Maintenance Under the Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act, 2005: A Comprehensive Legal Analysis

Maintenance Under the Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act, 2005: A Comprehensive Legal Analysis

Introduction

The Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act, 2005 (hereinafter "DV Act") was enacted as a landmark piece of legislation in India, aiming to provide a comprehensive civil law remedy for women facing various forms of domestic abuse. Beyond protection orders and residence rights, a crucial component of the relief envisaged under the DV Act is the provision for monetary relief, including maintenance for the aggrieved person and her children. This article undertakes a comprehensive analysis of the provisions and judicial interpretations concerning maintenance under the DV Act. It examines the legislative framework, the scope of entitlement, the interplay with other maintenance laws, and the evolving jurisprudence shaped by the Supreme Court and various High Courts of India. The analysis draws significantly from key judicial pronouncements that have clarified the ambit, procedure, and underlying principles governing maintenance claims within the DV Act's protective umbrella.

The Legislative Framework for Maintenance under the DV Act

The DV Act establishes a specific framework for granting maintenance, rooted in its broad definitions of "domestic violence," "economic abuse," and the entitlement of an "aggrieved person" in a "domestic relationship."

Defining "Domestic Violence" and "Economic Abuse"

Section 3 of the DV Act provides an expansive definition of "domestic violence." Crucially, for the purpose of maintenance, it includes "economic abuse."[1] The Supreme Court in D. Velusamy v. D. Patchaiammal (2010) highlighted that Section 3(a) defines domestic violence to include acts that harm or injure or endanger the health, safety, life, limb, or well-being, whether mental or physical, of the aggrieved person, or tend to do so. This encompasses physical, sexual, verbal, emotional, and economic abuse.[2]

The term "economic abuse," as defined in Explanation I (iv) to Section 3, includes:

"(a) deprivation of all or any economic or financial resources to which the aggrieved person is entitled under any law or custom whether payable under an order of a court or otherwise or which the aggrieved person requires out of necessity including, but not limited to, household necessities for the aggrieved person and her children, if any, stridhan, property, jointly or separately owned by the aggrieved person, payment of rental related to the shared household and maintenance."[2]

This definition is pivotal as it directly links the denial of maintenance and other financial resources to an act of domestic violence, thereby forming a basis for seeking monetary relief under the Act. The Supreme Court in Krishna Bhattacharjee v. Sarathi Choudhury And Another (2015) affirmed that deprivation of stridhan constitutes economic abuse.[3]

Entitlement to Monetary Relief (Section 20)

Section 20 of the DV Act empowers the Magistrate to grant monetary reliefs to meet the expenses incurred and losses suffered by the aggrieved person and any child of the aggrieved person as a result of domestic violence. Specifically, Section 20(1)(d) allows the Magistrate to direct the respondent to pay maintenance for the aggrieved person as well as her children, if any, in addition to an order under Section 125 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (CrPC), or any other law for the time being in force.[2] This provision underscores the distinct nature of maintenance under the DV Act, which can supplement other existing remedies.

Who is an "Aggrieved Person"? (Section 2(a))

An "aggrieved person" under Section 2(a) of the DV Act is defined as "any woman who is, or has been, in a domestic relationship with the respondent and who alleges to have been subjected to any act of domestic violence by the respondent."[4] This definition is broad and has been subject to judicial interpretation.

The Supreme Court in Juveria Abdul Majid Patni v. Atif Iqbal Mansoori And Another (2014) held that a divorced woman can seek relief under the DV Act for violence perpetrated during the subsistence of the marriage, even after the dissolution.[5] Similarly, in Krishna Bhattacharjee, it was held that a decree of judicial separation does not sever the domestic relationship, and the wife remains an "aggrieved person."[3] The Delhi High Court in Richa Arya Petitioner v. State Of Nct Of Delhi & Anr. (2016) also reiterated this broad interpretation.[6] However, the Allahabad High Court in Akash v. Pallavi And Another (2024) clarified that while a divorced woman can claim maintenance, this right ceases upon her remarriage, as the domestic relationship with the previous husband effectively terminates.[7]

