Invoking Article 227 of the Indian Constitution

Invoking Article 227 of the Indian Constitution: Scope, Thresholds, and Jurisprudential Trends

Introduction

Article 227 of the Constitution of India vests every High Court with “superintendence over all courts and tribunals” within its territorial jurisdiction.[1] Although couched in wide terms, the power is designed as an exceptional corrective mechanism rather than an additional appellate tier. This article critically examines when Article 227 can be invoked, mapping the constitutional text, statutory interplay, and evolving case-law from the Supreme Court and various High Courts.

Constitutional and Statutory Matrix

Textual Grant

Article 227(1) confers a general power of superintendence; clauses (2) and (3) enumerate ancillary administrative functions.[1] Unlike Article 226, which is an original writ jurisdiction directed primarily at persons, Article 227 is supervisory, aimed at courts and tribunals. Its lineage traces to Section 107 of the Government of India Act, 1915 and Section 224 of the Government of India Act, 1935, reaffirming its jurisdiction-regulating purpose.[2]

Relationship with Article 226 and Section 115 CPC

The amendment of Section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908—curtailing revisional powers—re-energised recourse to Articles 226/227.[8] However, the Supreme Court has repeatedly clarified that constitutional powers are not fettered by statutory amendments (Surya Dev Rai, later partly overruled)[5]. The dichotomy is now settled as follows:

  • Article 226 – original jurisdiction; addresses violations of fundamental or other legal rights; amenability confined to “State” or public authorities.
  • Article 227 – supervisory jurisdiction; ensures that subordinate courts/tribunals act within jurisdiction and according to law; extends even to purely civil disputes.

Jurisprudential Evolution

Foundational Phase

In Waryam Singh v. Amarnath the Supreme Court described Article 227 as a “supervisory jurisdiction” to be used “sparingly” for keeping subordinate courts within bounds.[2] The Court intervened because the Rent Controller’s refusal to order eviction was “arbitrary.” The early doctrine therefore allowed interference when subordinate tribunals:

  • Assumed jurisdiction without authority, or
  • Acted perversely or arbitrarily causing manifest injustice.

Maturation and Self-Limitation

In Mohd. Yunus v. Mohd. Mustaqim, the Court reiterated that High Courts “do not act as appellate courts” under Article 227 and cannot “re-weigh evidence or correct mere errors of law.”[3]

A decade later, Estralla Rubber v. Dass Estate castigated a High Court that had “arrogated to itself the powers of a court of appeal.” The apex Court restored the trial and appellate courts’ concurrent factual findings, reinforcing the narrow compass of Article 227.[4]

Expansion and Retrenchment: the Surya Dev Rai Episode

Surya Dev Rai v. Ram Chander Rai (2003) enlarged the perceived ambit by holding that after the Section 115 CPC amendment, judicial orders of civil courts could be challenged under Articles 226/227.[5] The ruling blurred the Article 226/227 divide and triggered a surge of “combined” petitions labelled under both articles, as lamented by several High Courts.[9][10]

Corrective restraint arrived in Shalini Shyam Shetty v. Rajendra Shankar Patil (2010), where the Supreme Court listed exhaustive limitations—superintendence is not for private landlord-tenant disputes absent statutory duty.[6] Finally, a three-judge bench in Radhey Shyam v. Chhabi Nath (2015) overruled Surya Dev Rai in part, holding that judicial orders of civil courts are not amenable to Article 226, though Article 227 remains available.[7]

Contemporary Threshold for Invocation

The cumulative doctrine distilled from Supreme Court and High Court pronouncements may be synthesised into the following tests:

  1. Jurisdictional Error – where the subordinate court/tribunal
    • (a) assumes jurisdiction not vested in it, or
    • (b) fails to exercise jurisdiction so vested, resulting in failure of justice.[12][14]
  2. Perversity or Patent Illegality – findings based on no evidence, misreading of material evidence, or conclusions that shock judicial conscience.[4][13]
  3. Violation of Natural Justice – denial of fair hearing, bias, or breach of audi alteram partem.[12][16]
  4. Grave Injustice or Abuse of Process – orders leading to miscarriage of justice, manifest arbitrariness, or abuse of judicial process.[2][6]
  5. No Alternate Adequate Remedy – though not an absolute bar, availability of efficacious appellate or revisional remedies militates against Article 227 intervention.[3][6]

Interface with Procedural Law and Intra-Court Appeals

Where a litigant invokes both Articles 226 and 227, courts examine the “true nature” of relief to determine maintainability of Letters Patent Appeals or intra-court appeals. The Bombay and Allahabad High Courts emphasise party autonomy but insist that if substantive relief is traceable to Article 226, an appeal should lie; mere ancillary directions touching Article 227 will not bar appeal.[9][10]

Practical Guidelines for Litigants and Courts

  • Petitions should be clearly labelled; omnibus captions under both Articles should be avoided unless justified by pleadings.
  • Plead specific jurisdictional flaws or perversity; factual re-appreciation is impermissible.
  • Exhaust statutory appeals/revisions unless urgency or patent illegality warrants immediate supervision.
  • High Courts must record reasons demonstrating how the impugned order satisfies one of the recognised grounds; absence thereof invites appellate censure.[4][7]

Conclusion

Article 227 remains a vital, though sparingly employable, constitutional tool to protect the integrity of judicial processes. The Supreme Court’s recent clarifications—in particular Radhey Shyam—re-anchor the provision to its supervisory moorings, rejecting its use as a surrogate appellate jurisdiction. Going forward, litigants and courts alike must internalise the settled parameters: jurisdictional oversight, not error-correction, is the leitmotif; correction of lawful conclusions, however erroneous, is the exclusive province of statutory appeals.

Footnotes

  1. Constitution of India, Article 227.
  2. Waryam Singh v. Amarnath, AIR 1954 SC 215.
  3. Mohd. Yunus v. Mohd. Mustaqim, (1983) 4 SCC 566.
  4. Estralla Rubber v. Dass Estate (P) Ltd., (2001) 8 SCC 97.
  5. Surya Dev Rai v. Ram Chander Rai, (2003) 6 SCC 675.
  6. Shalini Shyam Shetty v. Rajendra Shankar Patil, (2010) 8 SCC 329.
  7. Radhey Shyam v. Chhabi Nath, (2015) 5 SCC 423.
  8. Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, s. 115 (as amended by Act 46 of 1999).
  9. Aidal Singh v. Karan Singh, AIR 1957 All 414.
  10. Mansaram Sampat Patil v. Sambhu Harchand Chaudhary, 2004 SCC OnLine Bom 533.
  11. Dasari Laxmi v. Bejjenki Sathi Reddy, 2014 SCC OnLine AP 955.
  12. Ramesh Chand Tiwari v. Board of Revenue, 2005 SCC OnLine Raj 59.
  13. M/s India Pipe Fitting Co. v. Fakruddin M.A. Baker, (1977) 4 SCC 587.
  14. Southern & Rajamani Transport (P) Ltd. v. R. Srinivasan, 2010 SCC OnLine Mad 2346.
  15. Sir Sobha Singh & Sons (P) Ltd. v. Kamal Nursery, 2019 SCC OnLine Del 10905.
  16. A. Nagarajan v. A. Madhanakumar, 1996 SCC OnLine Mad 17.