Jurisdictional Framework for Lodging First Information Reports in India: A Scholarly Analysis
Introduction
The First Information Report (FIR) serves as the foundational document that sets the criminal law in motion in India. Lodging an FIR under Section 154 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (CrPC)[6], is the initial step towards the investigation of an alleged cognizable offence. However, the question of which police station possesses the jurisdiction to register an FIR has been a subject of considerable legal discourse and judicial interpretation. This article aims to provide a comprehensive analysis of the legal principles governing the jurisdiction to lodge an FIR in India, drawing upon key statutory provisions and landmark judicial pronouncements. It will explore the interplay between the mandatory duty to record information, the territorial limits of police stations, the expansive powers of police to investigate, and the approach of the judiciary in scrutinizing FIRs on jurisdictional grounds.
The Imperative of Section 154 CrPC: The Duty to Record Information
Section 154(1) of the CrPC mandates that every information relating to the commission of a cognizable offence, if given orally to an officer in charge of a police station, shall be reduced to writing by him or under his direction and be read over to the informant. The Supreme Court, in the seminal case of Lalita Kumari v. Government Of Uttar Pradesh And Others[6], authoritatively established that the registration of an FIR is mandatory under Section 154 CrPC if the information discloses the commission of a cognizable offence. The Court held that the use of the word "shall" in Section 154(1) leaves no discretion to the police officer, who is duty-bound to register the FIR.[6, 16]
While Lalita Kumari[6] carved out an exception for a preliminary inquiry in certain types of cases (e.g., matrimonial disputes, medical negligence) to ascertain whether a cognizable offence is disclosed, this does not dilute the fundamental obligation to register an FIR once such disclosure is apparent. The primary objective is to ensure that the criminal justice process is initiated promptly, preventing the loss of evidence and ensuring that victims have access to justice.
Territorial Jurisdiction for Enquiry and Trial: The General Rule and Its Exceptions (Sections 177-179 CrPC)
Chapter XIII of the CrPC lays down the provisions concerning the jurisdiction of criminal courts in inquiries and trials. While these sections primarily govern judicial jurisdiction, they provide the foundational principles for understanding the territorial competence typically associated with police stations.
Section 177 CrPC: The Ordinary Rule
Section 177 CrPC stipulates that "Every offence shall ordinarily be enquired into and tried by a Court within whose local jurisdiction it was committed."[12] This implies that the police station having jurisdiction over the place where the offence was committed is the appropriate station to register the FIR and conduct the investigation. The Supreme Court in Y. Abraham Ajith And Others v. Inspector Of Police, Chennai And Another[1], while dealing with judicial jurisdiction, emphasized that the cause of action, or the locus of the offence, is paramount. Similarly, in Bhura Ram And Others v. State Of Rajasthan And Another[5], proceedings were quashed because no part of the cause of action arose within the magistrate's jurisdiction. These principles underscore the importance of the place of commission of the offence.
Sections 178 and 179 CrPC: Exceptions and Extensions
Sections 178 and 179 CrPC provide crucial exceptions to the general rule under Section 177. Section 178 addresses situations where it is uncertain in which of several local areas an offence was committed, or where an offence is committed partly in one local area and partly in another, or where an offence is a continuing one and continues to be committed in more local areas than one, or where it consists of several acts done in different local areas. In such cases, the offence may be inquired into or tried by a court having jurisdiction over any of such local areas.[1, 12]
Section 179 CrPC states that when an act is an offence by reason of anything which has been done and of a consequence which has ensued, the offence may be inquired into or tried by a court within whose local jurisdiction such thing has been done or such consequence has ensued. The Supreme Court's decision in Rupali Devi v. State Of Uttar Pradesh And Others[7] is particularly instructive in this context. The Court held that in cases under Section 498-A of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 (IPC), the mental and emotional cruelty inflicted upon a wife, which continues to cause distress even after she takes shelter at her parental home, can be considered a "consequence" under Section 179 CrPC. Thus, courts (and by extension, police stations) at the place where the wife resides and experiences such consequences would have jurisdiction.[7] This principle was also acknowledged in Dr Umesh Sharma v. State & Anr., where it was argued that if offences are partly committed within a state, Section 178(b) CrPC could confer jurisdiction.[22]
Police Power to Investigate under Section 156 CrPC: Transcending Territorial Barriers
A pivotal provision concerning the police's power to investigate is Section 156 CrPC. Section 156(1) empowers an officer in charge of a police station to investigate any cognizable case which a court having jurisdiction over the local area within the limits of such station would have power to inquire into or try under the provisions of Chapter XIII. Crucially, Section 156(2) CrPC states: "No proceeding of a police officer in any such case shall at any stage be called in question on the ground that the case was one which such officer was not empowered under this section to investigate."[11]
