Mizo Customary Law: Contemporary Judicial Approaches and Constitutional Interface

Mizo Customary Law: Contemporary Judicial Approaches and Constitutional Interface

Introduction

Mizoram’s legal landscape is distinctive within India owing to the continued vitality of Mizo customary law, applied through a multi-tiered system of Village Courts, Subordinate and District Council Courts constituted under the Sixth Schedule to the Constitution. While the bulk of Mizo custom remains uncodified, a sizeable corpus has been judicially recognised, particularly in the sphere of inheritance. Recent decisions of the Supreme Court and the Gauhati High Court underscore both the resilience of custom and the judiciary’s increasing reliance on constitutional values of justice, equity and good conscience when assessing its validity. This article critically analyses the substantive and procedural dimensions of Mizo customary law, drawing extensively upon contemporary case-law and statutory instruments.

Historical and Constitutional Context

Sixth Schedule Framework

Paragraphs 3, 4 and 18 of the Sixth Schedule empower Autonomous District Councils to constitute courts and legislate on matters of customary law. Upon such constitution, the Governor’s powers under para 19 cease, and Acts of Parliament apply only where the President so directs under para 12-A (J. Thansiama, 2016)[1]. The Lushai Hills Autonomous District (Administration of Justice) Rules, 1953 (“1953 Rules”) operationalise this framework, mandating that District Council Courts decide cases “according to law, justice, equity and good conscience” rather than custom alone (r. 46(1))[2].

Pre-Independence Foundations

The 1937 “Rules for the Regulation of the Procedure of Officers Appointed to Administer Justice in the Lushai Hills” introduced principles such as the close following of the Limitation Act, 1908 in disputes involving non-tribals (r. 21). Although expressly repealed to the extent of overlap by the 1953 Rules (r. 59), they remain historically significant in illustrating the gradual accommodation of general law within a customary paradigm (Smt. Hmangaihzuali, 2003)[3].

Foundational Principles of Mizo Customary Law

Sources and Nature

  • Oral Custom—validated by consistent community practice.
  • Coded Digests—e.g., the Mizoram District Council’s 1957 English translation (amended 1960), frequently cited by courts for rules on marriage, divorce and inheritance (Thansiami v. Lalruatkima, 2011)[4].
  • Judicial Precedent—because the hierarchy of courts under the 1953 Rules subjects customary principles to appellate scrutiny culminating in the Gauhati High Court and, where constitutional issues arise, the Supreme Court.

The courts have consistently held that custom must not contravene “justice, equity or good conscience”, echoing the common-law test employed nationwide (cf. Ass Kaur v. Kartar Singh, 2007)[5].

The Law of Inheritance

Patrilineal Core Rule

Classical Mizo custom vests the bulk of a deceased male’s property in his kan melkhat (usually the youngest son). The Gauhati High Court has described this as an “explicit” exclusion of women when a son survives (Ralliani v. Kaithuami, 2008)[6]. Subsequent decisions reaffirm the rule’s rigidity: Master Zosangpuia (2017) held that the sole son inherits to the exclusion of all daughters, while Lalzarliana v. Lalfakawmi (2016)[7] treated the rule as the starting point even where the property was covered by a Land Settlement Certificate (LSC).

Equitable Exceptions: “Chawmhlum Rokhawm”

Notwithstanding the patrilineal norm, Mizo custom embeds an equitable doctrine—Chawmhlum Rokhawm—allowing the person who supports the deceased in old age to succeed irrespective of bloodline. Justice M. Lokur (as he then was) affirmed its validity in Thansiami v. Lalruatkima (2012 2 Gau LR 309), emphasising the moral duty of support. The Supreme Court’s recent decision in Kaithuami v. Ralliani (2022)[8] endorsed this principle, dividing property between the widowed daughter-in-law and the divorced youngest daughter who had cared for the mother, thereby demonstrating that support-based succession may override even a surviving male line.

Widows and Daughters

The judicial trend reflects a gradual expansion of women’s inheritance rights within the framework of custom:

  • Ri Sawiluaia v. Ngurbiakveli (1982) recognised the widow’s right to her husband’s service benefits, rejecting the father-in-law’s exclusive claim.
  • Germanthangi v. F. Rokunga (2003) upheld the wife’s right to a share in matrimonial property upon “abandonment”.
  • Lalzarliana (2016) noted that custom is silent on distribution of property standing in a woman’s own name, implying scope for female succession.

These decisions reveal a purposive reading of custom, harmonising it with Article 14’s guarantee of equality.

