Inimical and Partisan Witnesses: Standards of Appreciation under Indian Evidence Law

Inimical and Partisan Witnesses: Standards of Appreciation under Indian Evidence Law

1. Introduction

The testimonial trustworthiness of witnesses who bear hostility towards the accused or possess a partisan alignment with the prosecution has persistently vexed Indian courts. The Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (hereinafter “IEA”) is silent on the nomenclature “inimical” or “partisan” witness, yet judicial practice has evolved nuanced standards to evaluate such testimony. This article critically analyses those standards, synthesising seminal Supreme Court and High Court authorities, with particular emphasis on Hari Obula Reddy v. State of A.P.[1], State of U.P. v. Krishna Master[2], and allied jurisprudence. It further explores the statutory architecture (ss. 134, 146, 154–155 IEA) and policy considerations underpinning the contemporary approach.

2. Conceptual Taxonomy

2.1 Interested, Partisan and Inimical Witnesses

Indian courts distinguish multiple overlapping categories:

  • Interested witness: one with a direct stake in the outcome, typically relatives of the victim.
  • Partisan witness: one aligned with a litigating faction by reason of rivalry or affinity, even absent direct legal interest.
  • Inimical witness: one bearing proven hostility towards the accused.
  • Hostile witness: a procedural label under s. 154 IEA permitting cross-examination by the party calling the witness when hostility to that party is exhibited.[3]

2.2 Statutory Framework

  • s. 134 IEA – “no particular number of witnesses required”; quality prevails over quantity.
  • ss. 146 & 155 IEA – mechanisms to impeach credit and test veracity.
  • s. 154 IEA – judicial discretion to declare a witness hostile and allow cross-examination by the proponent.
  • Illustration (g) to s. 114 IEA – court may presume that evidence which could be produced and is withheld would be unfavourable to the party withholding it.

3. Doctrinal Evolution in Supreme Court Jurisprudence

3.1 Early Foundations

In Vadivelu Thevar v. State of Madras[4], the Court categorised witnesses as wholly reliable, wholly unreliable, or “neither wholly reliable nor wholly unreliable” and affirmed that conviction can rest on a single credible witness notwithstanding relationship. Dalip Singh v. State of Punjab (1953)[5] added that close relatives are often the least likely to shield true offenders, cautioning courts to test — not discard — their evidence.

3.2 Reinforcement of Credibility over Relationship

State of Rajasthan v. Kalki[6] reiterated that minor inconsistencies do not erode the substantive core of an “interested” widow’s evidence. Similarly, Kartik Malhar v. State of Bihar[7] applied s. 134 IEA to sustain conviction on the sole testimony of the deceased’s widow after other eyewitnesses turned hostile.

3.3 Analytical Framework for Partisan or Inimical Witnesses

The definitive articulation appears in Hari Obula Reddy. The Supreme Court held that an “interested” or “partisan” witness is not inherently untrustworthy; the correct judicial approach is:

  1. Examine the testimony with careful scrutiny.
  2. Seek corroboration from independent or circumstantial evidence where available.
  3. Assess whether animus afforded the witness a motive to falsely implicate.

Applying this triad, the Court endorsed the High Court’s reliance on PW-1 and PW-2 (both allied to the deceased faction) once corroborated inter alia by the rickshaw-driver PW-4 and medical evidence.

3.4 Contemporary Restatement

In State of U.P. v. Krishna Master, the apex court castigated hypertechnical rejection of rustic and child eyewitnesses, stressing “holistic appreciation” and the insignificance of socio-educational status. Notably, the Court found inimical history an additional guarantee of presence, not a reason for exclusion, because the hostile witness would hardly spare the true culprit to falsely swear against another.

4. Parameters of Judicial Scrutiny

4.1 Motive to Falsify

Courts are wary where the hostility is so intense that fabrication is probable (Mohd. Shafique Pahalwan[8]). Yet animus alone is insufficient to discredit if the evidence otherwise “rings true”.[9]

4.2 Corroboration Requirement

While not a legal mandate, corroboration is a prudential rule. In M.K. Anthony[10] the Court accepted extrajudicial confession corroborated by circumstantial evidence notwithstanding the witness’s prior acquaintance with the accused. Conversely, the Allahabad High Court in Masalti[11] acquitted where identification evidence from partisan witnesses lacked promptitude and procedural safeguards.

