Locating the “Place within Public View” in Indian Anti-Discrimination Jurisprudence

Locating the “Place within Public View” in Indian Anti-Discrimination Jurisprudence

Introduction

The expression “in any place within public view” constitutes a pivotal threshold requirement for a number of penal provisions in Indian law, most prominently Section 3(1)(r) and 3(1)(s) of the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 1989 (“SC/ST Act”). Whether an alleged act of caste-based insult or intimidation occurs within such a “place” decisively determines criminal liability, the availability of anticipatory bail, and the permissibility of quashing proceedings under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (“CrPC”). This article undertakes a doctrinal and analytical examination of the phrase, synthesising leading authorities from the Supreme Court and High Courts, and situating the inquiry within broader constitutional principles of equality, dignity, and privacy in India.

Statutory Framework

Prior to the 2016 amendment, Section 3(1)(x) criminalised intentional insult or intimidation “in any place within public view.” The Amendment Act 1 of 2016 bifurcated the provision into Sections 3(1)(r) and 3(1)(s) to (i) capture generic caste-based humiliation and (ii) address abuse by caste name. The spatial qualifier, however, was retained unaltered, underscoring legislative intent to distinguish “public view” from the broader notion of a “public place.”[1]

Jurisprudential Evolution

(A) Foundational Articulation – Swaran Singh v. State (2008)

The Supreme Court in Swaran Singh delivered the first authoritative exegesis. Markandey Katju, J. delineated a two-fold test: (i) the act may occur on private property yet be visible to, or capable of being witnessed by, the public; (ii) the presence of members of the public (beyond close relatives or friends) inside a private premise converts the locale into a “place within public view.”[2] The Court was emphatic that “public place” and “place within public view” are not synonymous.

(B) Consolidation – High Court Interpretations

  • Goluguri Ramakrishna Reddy (AP HC, 2005): A commercial shop with an implied invitation to the public was deemed to possess a public character, falling squarely within public view.[3]
  • Karansingh (MP HC, 1992): An insult hurled at 11 p.m. in an unlit tank-side confrontation failed the “public view” requirement, highlighting temporal and visibility considerations.[4]
  • Dhiren Prafulbhai Shah (Guj HC, 2016): The gate of a private house was affirmed as within public view, reaffirming Swaran Singh’s spatial visibility test.[5]

(C) Nuanced Refinement – Hitesh Verma v. State of Uttarakhand (2020)

The Supreme Court recalibrated the doctrine by insisting on both the spatial element and a caste-related mens rea. An altercation inside a house, devoid of non-family witnesses, was held outside public view; the ensuing charge-sheet under Section 3(1)(r) was quashed.[6] The decision emphasised that a civil property dispute cannot be constitutionalised into a caste atrocity absent demonstrable intent to humiliate on caste grounds.

(D) Recent Affirmation – Karuppudayar v. State (2025)

A three-judge bench, while reiterating Swaran Singh and Hitesh Verma, clarified that a lawn visible from a public lane satisfies the test; conversely, insults uttered in an enclosed drawing room bereft of public presence do not. The Court advised trial judges to undertake a prima facie enquiry into visibility and audience before summoning the accused.[7]

Analytical Parameters

1. Spatial Visibility versus Proprietary Status

Ownership is not determinative; the decisive factor is reasonable expectation of public observation. Thus, a private veranda abutting a public road, an office reception, or a shop open to customers are all within public view.[8]

2. Presence of Non-Intimates

Where the impugned speech occurs inside a building, courts inquire whether individuals other than close relatives or friends were present. Their presence converts a private enclosure into a public viewing arena.[9]

3. Evidentiary Burden

  • The prosecution must plead and prima facie establish the visibility or presence of public witnesses in the charge-sheet.[10]
  • Absence of such particulars invites quashing under Section 482 CrPC, as exemplified by Gorige Pentaiah.[11]

4. Temporal and Environmental Factors

Night-time incidents in secluded locales, though technically outdoors, may fail the test if public visibility is implausible. Conversely, festival grounds, markets, or Panchayat meetings inherently satisfy the criterion, as illustrated in Arumugam Servai.[12]

Intersection with Section 482 CrPC

The inherent jurisdiction of High Courts operates as a safeguard against vexatious prosecutions where the “public view” element is patently absent. In Gorige Pentaiah, the Supreme Court quashed proceedings noting the complaint’s silence on public visibility and caste intent.[13] Subsequent decisions (Hitesh Verma; Ketanbhai Nayak, 2025 Guj HC) extend this reasoning, underscoring that blanket invocation of the SC/ST Act in civil or familial disputes dilutes the statute’s remedial purpose and clogs the criminal docket.

Comparative Constitutional Perspectives

Privacy jurisprudence (e.g., Kharak Singh; PUCL) conceives the home as a protected space, yet acknowledges permissible legal intrusions founded on “authority of law.”[14] The SC/ST Act represents such authority, but only when statutory prerequisites—including “public view”—are met. Thus, the doctrinal balance between an individual’s right to privacy and the community’s interest in eradicating caste-based humiliation is struck at the visibility threshold.

Critical Appraisal

While courts have clarified the semantic contours of “public view,” application remains fact-sensitive. Over-reliance on visibility risks ignoring the symbolic harm inflicted even in private insults. Conversely, an expansive interpretation could criminalise purely interpersonal conflicts. A purposive approach—anchored in marginalised communities’ lived realities yet disciplined by constitutional criminal law safeguards—best serves justice.

Conclusion

The phrase “place within public view” functions as both an evidentiary gateway and a normative delimiter, ensuring that the SC/ST Act targets public or publicly-perceptible affronts to dignity. Judicial pronouncements from Swaran Singh through Karuppudayar furnish a coherent, though evolving, doctrinal matrix. Future litigation will likely pivot on digital spaces—social media posts, livestreams, and closed-circuit platforms—necessitating fresh engagement with the visibility paradigm in the virtual realm. Until then, the existing tests of spatial visibility, audience composition, and demonstrated caste intent remain the touchstones for courts assessing criminal liability under the Act.

Footnotes

  1. Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 1989, as amended by Act 1 of 2016.
  2. Swaran Singh v. State, (2008) 8 SCC 435.
  3. Goluguri Ramakrishna Reddy & Anr. v. State of A.P., (2005) SCC OnLine AP — analysis paragraph cited.
  4. Karansingh & Ors. v. State of M.P., 1992 SCC OnLine MP 240.
  5. Dhiren Prafulbhai Shah v. State of Gujarat, 2016 SCC OnLine Guj.
  6. Hitesh Verma v. State of Uttarakhand, (2020) 10 SCC 710.
  7. Karuppudayar v. State, 2025 SCC OnLine SC 215.
  8. Goluguri Ramakrishna Reddy, supra note 3.
  9. Swaran Singh, supra note 2, ¶28.
  10. Hitesh Verma, supra note 6, ¶15.
  11. Gorige Pentaiah v. State of A.P., (2009) 1 SCC (Cri) 446.
  12. Arumugam Servai v. State of Tamil Nadu, (2011) 6 SCC 405.
  13. Gorige Pentaiah, supra note 11.
  14. Kharak Singh v. State of U.P., AIR 1963 SC 1295; People’s Union for Civil Liberties v. Union of India, (1997) 1 SCC 301.