Order 37 Rule 2 CPC: Contemporary Judicial Approach to Summary Suits and Leave to Defend

Order 37 Rule 2 of the Code of Civil Procedure: Contemporary Judicial Approach to Summary Suits and Leave to Defend

Introduction

Order 37 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (CPC) establishes a summary procedure for expeditious adjudication of suits founded upon certain commercial instruments. Rule 2 is the fulcrum of this mechanism, prescribing the contours of suits on bills of exchange, hundis, promissory notes and other specified written contracts. While designed to curb dilatory tactics, Rule 2’s efficacy depends on a calibrated judicial balance between the plaintiff’s right to speedy recovery and the defendant’s right to due process. This article critically analyses the evolving Indian jurisprudence on Rule 2—particularly the principles governing leave to defend—by synthesising statutory text, legislative history and case law, with emphasis on recent Supreme Court pronouncements.

Statutory Framework

Rule 2(1) empowers a plaintiff to institute a summary suit where the claim is “upon a bill of exchange, hundi or promissory note, or for liquidated demand in money payable by written contract…”. Rule 2(3) mandates that the writ of summons highlight that it is under Order 37; failure to enter appearance within ten days entitles the plaintiff to an ex parte decree. The defendant who appears must subsequently apply for leave to defend under Rule 3, disclosing facts sufficient to entitle him to defend. The 1976–77 amendments introduced sub-rules 3(4)–(6), notably the second proviso to Rule 3(5) requiring deposit of the admitted amount as a pre-condition for defending that portion of the claim.

Historical Evolution and Legislative Intent

The pre-1976 scheme borrowed heavily from the English Order 14 procedure, but critiques of oppressive summary decrees prompted Parliament to temper rigidity. The Statement of Objects and Reasons to the 1976 Amendment underscores a dual objective: expedition in clear-cut cases and protection against abuse where bona fide defences exist. Consequently, while Rule 2 preserves the plaintiff’s procedural advantage, judicial discretion under Rule 3 was widened to mitigate harsh outcomes.

Judicial Construction of Order 37 Rule 2

Threshold Jurisdiction: Maintainability of the Summary Suit

Courts vigilantly scrutinise whether the cause of action falls within Rule 2. In Ge Capital Services v. May Flower Healthcare (2012, Del.) the High Court granted unconditional leave where the underlying agreement did not quantify a liquidated amount, holding that “arm-twisting” a defendant by invoking Order 37 in an ineligible suit is impermissible[1]. Likewise, Yogesh Vedpathak v. Ranjeet Singh Kaura (2018, Bom.) clarified that an oral agreement falls outside Rule 2, reaffirming the triad of requirements—concluded, written, and containing an express or implied promise to pay[2].

Parameters for Grant or Refusal of Leave to Defend

The seminal decision in Mechelec Engineers & Manufacturers v. Basic Equipment Corporation (1976 SCC 687) distilled the following matrix: (a) unconditional leave where the defence raises a triable issue, (b) conditional leave where the defence is plausible but improbable, and (c) refusal where the defence is sham, illusory or moonshine[3]. Subsequent rulings consistently invoke this taxonomy:

  • Raj Duggal v. Ramesh Kumar Bansal (1991 Supp (1) SCC 191) reiterated that leave must be refused only when the defence is “untenable and frivolous”, emphasising that the test is whether the facts, if proved, would disclose a “real issue”[4].
  • Sunil Enterprises v. SBI Commercial & International Bank (1998 5 SCC 354) exemplifies judicial reluctance to shut out a defence that is “not moonshine”, culminating in unconditional leave[5].
  • Conversely, Sushila Production Engineers v. SBI (1989, P&H) censured a trial court for denying leave without finding the defence frivolous, thereby reinforcing the high threshold for refusal[6].

Conditional Leave and the Deposit of Admitted Amounts

The 2008 Supreme Court decision in Southern Sales & Services v. Sauermilch Design reaffirmed the statutory imperative that a defendant who admits part of the claim must deposit that portion before contesting it[7]. The Court harmonised earlier precedents advocating unconditional leave on triable issues with the post-1977 statutory text, holding that the amendments create an exception for admitted claims. This reasoning aligns with earlier High Court authority permitting security as a condition precedent where justice so demands[8].

