4. Judicial Pronouncements

4.1 Impotence and Decrees of Nullity

• Moina Khosla v. Amardeep Singh Khosla (Delhi HC, 1986): annulment granted; court reiterated the “ordinary and complete intercourse” test and accepted husband’s confession of incapacity.
• Sadhana Satish Kolvankar v. Satish Kolvankar (Bom HC, 2004): both nullity and divorce granted; medical evidence established wife’s vaginismus resulting in non-consummation.
• Renuka v. Rajendra Hada (Raj HC, 2007): refusal to submit to medical examination permitted adverse inference; impotence need not be absolute but must obstruct consummation with the petitioner.
• <a href="/judgement/in/5608f9ade4b0149711145910" target="_blank">P v. K (Bom HC, 1981) and A v. B (Bom HC, 1952): affirm that even abnormal morphology or painful coitus may constitute impotence.

4.2 Wilful Refusal under the SMA

In Jean Emeline Thavamaki v. Joseph Taylor (Madras HC, 1965) the Court lamented the absence of a parallel provision in the Indian Divorce Act and clarified that persistent refusal, if bona fide, may permit an inference of incapacity where medical proof is withheld.

4.3 Non-Consummation as Mental Cruelty

• Vinita Saxena v. Pankaj Pandit (SC, 2006): held that non-consummation by itself constitutes mental cruelty^[1]; divorce granted under Section 13(1)(i-a) HMA.
• Samar Ghosh v. Jaya Ghosh (SC, 2007): enumerated illustrative instances of cruelty, including unilateral denial of cohabitation; emphasised cumulative impact.
• Mamta Goyal v. Ramgopal (Raj HC, 2011) and X v. Y (Bom HC, 2014): reiterated that prolonged abstention or false allegations surrounding consummation aggravate mental cruelty.
• Ravinder Kaur v. Manjeet Singh (SC, 2019): cautioned that allegations must be substantiated; underscores need for concrete evidence—a principle equally applicable to claims of non-consummation.

4.4 Interplay with Irretrievable Breakdown

Although irretrievable breakdown is not yet a statutory ground for divorce (cf. Law Commission Report 71), courts increasingly rely on extended non-cohabitation plus mental cruelty to dispense relief, thereby obliquely addressing breakdown without formal legislative sanction.

5. Procedural and Evidentiary Complexities

5.1 Burden and Standard of Proof

The petitioner carries the burden of proof on a preponderance of probabilities, but given the grave personal implications, courts expect “clear, cogent and convincing” evidence^[10]. Where the respondent advances a false plea of consummation, courts have drawn adverse inferences of impotence^[11].

5.2 Medical Examination and Privacy

Courts may direct medical evaluation provided Article 21 privacy concerns are balanced against the petitioner’s right to relief (Renuka, supra). Non-compliance justifies adverse inference, yet examination must be ordered only on a strong prima facie case^[12].

5.3 Presumptions Under the Evidence Act

Section 114 permits the court to presume facts consistent with human conduct. Thus, cohabitation for an extended period without sexual relations—absent medical evidence to the contrary—can support a conclusion of impotence or wilful refusal^[13].

6. Normative Assessment and Law Reform

The dichotomy between impotence-based nullity (HMA) and refusal-based nullity (SMA) generates inconsistent outcomes for similarly situated spouses. Parliament may consider harmonising the statutes by:

• Inserting wilful refusal as an independent ground under Section 12 HMA;
• Clarifying whether psychological impotence (e.g., vaginismus) squarely falls within the provision;
• Introducing “irretrievable breakdown” to obviate doctrinal contortions that force parties into cruelty arguments.

Additionally, guidelines regulating medical examinations, confidentiality of intimate evidence, and expedited hearings would mitigate the emotional toll on litigants.

7. Conclusion

Indian jurisprudence reflects a gradual but discernible shift from a strictly physiological understanding of non-consummation towards a more holistic appraisal encompassing volition, mental cruelty, and marital autonomy. While statutory text still privileges impotence as the linchpin for nullity under the HMA, the Supreme Court’s cruelty jurisprudence ensures that prolonged denial of conjugal relations does not go without remedy. A coherent legislative framework aligning the HMA with the SMA, coupled with procedural safeguards, would bring doctrinal clarity and safeguard fundamental marital rights.

Footnotes

1. Vinita Saxena v. Pankaj Pandit, (2006) 3 SCC 778.
2. Samar Ghosh v. Jaya Ghosh, (2007) 4 SCC 511.
3. Smt Indu Kumari Pathak v. Dr S.K. Pathak, 1982 (50) Raj LR — interpreting post-1976 text.
4. See Jean Emeline Thavamaki v. Joseph Taylor, 1965 Mad LJ (Mad HC).
5. T.K. Moidu Haji v. Konnapalarkandy Mariyam, 2006 SCC OnLine Ker 514.
6. Moina Khosla v. Amardeep Singh Khosla, Delhi HC, 1986.
7. Mrs Manjula S. Deshmukh v. Suresh Deshmukh, Delhi HC, 1978.
8. Samar Roy Chowdhury v. Snigdha Roy Chowdhury, Cal HC, 1976.
9. Yuvraj Digvijay Sinhji v. Yuvrani Pratap Kumari, (1970) 1 SCC 288.
10. Sadhana Satish Kolvankar v. Satish Kolvankar, 2004 SCC OnLine Bom 597.
11. Smt Kamla v. Jagdeesh Prasad, 1985 Raj HC.
12. Renuka v. Rajendra Hada, (2007) 2 Raj LJ — medical examination principles.
13. Smt Gitika Bagchi v. Subhabrota Bagchi, Cal HC, 1995 (discussion on presumptions).