Parrot-Like Statements in Indian Judicial Proceedings: Credibility, Admissibility, and the Demand for Independent Reasoning

Parrot-Like Statements in Indian Judicial Proceedings: Credibility, Admissibility, and the Demand for Independent Reasoning

1. Introduction

Indian courts repeatedly caution against “parrot-like statements” – oral or written assertions reproduced mechanically, without the speaker’s own knowledge, perception, or reasoning. Such statements arise in diverse contexts: witnesses coached to recite identical facts, investigating officers mechanically reproducing standard formulas, or quasi-judicial bodies issuing cryptic, copy-paste orders. This article critically examines the doctrinal treatment of parrot-like statements, traces their statutory foundation under the Indian Evidence Act, 1872 and the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (CrPC), and analyses leading authorities from the Supreme Court and High Courts. It argues that Indian jurisprudence disfavors mechanical repetition, valorises minor discrepancies as indicia of authenticity, and increasingly demands “speaking orders” that display independent application of mind.

2. Historical and Philosophical Antecedents

The metaphor of the caged parrot, unable to exercise autonomous thought, is not new to Indian legal discourse. Bal Gangadhar Tilak v. Emperor (1916) popularised Rabindranath Tagore’s allegory of the parrot choosing the comfort of a gilded cage over freedom, illustrating the loss of critical faculties under colonial rule[1]. Modern courts deploy the same imagery to censure evidence or orders that lack spontaneity or independent reasoning.

3. Statutory Framework

3.1 Indian Evidence Act, 1872

  • Section 3 defines “evidence” as all statements permitted or required to be made before the Court by witnesses, thereby anchoring credibility assessments.
  • Sections 137–139 (examination-in-chief, cross-examination, re-examination) enable testing of whether testimony is internally consistent or merely rehearsed.
  • Section 145 sanctions impeachment through prior inconsistent statements, a common technique to expose mechanical reproduction.
  • Sections 155 & 157 address corroboration and impeachment, permitting courts to appraise minor inconsistencies favourably while discounting parrot-like uniformity.

3.2 Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973

  • Section 161 statements to police are not substantive evidence; their authenticity is tested under Section 145 of the Evidence Act. Madras High Court has emphasised that identical 161 statements, “parrot-like” in tenor, may erode credibility[2].
  • Section 313 mandates direct dialogue with the accused. Rajasthan High Court decisions warn against perfunctory, formulaic questioning and against over-reliance on such answers divorced from other evidence[3].

4. Parrot-Like Testimony: Supreme Court Jurisprudence

4.1 State of H.P. v. Lekh Raj (2000)

The Court drew a sharp distinction between contradictions (fatal) and minor discrepancies (often hallmarks of truth). It held that “parrot-like statements are disfavoured” because spontaneous narration normally bears slight variation[4]. Uniformity beyond the ordinary signals tutoring.

4.2 Narayan Chetanram Chaudhary v. State of Maharashtra (2000)

Echoing Lekh Raj, the Bench reiterated that minor omissions do not taint testimony; rather, rigid consistency invites suspicion of parrot-like coaching[5].

4.3 Allarakha K. Mansuri v. State of Gujarat (2002)

While reversing an acquittal, the Supreme Court praised ocular witnesses who avoided mechanical reproduction, noting absence of “parrot-like statements” lent authenticity[6].

4.4 Epistemic Rationale

The common rationale is grounded in human psychology: honest witnesses rarely replicate language verbatim. Courts thus valorise natural variance as an indicium of credibility and treat parrot-like testimony as either coached or rehearsed, thereby attracting rigorous scrutiny under Sections 155 and 157 Evidence Act.

5. High Court Approaches

5.1 Witness Evidence

  • Orissa High Court in Sri Harasingh Charan Mohanty v. Surendra Mohanty (1973) discarded a series of “identical set-piece” testimonies that reflected ignorance of substance beyond rote reproduction[7].
  • Calcutta High Court decisions such as Rajesh Haldar v. State of W.B. (2015) rely on Lekh Raj to prefer natural discrepancies over parroted uniformity[8].
  • Delhi High Court in Sombir v. State (2018) criticised investigating officers who merely asserted that passers-by “refused to join” searches in identical language[9].

5.2 Statements under Section 161 CrPC

In Kaki Lova Kumar v. State of A.P. (2017) the Telangana High Court rejected a plea to quash charges noting that the allegation of “parrot-like 161 statements” was a trial issue; yet it accepted that, if proved, such mechanical uniformity could impeach reliability[10].