Special Categories: Indemnity Bonds, Corporate Guarantees, and Other Instruments

Rule 2’s ambit does not extend to every monetary instrument. In State Bank of Saurashtra v. Ashit Shipping Services (2002 4 SCC 736) the Supreme Court distinguished an indemnity bond from a guarantee, holding that the former falls outside Order 37; hence unconditional leave was warranted[9]. In IDBI Trusteeship v. Hubtown Ltd. (2017 1 SCC 568) enforcement of a corporate guarantee was amenable to Rule 2, yet the Court imposed conditions owing to dubious FEMA compliance, underscoring the flexible nature of judicial discretion post-amendment[10].

Procedural Nuances Under Rule 2

Timelines under Order 37 are strict. As elucidated in Print Pak Machinery v. Jay Kay Papers (1979, Del.), the 1976 reforms require only an appearance within ten days; the plaintiff must thereafter issue a summons for judgment, triggering the ten-day clock for seeking leave. Courts have occasionally condoned delay in appearance (Emkay Exports v.  Madhusudan Shrikrishna, 2008, Bom.), demonstrating that summary procedure does not eclipse equitable discretion under Rule 3(7) and Rule 4 (setting aside ex parte decrees on “special circumstances”)[11].

Comparative Insights and Interaction with Other CPC Provisions

Rule 2 operates in tandem with—yet distinct from—other procedural safeguards:

  • Order 19 (Affidavits): While affidavits commonly support summons for judgment, Ram Ekwal Thakur v. State of Bihar (1993, Pat.) underscores that Order 19 is an exception to the rule of viva voce evidence and must be sparingly invoked[12].
  • Order 2 Rule 2 (Bar against Split Claims): In ordinary suits, subsequent claims on the same cause of action may be barred. However, summary suits often relate to a discrete written instrument, mitigating overlap concerns (see Nirmal Singh v. Om Prakash, 2016, Del.)[13].

Policy Considerations and Recommendations

The jurisprudence demonstrates a conscious judicial endeavour to prevent the misuse of Order 37 without diluting its objective of swift recovery of undisputed debts. Two normative trends emerge:

  1. Courts steadfastly guard the defendant’s right to trial where a genuine, albeit thin, defence subsists, thereby preserving procedural fairness.
  2. Simultaneously, they have leveraged conditional leave—particularly security deposits—to deter dilatory tactics, consistent with the legislative intent embodied in the 1977 amendments.

To enhance uniformity, a consolidated Practice Direction could be issued under Order 37 Rule 7, enumerating factors for imposing conditions (nature of admission, quantum involved, solvency of defendant) and guidance on maintainability screening at the pre-admission stage.

Conclusion

Order 37 Rule 2 continues to be an effective procedural tool, provided courts exercise their discretion consonant with the Mechelec matrix, statutory amendments and constitutional imperatives of fairness. Recent apex-court jurisprudence—particularly Southern Sales, State Bank of Saurashtra and IDBI Trusteeship—has refined the contours of leave to defend, harmonising expedition with equity. Practitioners must therefore undertake a rigorous preliminary assessment of the instrument, admissions and potential defences before opting for or resisting the summary route. Judicial consistency in applying these principles will ensure that Rule 2 remains a guardian of commercial certainty rather than a gateway to procedural ambush.

Footnotes

  1. Ge Capital Services India v. May Flower Healthcare Pvt. Ltd., 2012 SCC OnLine Del 4378.
  2. Yogesh Babanrao Vedpathak v. Ranjeet Singh Kaura, 2018 SCC OnLine Bom 8930.
  3. Mechelec Engineers & Manufacturers v. Basic Equipment Corporation, (1976) 4 SCC 687.
  4. Raj Duggal v. Ramesh Kumar Bansal, 1991 Supp (1) SCC 191.
  5. Sunil Enterprises & Anr. v. SBI Commercial & International Bank Ltd., (1998) 5 SCC 354.
  6. Sushila Production Engineer Chandigarh v. State Bank of India, 1989 CURLJ 683 (P&H).
  7. Southern Sales & Services & Ors. v. Sauermilch Design & Handels GmbH, (2008) 14 SCC 457.
  8. Sardari Lal Gulzari Lal v. Gokal Chand Rattan Chand, AIR 1972 P&H 240.
  9. State Bank of Saurashtra v. Ashit Shipping Services (P) Ltd., (2002) 4 SCC 736.
  10. IDBI Trusteeship Services Ltd. v. Hubtown Ltd., (2017) 1 SCC 568.
  11. Emkay Exports & Anr. v. Madhusudan Shrikrishna, 2008 SCC OnLine Bom 135.
  12. Ram Ekwal Thakur v. State of Bihar, 1993 (2) BLJ 285 (Pat).
  13. Nirmal Singh (since deceased) v. Om Prakash, 2016 SCC OnLine Del 5896.