The Supreme Court in Satvinder Kaur v. State (Govt. Of Nct Of Delhi) And Another[8, 12] delivered a landmark judgment clarifying this aspect. The Court held that a police officer is statutorily empowered to investigate a cognizable offence without any territorial limitations at the initial stage of registering an FIR. If, after investigation, the officer finds that the crime was not committed within their territorial jurisdiction, the FIR and the case can be forwarded to the police station having jurisdiction.[8, 11, 12, 15] The Court emphasized that an FIR should not be quashed at the threshold solely on the ground of lack of territorial jurisdiction of the police. This view has been consistently followed by various High Courts and the Supreme Court.[9, 10, 14, 18] As stated in Union Of India (S) v. Ashok Kumar Sharma And Others (S), "this would not mean that in a case which requires investigation, the police officer can refuse to record the FIR and/or investigate it."[11]
The Delhi High Court in MANOJ SHARMA MANU v. STATE OF NCT OF DELHI & ANR[10] reiterated that even if an offence may have been committed beyond the territorial jurisdiction of a police station, the officer in-charge would still register the FIR and investigate. However, a distinction was drawn regarding a Magistrate's power under Section 156(3) CrPC, holding that a Magistrate cannot direct an officer in-charge of a police station beyond its territorial jurisdiction to investigate.[10, 18]
Judicial Scrutiny of FIRs on Grounds of Jurisdiction
The judiciary has generally exhibited reluctance to quash FIRs at the investigation stage solely on the ground of lack of territorial jurisdiction. The power of the High Court under Section 482 CrPC to quash an FIR is to be exercised sparingly and in exceptional circumstances, primarily to prevent abuse of the process of the court or to secure the ends of justice.[13, 22] In Satvinder Kaur[8], the Supreme Court deprecated the quashing of an FIR by the High Court on grounds of territorial jurisdiction. The Rajasthan High Court in Dinesh Meena v. State Of Rajasthan & Anr.[13] observed that if the ingredients of the alleged offence are prima-facie made out, the Court should not interfere with the FIR, as investigation is the domain of the police.
However, if it is clear that no part of the cause of action arose within a particular jurisdiction, courts may intervene, as seen in cases concerning judicial jurisdiction like Y. Abraham Ajith[1] and Bhura Ram[5]. The focus remains on whether the allegations, taken at face value, disclose an offence and have some nexus with the jurisdiction invoked.
The Andhra Pradesh High Court in K V BHASKAR v. THE STATE OF ANDHRA PRADESH[27] held that a High Court could not issue a writ of mandamus to direct police to register an FIR if the police concerned lacked territorial jurisdiction, suggesting that alternative remedies like approaching the Magistrate under Section 156(3) CrPC (within jurisdictional limits) or filing a private complaint under Section 200 CrPC might be appropriate. This pertains to court-directed registration rather than the police's inherent power.
"Cause of Action" and Its Relevance in Determining Jurisdiction
The concept of "cause of action," though predominantly used in civil law, finds analogous application in criminal law for determining jurisdiction. It refers to the bundle of facts that give rise to a legal claim. The Supreme Court in Navinchandra N. Majithia v. State Of Maharashtra And Others[3], while dealing with the territorial jurisdiction of High Courts under Article 226 of the Constitution, elaborated that if a part of the cause of action arises within a High Court's territorial limits, it can exercise jurisdiction. This principle is often extended to criminal matters.
In Shri Subhkaran Luharuka & Anr. v. State & Anr.[9], the Delhi High Court noted the averment that the parties had an office in Delhi and deliberations took place there as factors supporting Delhi's jurisdiction. Conversely, in AJAY GOYAL v. THE STATE AND ORS.[25], it was argued that mere payment of some amounts in Delhi years ago would not constitute a part of the cause of action to vest jurisdiction in Delhi Police, and that a false plea was taken to confer jurisdiction. This highlights that the nexus must be substantial and not illusory.
Special Considerations
FIRs under Special Statutes
When dealing with offences under special statutes, the provisions of that statute regarding the lodging of complaints or FIRs, and by whom, become paramount. If a special law prescribes a specific procedure or designates particular officers to initiate proceedings, that will override the general provisions of the CrPC. For instance, in Bansal & Deol Fertilizer And Another Petitioners v. State Of Punjab[20], an FIR under the Essential Commodities Act was quashed because the item in question was no longer a "controlled item," meaning the Fertilizer Inspector lacked jurisdiction to conduct a raid or lodge the FIR. Similarly, in ROSHNI DEVI & ANR v. STATE OF HARYANA[21], an FIR lodged by the Town and Country Planning Department was questioned as the plot was within municipal limits and a notification was subsequent.
In Narayan Mahto @ Narayan Chandra Mahto v. The State Of Jharkhand And Ors.[26], an FIR lodged by a Chowkidar for offences under mining rules was held to be without authority because the special rules required a complaint by a competent officer. The Jammu and Kashmir High Court in BASHIR AHMAD KHAN AND OTHERS v. U T OF LADAKH[23] considered whether police were competent to lodge an FIR for offences under the Wildlife Protection Act, 1972, in light of Section 55 of that Act, which mandates cognizance based on a complaint by specified officers. These cases underscore that the *competency* of the informant or authority under a special statute is a crucial jurisdictional aspect, distinct from, yet related to, territorial jurisdiction. The jurisdiction of Special Courts under acts like the NIA Act, as discussed in Bikramjit Singh v. State Of Punjab[4], also pertains to the trial and related bail matters for specific offences, rather than the initial lodging of the FIR by the police.
