Case Title: Patricia Mukhim v. State Of Meghalaya And Others
The Supreme Court dismissed an FIR filed against Shillong Times Editor Patricia Mukhim in connection with a Facebook post about violence against non-tribal people in Meghalaya.
Mukhim's appeal against the Meghalaya High Court ruling, denying her request to quash the FIR was approved by the Court.
The bench, which included Justices L. Nageswara and S. Ravindra Bhat, noted that the Facebook post was directed at the Chief Minister of Meghalaya, the Director General of Police, and the Dorbar Shnong of the area for failing to take action against the perpetrators who attacked the non-tribal youngsters.
Mukhim's appeal against the Meghalaya High Court ruling denying her request to quash the FIR was granted. Referring to Sections 153 A and 505 (1) (c) of the Indian Penal Code, the bench stated that the law must intervene only when written or spoken comments have the potential to cause a public commotion, disturb law and order, or affect public peace.
The Court also stated the absolutely necessary ingredients that make up for an offence under Section 153-A. The essence of the offence under Section 153-A IPC is the intention to promote feelings of enmity or hatred between different classes of people. Such intention has to be inferred primarily from the tone of language used and the circumstances under which it was written and published. One should read the entire matter complained of within the ambit of section 153-A to get the right context instead of relying on isolated sentences and quoting them out of context to prove a charge under the aforementioned section
The Court further relied on other significant ruling and stated that, "In Bilal Ahmed Kaloo v. State Of A.P .. (1997) 7 SCC 431, this Court analysed the ingredients of Sections 153 A and 505(2) IPC. It was held that Section 153 A covers a case where a person by “words, either spoken or written, or by signs or by visible representations”, promotes or attempts to promote feeling of enmity, hatred or ill will. Under Section 505(2) promotion of such feeling should have been done by making a publication or circulating any statement or report containing rumour or alarming news. Mens rea was held to be a necessary ingredient for the offence under Section 153 A and Section 505(2)."
The bench specifically cited a Canadian Supreme Court decision [Saskatchewan (Human Rights Commission) v. Whatcott] that explained a workable approach in interpreting "hatred" as used in legislative provisions prohibiting hate speech. The court noted while allowing the appeal:
"The first test was for the Courts to apply the hate speech prohibition objectively and in so doing, ask whether a reasonable person, aware of the context and circumstances, would view the expression as exposing the protected group to hatred. The second test was to restrict the interpretation of the legislative term "hatred" to those extreme manifestations of the emotion described by the words "detestation" and "vilification". This would filter out and protect speech which might be repugnant and offensive, but does not incite the level of abhorrence, delegitimization and rejection that risks causing discrimination or injury. The third test was for Courts to focus their analysis on the effect of the expression at issue, namely, whether it is likely to expose the targeted person or group to hatred by others. Mere repugnancy of the ideas expressed is insufficient to constitute the crime attracting penalty."