The scope extends to women in "relationships in the nature of marriage." The Supreme Court in D. Velusamy v. D. Patchaiammal (2010) laid down criteria for such relationships, emphasizing cohabitation, public presentation as spouses, and legal capacity.[8] However, in Indra Sarma v. V.K.V Sarma (2013), the Court held that not all live-in relationships, particularly those where the respondent is already married, would qualify, classifying the appellant's status in that specific case as akin to a concubine, outside the DV Act's ambit.[9] Despite this, in Lalita Toppo v. State Of Jharkhand And Another (2018), the Supreme Court observed that an aggrieved person may seek maintenance under the DV Act even if not entitled under Section 125 CrPC, due to the broad definition of domestic violence including economic abuse.[10]

"Domestic Relationship" (Section 2(f))

Section 2(f) defines a "domestic relationship" as "a relationship between two persons who live or have, at any point of time, lived together in a shared household, when they are related by consanguinity, marriage, or through a relationship in the nature of marriage, adoption or are family members living together as a joint family."[11] The existence of such a relationship, past or present, is a prerequisite for invoking the DV Act. The interpretation of "shared household" under Section 2(s) also plays a role, as clarified in Satish Chander Ahuja v. Sneha Ahuja (2021).[12]

Judicial Interpretation of Maintenance Provisions

Nature and Scope of Maintenance under DV Act

The judiciary has grappled with whether the DV Act creates an additional or independent right to maintenance or merely provides an enforcement mechanism for existing rights. Section 36 of the DV Act states that its provisions "shall be in addition to, and not in derogation of the provisions of any other law for the time being in force."[13] This suggests an additive rather than substitutive role. The Allahabad High Court in Sunil Sharma v. Gunjan Kumari @ Sitara Begam (2021) noted that maintenance may be claimed under one or more statutes, each providing an independent and distinct remedy.[14]

However, some High Courts have taken a more restrictive view. The Delhi High Court in Sanjay Bhardwaj & Ors. v. State & Anr. Complainant (2010) opined that the DV Act "does not create any additional right in favour of wife regarding maintenance. It only enables the Magistrate to pass a maintenance order as per the rights available under existing laws."[15] A similar view was expressed in Rachna Kathuria v. Ramesh Kathuria (2010)[16] and Renu Mittal v. Anil Mittal & Ors. (2010),[17] suggesting that if maintenance is already determined by a competent court, an application for additional maintenance under the DV Act might not be maintainable, and enhancement should be sought from the original court.

The overarching purpose of maintenance, including under the DV Act, is social justice, aimed at preventing destitution and vagrancy, as affirmed in cases like Sunil Sharma[14] and Ashwinkumar Babulal Trivedi v. State of Gujarat (2014).[18] The quantum of maintenance is determined based on various factors, including the needs of the aggrieved person and children, and the income and assets of the respondent, often assessed through affidavits of disclosure as mandated by Rajnesh v. Neha And Another (2020).[12]

Overlapping Jurisdictions and Harmonization: The Rajnesh v. Neha Guidelines

The Supreme Court in Rajnesh v. Neha And Another (2020) addressed the complexities arising from overlapping jurisdictions under various maintenance laws (DV Act, Section 125 CrPC, Hindu Marriage Act, 1955, Hindu Adoptions and Maintenance Act, 1956).[12] The Court laid down comprehensive guidelines to ensure uniformity and prevent multiplicity of proceedings and conflicting orders. Key directives include:

  • Mandatory disclosure of previous maintenance proceedings and orders.
  • Standardized Affidavits of Disclosure of Assets and Liabilities to be filed by both parties.
  • The principle that while a party can claim maintenance under different statutes, it is incumbent upon the court to consider any prior maintenance awarded and make suitable adjustments or set-offs to prevent multiple recoveries for the same period.
  • Timelines for disposal of maintenance applications.

This judgment affirmed that maintenance awarded under the DV Act can be in addition to orders under Section 125 CrPC (as also held in Shailja & Anr. v. Khobbanna (2018) cited in Rajnesh v. Neha[12]), but emphasized the need for adjustment. The Bombay High Court in Prakash Babulal Dangi v. State Of Maharashtra (2017) also dealt with the adjustment of maintenance amounts awarded under Section 125 CrPC and the DV Act.[19] Section 20(1)(d) of the DV Act itself contemplates maintenance "in addition to" other orders, and Section 36 supports this. The Allahabad High Court in Deepak Singh And 4 Ors v. State Of U.P. And Anr (2019) also referred to Section 36 in this context.[13]

Temporal Scope: Applicability to Past Acts

The Supreme Court in V.D. Bhanot v. Savita Bhanot (2012) clarified that the DV Act has a retrospective effect in a limited sense. Protections under the Act can be extended to domestic violence incidents that occurred before the Act's enactment, provided the legal relationship persists or the repercussions of the past violence continue into the present.[20] This is crucial for maintenance claims arising from long-standing abusive relationships where violence predated 2005.