The Concept of "Zero FIR"
Arising from the principles laid down in Lalita Kumari[6] (mandatory registration) and Satvinder Kaur[8] (police power to investigate irrespective of initial territorial limits), the concept of "Zero FIR" has gained practical significance. A Zero FIR can be registered by any police station upon receiving information about a cognizable offence, irrespective of whether the offence was committed within its territorial jurisdiction. After registration, the Zero FIR is assigned a serial number of '0' and is then transferred to the police station that has the actual jurisdiction over the place of crime for investigation. This ensures immediate recording of information and initiation of preliminary steps without delays caused by jurisdictional uncertainties, thereby facilitating swift justice, especially in sensitive cases.
Conclusion
The law governing the jurisdiction to lodge an FIR in India is designed to balance procedural propriety with the imperative of ensuring that criminal investigations are not thwarted by hyper-technical objections at the outset. While Section 177 CrPC points to the "ordinary" place of inquiry and trial being where the offence is committed, Sections 178 and 179 CrPC provide for exceptions, particularly in cases of continuing offences or where consequences ensue in different jurisdictions, as notably applied in Section 498-A IPC matters.
The Supreme Court's pronouncement in Satvinder Kaur[8], fortified by Section 156(2) CrPC, establishes robustly that a police officer can register an FIR and commence investigation into a cognizable offence even if it is committed outside their precise territorial limits, with the provision to transfer the case later if necessary. Coupled with the mandate in Lalita Kumari[6] for compulsory registration of FIRs disclosing cognizable offences, the legal framework aims to make the criminal justice system accessible and responsive. The development of practices like the "Zero FIR" further reflects this victim-centric approach. While specific rules under special statutes regarding the competency to lodge complaints must be adhered to, the overarching principle for general offences is that territorial jurisdiction should not be a preliminary bar to the registration and initial investigation of an FIR, thereby upholding the rule of law and the pursuit of justice.
References
- [1] Y. Abraham Ajith And Others v. Inspector Of Police, Chennai And Another (2004 SCC CRI 2134, Supreme Court Of India, 2004)
- [3] Navinchandra N. Majithia v. State Of Maharashtra And Others (2000 SCC 7 640, Supreme Court Of India, 2000)
- [4] Bikramjit Singh v. State Of Punjab . (2020 SCC ONLINE SC 824, Supreme Court Of India, 2020)
- [5] Bhura Ram And Others v. State Of Rajasthan And Another (2009 SCC CRI 1 109, Supreme Court Of India, 2008)
- [6] Lalita Kumari v. Government Of Uttar Pradesh And Others (2014 SCC CRI 1 524, Supreme Court Of India, 2013)
- [7] Rupali Devi v. State Of Uttar Pradesh And Others (2019 SCC 5 384, Supreme Court Of India, 2019)
- [8] Satvinder Kaur v. State (Govt. Of Nct Of Delhi) And Another (1999 SCC 8 728, Supreme Court Of India, 1999)
- [9] Shri Subhkaran Luharuka & Anr. v. State & Anr. (Delhi High Court, 2010)
- [10] MANOJ SHARMA MANU v. STATE OF NCT OF DELHI & ANR (Delhi High Court, 2017)
- [11] Union Of India (S) v. Ashok Kumar Sharma And Others (S). (Supreme Court Of India, 2020)
- [12] Satvinder Kaur v. State (Govt. Of Nct Of Delhi) And Another (Supreme Court Of India, 1999) [Referring to the CrPC sections]
- [13] Dinesh Meena v. State Of Rajasthan & Anr. (Rajasthan High Court, 2013)
- [14] B.L Koli v. Union Of India (Rajasthan High Court, 2010)
- [15] MRS MEERA SHARMA v. The State of Bihar (Patna High Court, 2023)
- [16] ROHIT KHATRI v. STATE & ANR (Rajasthan High Court, 2016)
- [18] GAUTAM SARKAR v. STATE & ANR. (Delhi High Court, 2017)
- [19] State Of Bihar And Others v. Ashok Kumar Singh And Others (2015 SCC L&S 1 304, Supreme Court Of India, 2014)
- [20] Bansal & Deol Fertilizer And Another Petitioners v. State Of Punjab (2005 SCC ONLINE P&H 828, Punjab & Haryana High Court, 2005)
- [21] ROSHNI DEVI & ANR v. STATE OF HARYANA (Punjab & Haryana High Court, 2019)
- [22] DR UMESH SHARMA v. STATE & ANR. (Rajasthan High Court, 2017)
- [23] BASHIR AHMAD KHAN AND OTHERS v. U T OF LADAKH TH SHO POLICE STATION LEH LADAKH AND ANOTHER (Jammu and Kashmir High Court, 2023)
- [25] AJAY GOYAL v. THE STATE AND ORS. (Delhi High Court, 2024)
- [26] Narayan Mahto @ Narayan Chandra Mahto v. The State Of Jharkhand And Ors. (Jharkhand High Court, 2006)
- [27] K V BHASKAR v. THE STATE OF ANDHRA PRADESH (Andhra Pradesh High Court, 2022)