the CPC and SRA demonstrates that the doctrine is neither inflexible nor absolute. Courts retain discretion—anchored in public policy—to mould reliefs, whether by liberal impleadment, denial of locus, or conditional protection of bona fide purchasers. A coherent application of these principles, complemented by minor legislative interventions, can harmonise the twin imperatives of finality in litigation and certainty in real estate transactions.

Footnotes

  1. Transfer of Property Act, 1882, s. 52.
  2. Sanjay Verma v. Manik Roy, (2006) 13 SCC 608.
  3. CPC, 1908, s. 146; Saila Bala Dassi v. Nirmala Sundari Dassi, AIR 1958 SC 394.
  4. Specific Relief Act, 1963, s. 19(b).
  5. Kadali Pullayya v. Kadali Narasanna, 2001 AP HC; CPC Order 21 Rule 102.
  6. Jayaram Mudaliar v. Ayyaswami, (1972) 2 SCC 200.
  7. T.G. Ashok Kumar v. Govindammal, (2010) 14 SCC 370.
  8. Amit Kumar Shaw v. Farida Khatoon, (2005) 11 SCC 403.
  9. A. Nawab John v. V.N. Subramaniyam, (2012) 7 SCC 738.
  10. Vidur Impex v. Tosh Apartments, (2012) 8 SCC 384; Thomson Press v. Nanak Builders, (2013) 5 SCC 397.
  11. P. Saraswathi v. C. Subramaniam, 2013 SCC OnLine Mad 81.
  12. Raj Kumar v. Sardari Lal, (2004) 2 SCC 601.
  13. Vijayalakshmi Leather Industries v. K. Narayanan, 2003 Mad HC.
  14. CPC Order 21 Rule 102; Usha Sinha v. Dina Ram, (2008) 7 SCC 144.
  15. Ibid.
  16. Hardev Singh v. Gurmail Singh, (2007) 2 SCC 404.
  17. Vidur Impex, supra note 10.
  18. Thomson Press, supra note 10.
  19. Rajender Singh v. Santa Singh, (1973) 2 SCC 705.
  20. Sri C. Mahesh Kumar v. Bhagyavathi Narayan, 2018 KAR HC.
  21. Dr. Rakurthi Pawan v. Bodda Jagadamba, 2015 Tel HC.
  22. Lebaka Vijaya Bhaskar Reddy v. Ambavaram Narayanamma, 2013 SCC OnLine AP 471.