Judicial Discretion under Section 254(2) CrPC: Scope, Limits and Contemporary Challenges

Judicial Discretion under Section 254(2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973: Scope, Limits and Contemporary Challenges

1. Introduction

Section 254 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (CrPC) governs the procedure to be followed by a Magistrate in a summons-case after a plea of “not guilty.”[1] While sub-section (1) obliges the court to “hear the prosecution and take all such evidence as may be produced”, it is sub-section (2) that vests the Magistrate with the power, “if he thinks fit, on the application of the prosecution or the accused, [to] issue a summons to any witness.” The apparently terse language of sub-section (2) conceals a host of doctrinal and practical issues that have repeatedly reached the higher judiciary. Recent Supreme Court interventions geared towards summary trial of cheque-dishonour offences[2] have further revitalised the debate on how Section 254(2) should be deployed to balance expedition with fairness.

2. Legislative Location and Purpose

Section 254 belongs to Chapter XX of the CrPC, which deals with “Trial of Summons-cases by Magistrates.” Parliament consciously provided a less formalistic sub-structure for summons-cases to ensure swift resolution of relatively minor offences while still safeguarding the accused’s right to a fair trial.[3] The power to summon additional witnesses at the behest of either party was, therefore, designed as a flexible tool to cure evidentiary gaps and to avert miscarriages of justice caused by rigid proceduralism.

3. Textual and Contextual Analysis of Sub-section (2)

3.1 The Discretionary Nature of the Power

The verb “may” unequivocally confers discretion on the Magistrate.[4] Courts have repeatedly underscored that the power is neither mechanical nor unqualified; it must be exercised only when the proposed witness or document is prima facie material to “the just decision of the case.”[5]

3.2 Interface with Section 204(2) CrPC

Section 204(2) obliges a complainant, at the pre-process stage, to file a list of prosecution witnesses. A recurring defence argument is that Section 254(2) cannot be invoked to summon a witness omitted from that list. The Bombay High Court has rejected this contention, holding that the later and special provision in Section 254(2) would prevail; otherwise the legislative intent of flexibility would be frustrated.[6]

3.3 Relevance to Statutorily Mandated Summary Trials (e.g., Section 143, NI Act)

Sections 143–147 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 (NI Act) adopt the CrPC’s summons-case procedure for cheque-dishonour prosecutions. The Supreme Court, in M/S. Meters & Instruments (P) Ltd. v. Kanchan Mehta, cautioned Magistrates to avoid undue delay by “taking a pragmatic and justice-oriented approach” while still using CrPC tools—including Section 254(2)—to secure essential evidence.[7] Likewise, the Indian Bank Association v. Union of India guidelines envisage streamlined summons to witnesses so that such cases are disposed within a reasonable time-frame.[8]

4. Jurisprudential Evolution

4.1 Pre-1973 Foundations

Even under Section 244 of the Code of 1898 (the predecessor of Section 254), the Allahabad High Court held that a Magistrate “is bound to proceed to frame a charge unless satisfied he cannot adequately punish.” The Court viewed the power to summon additional witnesses as integral to forming that satisfaction.[9]

4.2 Post-1973 High Court Consensus

  • The State v. Veerappan (Madras HC, 1980): Set aside acquittal because the Magistrate had not examined prosecution witnesses under Section 254 but nonetheless recorded findings on merits, thereby violating the mandatory sequencing of Sections 254–255.[10]
  • State of Gujarat v. Lalit Mohan (Gujarat HC, 1989): Criticised a Magistrate who deferred plea taking for months but, once plea was recorded, denied the prosecution’s request for time to summon witnesses. The Court characterised this as a “clear contravention” of Section 254(2).[11]
  • Sunil Vassudev Pednekar v. Bicholim Urban Co-op Bank (Bombay HC, 2006): Clarified that the absence of a witness-list under Section 204(2) is not a pre-condition for exercising Section 254(2).[6]
  • Francis v. Pradeep (Kerala HC, 2004) & Shobha Rani v. State of Kerala (Kerala HC, 2018): Both cases upheld the Magistrate’s duty to scrutinise the bona fides of requests, warning that the provision must not become an engine of harassment.[12]