Maintenance for Women in Non-Marital Relationships

As discussed earlier, the DV Act extends protection to women in "relationships in the nature of marriage." The Supreme Court in D. Velusamy[8] and Indra Sarma[9] provided guidance on what constitutes such a relationship. While Indra Sarma adopted a somewhat restrictive interpretation in the specific facts involving a married respondent, the general principle allows for claims if the criteria are met. The observation in Lalita Toppo[10] further supports the idea that the DV Act offers a broader avenue for maintenance than Section 125 CrPC for women not in formal marriages, provided "economic abuse" within a "domestic relationship" is established.

Impact of Divorce and Remarriage on Maintenance Claims

The ruling in Juveria Abdul Majid Patni[5] firmly established that a divorced woman can claim relief, including maintenance, under the DV Act for violence experienced during the marriage. This ensures that dissolution of marriage does not become a shield for past abusers. However, as per Akash v. Pallavi,[7] if the aggrieved woman remarries, her entitlement to claim maintenance from her former husband under the DV Act ceases from the date of her remarriage. This is because the "domestic relationship" with the first husband, which is the foundation of a DV Act claim, is considered terminated by the subsequent marriage.

Procedural Aspects

Section 28(1) of the DV Act states that proceedings shall generally be governed by the CrPC. However, Section 28(2) grants courts flexibility to lay down their own procedures for disposing of applications under Section 12 or Section 23(2) (interim orders). The Supreme Court in Kunapareddy Alias Nookala Shanka Balaji v. Kunapareddy Swarna Kumari And Another (2016) upheld the power of courts to permit amendments to petitions under the DV Act, including those seeking maintenance, to ensure justice and prevent multiplicity of litigation.[21] Interim maintenance can be granted under Section 23 of the DV Act, as seen in cases like Rajat Johar Petitioner v. Divya Johar (2017).[22] The Karnataka High Court in Krishna Murthy Nookula v. Y. Savitha (2009) noted that Magistrates may proceed with a summary enquiry for expeditious disposal.[23]

Challenges and Considerations

Several challenges and considerations arise in the context of maintenance under the DV Act. Enforcement of maintenance orders remains a significant hurdle, though Rajnesh v. Neha[12] has suggested measures to strengthen enforcement.

The earning capacity of the wife is another contentious issue. Some High Court judgments, particularly from Delhi, have suggested that a well-qualified wife capable of earning may not be entitled to maintenance, especially if the husband is not earning or if both are equally qualified (e.g., Sanjay Bhardwaj,[15] NIHARIKA GHOSH @ NIHARIKA KUNDU v. SHANKAR GHOSH (2023)[24] in the context of HMA). While these primarily address situations of spouses living separately or under other statutes, such arguments can influence DV Act proceedings. However, the DV Act's focus on "economic abuse" and the needs arising from domestic violence might warrant a different approach.

It is also important to distinguish claims for maintenance and other monetary reliefs under the DV Act from pure property right disputes, which are generally to be adjudicated by civil courts, as observed by the Punjab & Haryana High Court in Om Parkash Syngal And Others Petitioners v. Shimla Garg (2015).[25] The DV Act is primarily for urgent relief arising from domestic violence.

Conclusion

Maintenance under the Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act, 2005, represents a critical legal remedy for women subjected to economic abuse and other forms of domestic violence in India. The legislative intent, as interpreted and amplified by the judiciary, particularly the Supreme Court, is to provide effective, expeditious, and often supplementary financial support to aggrieved women and their children. The definition of "economic abuse," the broad scope of "aggrieved person" and "domestic relationship" (including certain non-marital relationships and post-divorce scenarios), and the guidelines laid down in Rajnesh v. Neha for harmonizing overlapping jurisdictions, collectively strengthen this protective framework.

While debates continue on whether the DV Act creates new substantive rights to maintenance or merely enforces existing ones, its procedural innovations and the emphasis on preventing destitution underscore its significance. The cessation of maintenance claims upon remarriage of the aggrieved woman, as recently clarified, marks an important boundary. Ultimately, the jurisprudence surrounding maintenance under the DV Act reflects an ongoing effort to balance the rights and obligations of parties within a domestic setting, ensuring that the law serves as a robust instrument of social justice and financial security for victims of domestic violence.

References