Order VI Rule 15(4) CPC: Affidavits, Verification and Procedural Integrity in Indian Civil Litigation

Order VI Rule 15(4) CPC: Affidavits, Verification and Procedural Integrity in Indian Civil Litigation

Introduction

Order VI Rule 15 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (“CPC”) governs the verification of pleadings. Sub-rule (4), inserted by the Code of Civil Procedure (Amendment) Act 22 of 2002, obliges the pleader to file, in addition to ordinary verification, an affidavit in support of the pleadings. The amendment seeks to buttress the truth-telling function of pleadings, discourage frivolous litigation and facilitate expeditious adjudication.[1] This article critically analyses the statutory text, legislative intent, and judicial exposition of Order VI Rule 15(4), with particular attention to Salem Advocate Bar Association v. Union of India[2] and the subsequent controversy over its application to election petitions culminating in G.M. Siddeshwar v. Prasanna Kumar[3].

Statutory Framework and Legislative History

Order VI Rule 15 now reads, in relevant part:

“(1) Every pleading shall be verified at the foot by the party…
…
(4) The person verifying the pleading shall also file an affidavit in support of his pleadings.”[4]

Prior to 2002, the CPC required only verification. The Malimath Committee (1990) recommended reinforcing the sanctity of pleadings by introducing sworn affidavits; Parliament adopted the suggestion through the 2002 Amendment Act.[5] Unlike Order 6 Rule 17 (amendment of pleadings) which attracted immediate controversy, Rule 15(4) drew limited resistance, save for challenges on the ground that it imposed an onerous burden on litigants and risked criminal prosecution for perjury.

Constitutional Validation: Salem Advocate Bar Association (II)

In Salem Advocate Bar Association, T.N. v. Union of India (2005) 6 SCC 344, a Constitution Bench upheld the 1999 and 2002 amendments, including Rule 15(4). The Court reasoned that:

  • Affidavits promote truthful pleadings by imposing an additional moral and legal responsibility on deponents.[6]
  • The affidavit is not evidentiary in nature; cross-examination remains available at trial.[7]
  • Far from infringing Article 14, the requirement ensures equality by curbing fraudulent litigation that disproportionately harms bona fide litigants.

Crucially, the Court constituted the Jagannadha Rao Committee to prepare rules simplifying affidavit formats — recognising the need for practical guidance without diluting the mandate.[8]

Mandatory or Directory? – Analytical Parameters

Indian courts traditionally employ a “legislative intent” test, aided by the consequences of non-compliance, to classify procedural provisions as mandatory or directory.[9] While Rule 15(4) uses the imperative “shall”, its location in procedural law and the purpose of advancing justice invite a contextual reading. Analogous rulings on Order 8 Rule 1 (“written statement within 90 days”) treated the provision as directory, allowing judicial discretion to avoid injustice (Kailash v. Nanhku, 2005 4 SCC 480). The Supreme Court’s reasoning there — deterring delay without sacrificing substantive justice — is instructive for Rule 15(4).

Application beyond the CPC: Election Petitions

Dual Regime under the Representation of the People Act, 1951

Section 83(1)(c) of the Representation of the People Act, 1951 (“RP Act”) requires an election petition to be “signed and verified in the manner laid down in the CPC”. A proviso mandates an additional Form 25 affidavit when corrupt practice is alleged. The interpretive question: does Rule 15(4) compel another affidavit, or is Form 25 sufficient?

Jurisprudential Divergence

  • P.A. Mohammed Riyas v. M.K. Raghavan (2012) 5 SCC 511 held that two affidavits are compulsory — one under Rule 15(4), one under Form 25.[10]
  • The Karnataka High Court disagreed in Prasanna Kumar v. G.M. Siddeshwar (2010) 6 Kant LJ 78, treating Rule 15(4) as inapplicable where Form 25 is filed.[11]

Resolution by Three-Judge Bench: G.M. Siddeshwar v. Prasanna Kumar (2013) 4 SCC 776

Reconciling the conflict, the Supreme Court overruled P.A. Mohammed Riyas on this point and held:

  1. Section 83(1)(c) imports verification, not the additional affidavit obligation; therefore, Rule 15(4) is not mandatory for election petitions, save where corrupt practice is pleaded.[12]
  2. Even where required, substantial compliance suffices; defects are curable and do not ipso facto warrant dismissal.[13]

Subordinate courts have applied this ratio to Panchayat elections (Lokendra Singh v. State of U.P., 2023 All HC) emphasising curability.[14]

Curability, Sanctions and Judicial Discretion

Rule 15(4) sits within a matrix of procedural sanctions: Order 6 Rule 16 (striking out scandalous matter) and Section 35-A (compensatory costs) arm the court against false pleadings (T. Arivandandam v. T.V. Satyapal, 1977 4 SCC 467). However, Indian jurisprudence disfavors hyper-technical dismissals that defeat the “real controversy” test.[15] Thus courts routinely permit filing of belated affidavits, impose costs, or strike pleadings only where mala fides are patent.

Critical Evaluation

Order VI Rule 15(4) advances four normative goals:

  • Accuracy: By subjecting pleadings to the penalty of perjury, it incentivises candour.
  • Efficiency: Truthful pleadings narrow issues, dovetailing with ADR initiatives under Section 89 CPC highlighted in Salem Advocate.
  • Deterrence of Frivolity: Affidavits raise litigation costs for vexatious litigants.
  • Responsiveness: The curability doctrine balances procedural rigor with substantive justice.

Yet, concerns remain: rural litigants may struggle with affidavit formalities; notaries are prone to perfunctory attestation; and over-reliance on affidavits risks criminalising bona fide pleading errors. The Jagannadha Rao Committee’s model forms partially mitigate these hazards but require nationwide adoption.

Conclusion

Order VI Rule 15(4) embodies the legislature’s endeavour to inject veracity into civil litigation without erecting insurmountable technical barriers. The Supreme Court’s twin-track approach — validating the rule (Salem Advocate) while tempering its application through curability and context-sensitivity (Siddeshwar) — reflects a pragmatic balance between procedural discipline and access to justice. Future reforms should focus on standardised affidavit templates, digital verification mechanisms and judicial training to ensure the promise of Rule 15(4) translates into tangible enhancement of India’s civil justice system.

Footnotes

  1. Statement of Objects and Reasons, Code of Civil Procedure (Amendment) Bill, 1997.
  2. Salem Advocate Bar Association, T.N. v. Union of India (2005) 6 SCC 344.
  3. G.M. Siddeshwar v. Prasanna Kumar (2013) 4 SCC 776.
  4. Order VI Rule 15 CPC (as amended by Act 22 of 2002).
  5. Law Commission of India, 163rd Report (1998), para 19.
  6. Salem Advocate Bar Association, supra note 2, para 39.
  7. Id., para 40.
  8. Id., para 62.
  9. Raza Buland Sugar Co. v. Municipal Board, Rampur (1965) 1 SCR 970.
  10. P.A. Mohammed Riyas v. M.K. Raghavan (2012) 5 SCC 511.
  11. Prasanna Kumar v. G.M. Siddeshwar AIR 2010 Kant 113.
  12. Siddeshwar, supra note 3, paras 31–37.
  13. Id., paras 46–52.
  14. Lokendra Singh v. State of U.P., Writ-C 39558/2022 (All HC, 20 Jan 2023).
  15. T. Arivandandam v. T.V. Satyapal (1977) 4 SCC 467.