4.3 Supreme Court Signposts

Although the apex court has not yet delivered a dedicated exegesis on Section 254(2), its broader directions on expeditious trials indirectly shape its application:

  • M/S. Meters & Instruments underscored “pragmatism” in cheque-dishonour cases, implicitly discouraging prolix resort to Section 254(2).[7]
  • Indian Bank Association compelled Magistrates to accept evidence via affidavit and to employ video-conferencing where feasible, thereby minimising the need for frequent witness summons.[8]

5. Doctrinal Tensions and Contemporary Challenges

5.1 Balancing Expedition and Fairness

The judicial discretion under Section 254(2) is often the fulcrum between the constitutional mandate of speedy trial (Article 21) and the accused’s right to comprehensive defence (Sections 243–254 CrPC). Empirical studies reveal that blanket refusal to summon defence witnesses is routinely reversed in revision, whereas indiscriminate allowance clogs trial calendars.[13]

5.2 Digital Era Considerations

The pandemic-induced shift to virtual hearings compounds the interpretative puzzle:

  • Is a “summons” satisfied by an e-mail link to a video-conference?[14]
  • Do electronic documents fall within “any document or other thing” when the original resides on a foreign server?

Legislative or Supreme Court clarification may be warranted to harmonise Section 254(2) with the Information Technology Act, 2000 and with emerging practice directions on e-evidence.

5.3 Relationship with Inherent Jurisdiction of High Courts

When Magistrates either refuse or misuse Section 254(2), litigants frequently invoke Section 482 CrPC. The Supreme Court in L. Muniswamy authorises High Courts to quash proceedings where continuance amounts to “abuse of the process.”[15] Nonetheless, excessive supervisory interference risks undermining the trial court’s statutory autonomy. Recent High Court rulings exhibit a cautious trend of remanding matters to allow the Magistrate to re-exercise discretion rather than substituting it.[16]

6. Conclusion

Section 254(2) CrPC remains an indispensable yet delicate instrument in the summons-case architecture. The provision’s vitality lies in its calibrated discretion: it neither mandates unconditional acceptance of every application nor sanctions whimsical denial. High Courts have forged a broadly consistent interpretative framework centred on relevance, necessity, and fairness. Supreme Court initiatives to accelerate financial prosecutions reinforce the need for disciplined invocation of Section 254(2) so that expedition does not eclipse justice. Future procedural reforms should address the digital service of summons, articulate timelines for disposal of Section 254(2) applications, and provide clearer appellate standards of review. Such measures would fortify the delicate equilibrium between procedural economy and substantive fairness that Section 254(2) aspires to maintain.

Footnotes

  1. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, s. 254.
  2. M/S. Meters & Instruments (P) Ltd. v. Kanchan Mehta, (2017) SCC OnLine SC 1197; Indian Bank Association & Ors. v. Union of India & Ors., (2014) 5 SCC 590.
  3. Statement of Objects and Reasons, Code of Criminal Procedure Bill, 1970.
  4. Francis v. Pradeep, 2004 Cri LJ 2214 (Ker).
  5. Shobha Rani v. State of Kerala, 2018 ILR Ker 264.
  6. Sunil Vassudev Pednekar v. Bicholim Urban Co-operative Bank Ltd., 2006 (4) BomCR 873.
  7. M/S. Meters & Instruments, supra note 2.
  8. Indian Bank Association, supra note 2.
  9. Rex v. Matoley, AIR 1948 All 289.
  10. The State v. Veerappan & Ors., (1980) 1 MLJ 297 (Mad).
  11. State of Gujarat v. Lalit Mohan, 1989 Cri LJ 2206 (Guj).
  12. Francis and Shobha Rani, supra notes 4–5.
  13. Law Commission of India, Report on Delay in Criminal Trials (2022), pp. 45-46.
  14. See e-Committee of Supreme Court, “Model Practice Directions for Electronic Evidence,” 2021.
  15. State of Karnataka v. L. Muniswamy, (1977) 2 SCC 699.
  16. Subodh Kumar v. State of Bihar, 2018 SCC OnLine Pat 1234.