Irregular Exercise of Jurisdiction under Indian Law

Irregular Exercise of Jurisdiction: Constitutional and Procedural Dimensions in Indian Law

Introduction

The expression “irregular exercise of jurisdiction” permeates Indian procedural and constitutional jurisprudence. Although frequently invoked in writ petitions under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution and in revisions under Section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (CPC), its ambit is often misunderstood. This article undertakes a doctrinal and case-law driven analysis of the concept, distinguishing it from complete absence of jurisdiction, and elucidates the consequences that flow from each category of jurisdictional error. The discussion integrates seminal Supreme Court pronouncements—Hari Vishnu Kamath, Kiran Singh, Dhulabhai, Ujjam Bai, M.L. Sethi—and representative High Court authorities to construct a coherent framework.

Conceptual Framework

Jurisdictional errors are classically classified into three categories[1]:

  • Excess of jurisdiction – acting where no jurisdiction exists.
  • Failure to exercise jurisdiction – refusing to act where jurisdiction exists.
  • Irregular or illegal exercise of jurisdiction – acting within jurisdictional bounds but in an unlawful or procedurally irregular manner.

The third category—subject of this article—is the most nuanced, for it straddles the line between mere legal error (unreviewable on revision or certiorari) and a jurisdictional defect that vitiates the decision ab initio.

Constitutional Dimensions

Articles 226 and 227: Supervisory and Corrective Jurisdiction

In Hari Vishnu Kamath v. Syed Ahmad Ishaque (1955), the Supreme Court drew a critical distinction between writs of prohibition (addressing excess of jurisdiction) and certiorari (addressing patent errors apparent on the face of the record)[2]. While acknowledging that High Courts do not sit in appeal over Election Tribunals, the Court treated a manifest misapplication of Rule 47(1)(c) of the 1951 Rules as an irregular exercise of jurisdiction warranting certiorari. The judgment crystallised two propositions:

  • Error must be “manifest on the face of the record” to justify interference.
  • An irregular exercise that results in violation of a mandatory statutory provision equates to jurisdictional error.

Article 32 and the Doctrine of Alternative Remedies

Smt. Ujjam Bai v. State of Uttar Pradesh (1962) circumscribed the Supreme Court’s intervention under Article 32 in taxation matters, holding that misconstruction of an intra-vires statute by a quasi-judicial authority is not per se a breach of fundamental rights[3]. The Court emphasized exhaustion of statutory remedies, thereby signalling that only jurisdictional errors going to competence, not irregularities within jurisdiction, can be corrected via Article 32.

Statutory Framework: Section 115 CPC

Section 115 CPC empowers High Courts to revise orders where the subordinate court “has exercised a jurisdiction not vested in it by law, failed to exercise a jurisdiction so vested, or acted in the exercise of its jurisdiction illegally or with material irregularity.” The legislative text thus mirrors the tripartite classification. Case-law has incrementally clarified the contours of the third limb.

Limiting Excessive Interference

In Janardan Reddy v. State of Hyderabad (1951) the Supreme Court drew a “basic difference” between want of jurisdiction and irregular exercise thereof[4]. Akin reasoning appears in Kannan v. Food Inspector (Ker HC, 1964) and more recently in Ambadas Shinde v. Ashok Mamurkar (2017) where the Court warned against re-appreciation of evidence under the guise of revisional review[5].

Illustrative High Court Applications

  • Mohunt Bhagwan Ramanuj Das (Cal HC, 1896) emphasised that not every error qualifies as jurisdictional—only those mistakes that vitiate competence.
  • Laxmandas v. Chunnilal (MP HC, 1930) treated the application of an inapposite law as an “illegal action,” thus revisable.[6]
  • Appu Pillai v. Nataraja Pillai (Mad HC, 1929) declined interference where the lower court merely evaluated evidence, underscoring that factual errors fall outside Section 115.