4.3 Minor Discrepancies

Judicial tolerance for peripheral inconsistencies remains high (Ramesh Harijan[12]), provided the substratum of prosecution is intact. The “ring of truth” test from Anil Singh (1988) persists as guiding light.

4.4 Hostility under Section 154

English common-law labels “hostile” or “adverse” are not decisive in India (Sat Pal v. Delhi Administration[13]). Grant of s. 154 permission is conditioned on demonstrable hostility to the calling party, not mere unhelpfulness (CBI v. Rajesh Chaudhary[14]). Importantly, once declared hostile, the witness’s evidence is not obliterated; courts may rely on credible portions (Bhagwan Singh v. State of Haryana 1976; affirmed in Ramesh Harijan).

5. High Court Divergence and Convergence

Several Allahabad High Court decisions adopt a cautious — sometimes sceptical — stance towards inimical witnesses (Vijai Shanker Misra[15], Birey[16]). Yet even within that court, the jurisprudence aligns with Supreme Court principles when corroboration exists (Bani Singh[17]). The Madras High Court in Arjunan[18] synthesised Supreme Court dicta, warning against “mechanical rejection” of relative-witness testimony.

6. Policy Considerations

The primacy of oral evidence, underscored in Subair T.P. v. Union of India[19], necessitates robust judicial tools to filter truth without chilling genuine witness participation. Witness protection schemes, expedited trials, and technology-based testimony (video-link) may reduce the adversarial pressure that breeds hostility or partisanship.

7. Synthesis of Governing Principles

  1. Relation or enmity does not per se render testimony inadmissible or unreliable.[20]
  2. Courts must scrutinise such evidence with caution, seeking corroboration where practicable.
  3. Minor omissions, rustic expression, or child-like narration are immaterial to credibility if the core narrative is consistent.
  4. Section 154 hostility merely expands the field of cross-examination; it neither expunges the testimony nor prohibits reliance on truthful segments.
  5. The golden thread remains whether the testimony bears the “ring of truth” when tested against surrounding circumstances, medical and forensic evidence, and probabilities.

8. Conclusion

Indian evidence law has consciously eschewed formalistic distrust of inimical or partisan witnesses, opting instead for a calibrated evaluative model. Supreme Court jurisprudence, particularly post-Hari Obula Reddy, harmonises two competing imperatives: safeguarding the accused from vendetta-driven perjury and ensuring that genuine eyewitness accounts are not discarded on relational or animus grounds. The judicial task is therefore not rejection but rigorous scrutiny, deploying corroborative yardsticks and common-sense realism. Such an approach upholds both the presumption of innocence and society’s interest in accurate fact-finding — the twin pillars of criminal justice.

Footnotes

  1. Hari Obula Reddy and Others v. State of Andhra Pradesh, (1981) 3 SCC 675.
  2. State of U.P. v. Krishna Master & Others, (2010) 12 SCC 324.
  3. Sat Pal v. Delhi Administration, (1976) 1 SCC 727.
  4. Vadivelu Thevar v. State of Madras, AIR 1957 SC 614.
  5. Dalip Singh v. State of Punjab, AIR 1953 SC 364.
  6. State of Rajasthan v. Kalki, (1981) 2 SCC 752.
  7. Kartik Malhar v. State of Bihar, (1996) 1 SCC 614.
  8. Mohd. Shafique Pahalwan v. State of M.P., 2000 Cri LJ 3560 (MP).
  9. State of U.P. v. Anil Singh, 1988 Supp SCC 686.
  10. State of U.P. v. M.K. Anthony, (1985) 1 SCC 505.
  11. Masalti v. State of U.P., 2004 SCC OnLine All 1153.
  12. State of U.P. v. Ramesh Harijan, (2012) 5 SCC 777.
  13. Sat Pal v. Delhi Administration, supra.
  14. Central Bureau of Investigation v. Rajesh Chaudhary, 2016 SCC OnLine Raj 4847.
  15. Vijai Shanker Misra v. State, 1984 SCC OnLine All 389.
  16. Birey v. State of U.P., 2012 SCC OnLine All 6.
  17. Bani Singh v. State of U.P., 1995 SCC OnLine All 674.
  18. Arjunan & Others v. State, 1992 Cri LJ 2374 (Mad).
  19. Subair T.P. v. Union of India, 2019 SCC OnLine Ker 3849.
  20. Brathi @ Sukhdev Singh v. State of Punjab, (1991) 1 SCC 519.