6. Parrot-Like Reasoning in Administrative and Quasi-Judicial Orders

6.1 Mandate for Speaking Orders

The Supreme Court’s decision in Kranti Associates v. Masood Ahmed Khan (2010) invalidated non-speaking, copy-paste orders of the National Consumer Disputes Redressal Commission, insisting that quasi-judicial authorities must provide “reasoned decisions” to satisfy principles of natural justice[11]. Parrot-like reproduction of prior findings without independent analysis violates Article 14.

6.2 Disciplinary and Tax Proceedings

Similarly, CESTAT in Union of India v. M.L. Capoor (2015) castigated an adjudication order as “grossly perverse” for offering only skeletal, repetitive reasoning[12].

6.3 Procedural Fairness in Public Employment

In State of Orissa v. Mamata Mohanty (2011) the Supreme Court emphasised that appointments made via perfunctory, non-transparent procedures – effectively parroting earlier selection notes – offend Articles 14 and 16[13].

7. Investigative Formalism and Mechanical Arrests

The metaphor extends to policing. In Arnesh Kumar v. State of Bihar (2014) the Court deplored routine arrests under Section 498-A IPC and mandated a check-list under Section 41 CrPC. Officers who arrest mechanically, without genuine application of mind, are deemed to act on “parrot-like” assumptions, violating personal liberty under Article 21[14].

8. Analytical Synthesis

8.1 Evidentiary Principles

  • Credibility Assessment: Courts weigh spontaneity, individual recollection, and minor inconsistencies favourably; verbatim uniformity triggers scepticism.
  • Hearsay v. Parroting: While hearsay concerns second-hand assertions, parrot-like statements are first-hand but lack genuine perception. Both suffer diminished probative value but on distinct rationales[15].
  • Omission–Contradiction Matrix: Under Section 145 Evidence Act, only material contradictions may impeach; minor omissions, if naturally occurring, strengthen credibility, whereas identical omissions across witnesses suggest coaching.

8.2 Procedural Dimensions

  • Section 161 CrPC: Courts scrutinise whether identical police statements result from coercion or tutoring; a proven taint can vitiate the trial.
  • Section 313 CrPC: Judges must avoid formulaic questioning; failure to put material circumstances individually may violate fair-trial rights.
  • Administrative Justice: Speaking-order doctrine combats bureaucratic parroting, ensuring accountability and facilitating appellate review.

8.3 Doctrinal Justification

The hostility to parrot-like expressions aligns with the constitutional mandate of reasonableness. Article 14’s non-arbitrariness principle, as elaborated in EP Royappa and Maneka Gandhi, demands rational nexus between facts and conclusions – unattainable where reasoning or testimony is a mere recital.

9. Recommendations

  1. Judicial Training: Trial judges should explicitly evaluate uniformity in witness testimony, recording reasons whenever evidence is discounted for parroting.
  2. Investigative Guidelines: Police manuals ought to caution officers against templated panchnamas and rote assertions about non-availability of public witnesses.
  3. Technology-Aided Recording: Audio-visual recording of witness interviews can reveal coaching and reduce mechanical reproduction.
  4. Drafting Standards for Orders: Tribunals should adopt structured formats compelling issues-based reasoning, thereby discouraging copy-paste dispositions.

10. Conclusion

From witness box to administrative file, the Indian legal system mistrusts words spoken or written without authentic thought. Supreme Court jurisprudence treats minor human errors as badges of truth while condemning robotic uniformity. Simultaneously, the demand for reasoned decisions combats parroting by public authorities. Upholding these standards not only preserves the probative integrity of evidence but also reinforces constitutional values of fairness, transparency, and rationality in the justice delivery system.

Footnotes

  1. Bal Gangadhar Tilak v. Emperor, Bombay High Court, 1916.
  2. Chinna Thimmappa v. Talukunta Timmappa, Madras High Court, 1928 (interpretation of “statement” under Section 161 CrPC).
  3. Shakir v. State of Rajasthan, Rajasthan High Court, 2023; Moinuddin v. State of Rajasthan, 2023; Parvez v. State of Rajasthan, 2023.
  4. (2000) 1 SCC 247.
  5. (2000) 8 SCC 457.
  6. (2002) 3 SCC 57.
  7. Supreme Court of India, 1973 decision (citation supra).
  8. Calcutta High Court, 2015.
  9. Delhi High Court, 2018.
  10. Telangana High Court, 2017.
  11. (2010) 9 SCC 496.
  12. CESTAT, 2015.
  13. (2011) 3 SCC 436.
  14. (2014) 8 SCC 273.
  15. Karri Simhachalam Naidu v. State of A.P., Telangana High Court, 2011 (discussion of hearsay doctrine).