Doctrinal Tests Evolved by the Supreme Court

Prejudice and Nullity: Kiran Singh v. Chaman Paswan

Section 11 of the Suits Valuation Act introduces the “prejudice” test: jurisdictional objections based on valuation cannot succeed absent demonstrable prejudice affecting the merits[7]. The Court conceptualised “prejudice” as substantive injustice, signalling that procedural irregularities without adverse impact may be ignored.

Civil Court Exclusion: Dhulabhai v. State of M.P.

The “Dhulabhai principles” govern when statutory remedies oust civil jurisdiction. Where a statute provides a complete apparatus and expressly bars civil suits, civil jurisdiction is excluded unless the statutory tribunal acts ultra vires. Conversely, irregular exercise of jurisdiction within the statute must be corrected intra-framework, sustaining the autonomy of specialised adjudication[8].

Revisional Boundaries: M.L. Sethi v. R.P. Kapur

The Court reaffirmed that Section 115 targets jurisdictional errors, not mere legal mistakes. Discovery orders in pauper proceedings were upheld, signalling tolerance for discretionary procedural orders unless they destroy jurisdictional competence[9].

Analytical Synthesis

A coherent reading of the authorities suggests the following cumulative test for identifying “irregular exercise of jurisdiction” warranting supervisory correction:

  1. The tribunal/court possesses initial jurisdiction over the subject-matter and parties.
  2. It commits a manifest violation of a mandatory statutory or constitutional requirement.
  3. The violation affects the decision-making process so fundamentally that it produces substantive injustice or defeats legislative intent.
  4. No equally efficacious statutory remedy exists—or, if it exists, has been pursued without redress.

Mere erroneous findings of fact or law, howsoever grave, fall short of this threshold unless they alter the tribunal’s jurisdictional footing. This distinction preserves the vertical judicial hierarchy and prevents supervisory courts from transmuting into courts of appeal.

Practical Implications

  • Pleadings: Petitioners must articulate how the impugned act meets the cumulative test; bald allegations of “illegality” are insufficient.
  • Drafting Tribunals’ Orders: Subordinate courts must demonstrate conscious application of mind to mandatory provisions to insulate their orders from supervisory attack.
  • Legislative Drafting: Where Parliament or State Legislatures intend to bar supervisory review, they must employ clear and unambiguous language; courts will otherwise presume residual jurisdiction to correct irregular exercises that subvert due process.

Conclusion

The Indian legal system draws a principled line between lack of jurisdiction and irregular exercise of jurisdiction. The latter, though committed within the court’s substantive competence, attracts supervisory correction only when it violates mandatory norms and occasions substantive injustice. The jurisprudence—from Hari Vishnu Kamath through M.L. Sethi—reflects an enduring effort to balance two imperatives: (a) protecting litigants from grave procedural aberrations, and (b) preventing supervisory courts from degenerating into appellate forums. Appreciating this balance is indispensable for practitioners, judges, and lawmakers intent on preserving the integrity and efficiency of the Indian adjudicatory process.

Footnotes

  1. See the language of Section 115 CPC; also Mohunt Bhagwan Ramanuj Das v. Khetter Moni Dassi (1896) (Cal HC).
  2. Hari Vishnu Kamath v. Syed Ahmad Ishaque, 1955 SCC 0 1104.
  3. Smt. Ujjam Bai v. State of U.P., AIR 1962 SC 1621.
  4. Janardan Reddy v. State of Hyderabad, AIR 1951 SC 217.
  5. Ambadas Khanduji Shinde v. Ashok Sadashiv Mamurkar, 2017 SCC OnLine SC 412.
  6. Laxmandas v. Chunnilal, (1930) ILR M.P. — see discussion in judgment.
  7. Kiran Singh v. Chaman Paswan, 1954 SCR 117.
    Section 11, Suits Valuation Act, 1887.
  8. Dhulabhai v. State of M.P., AIR 1969 SC 78.
  9. M.L. Sethi v. R.P. Kapur, (1972) 2 SCC 427.