Procedural Architecture and Forum Hierarchy

Jurisdiction over customary disputes is stratified:

  1. Village Courts (r. 6, 1953 Rules).
  2. Subordinate District Council Courts (r. 7).
  3. District Council Court (r. 10) – final fact-finding forum.
  4. Gauhati High Court – second-appeal jurisdiction under clause 3 of the Assam High Court (Jurisdiction over District Council Courts) Order, 1954, irrespective of a substantial question of law, provided the valuation threshold of ₹1,000 is met (Thansiami, 2011; Lalramchhani, 2002)[9].

In Smt. Hmangaihzuali (2003), the High Court emphasised that limitation principles, though not statutorily applicable, should be “closely followed”, reinforcing procedural regularity. Meanwhile, Union Territory of Mizoram v. C. Lalthanpara (1983)[10] clarified that Village Courts lack jurisdiction over suits involving non-tribals or the State.

Applicability of General Statutes

The Supreme Court in J. Thansiama (2016)[1] held that the 1963 Limitation Act applies proprio vigore to Mizoram in the absence of a Presidential notification to the contrary, rejecting reliance on pre-Statehood notifications. The High Court has likewise resisted arguments that national labour or social-welfare legislation is ipso facto excluded from tribal areas (L. Biakchhunga, 2005)[11]. These rulings demonstrate that customary autonomy co-exists with, rather than displaces, general law unless expressly exempted.

Custom, Fundamental Rights and Non-State Actors

Judicial willingness to scrutinise customary practices against constitutional norms is evident in Lalringzovi v. State of Mizoram (2019)[12], where the High Court restrained community organisations from evicting a woman for marrying a non-Mizo, invoking Articles 19 and 21. The decision affirms that custom cannot legitimise violations of fundamental rights, and that the State bears an affirmative duty to curb vigilante enforcement of customary sanctions.

Comparative Perspective

Customary systems elsewhere in India, such as the Punjab Zimindara custom recognised in Ass Kaur (2007), are tolerated only when consonant with “justice, equity or good conscience”. This mirrors the evaluative standard applied to Mizo custom, suggesting a pan-Indian doctrine whereby the legitimacy of any custom—local, class or family—is contingent upon its normative compatibility with constitutional and statutory law.

Critical Evaluation and Prospects for Reform

Three themes emerge:

  1. Judicial Equity – Courts increasingly temper rigid patrilineal rules with equitable considerations, expanding women’s inheritance rights without formally abrogating custom.
  2. Need for Codification – Fragmentary digests lack legislative force, causing uncertainty; a democratically enacted “Mizoram Customary Code” could reconcile tradition with gender justice.
  3. Constitutional Supremacy – Article 371G accords special protection to Mizo religious and social practices, yet does not oust fundamental rights. Future challenges may invoke Articles 14, 15 and 21 to test discriminatory customs, echoing developments under Hindu and Muslim personal laws.

Conclusion

Mizo customary law retains profound cultural significance and legal authority. However, its contemporary application reveals an adaptive trajectory: courts respect traditional norms but invoke equity and constitutional values to mitigate exclusionary effects, particularly upon women. Procedural safeguards under the Sixth Schedule and the 1953 Rules ensure that disputes are resolved within an institutional framework integrated with the national judiciary. The evolving jurisprudence invites legislative attention to codify and clarify custom, thereby fortifying legal certainty while advancing the constitutional vision of equality and dignity.

Footnotes

  1. J. Thansiama v. State of Mizoram & Ors., (2016) 11 SCC 532.
  2. Lushai Hills Autonomous District (Administration of Justice) Rules, 1953, r. 46(1).
  3. Smt. Hmangaihzuali v. Smt. C. Laldingi, 2003 (2) GLT 546.
  4. Thansiami v. Lalruatkima & Ors., 2011 SCC OnLine Gau 611.
  5. Smt. Ass Kaur v. Kartar Singh, (2007) 11 SCC 547.
  6. Ralliani & Ors. v. Kaithuami & Ors., 2008 Supp GLT 820.
  7. Master Zosangpuia v. State of Mizoram & Ors., 2017 Gauhati HC (unreported slip op.).
  8. Kaithuami [L] v. Ralliani & Ors., 2022 SCC OnLine SC 512.
  9. Smt. Lalramchhani v. Smt. Lalthachhungi, 2002 Gauhati HC (unreported).
  10. Union Territory of Mizoram v. C. Lalthanpara & Ors., 1983 (2) GLR 347.
  11. L. Biakchhunga v. State of Mizoram & Ors., 2005 (3) GLR 267.
  12. Lalringzovi v. State of Mizoram & Ors., 2019 (4) GLT 392.