The Evolving Landscape of Inherent Powers of Tribunals in India: A Juridical Exposition

Introduction

The proliferation of tribunals in India marks a significant shift in the administration of justice, designed to provide specialized, speedy, and effective resolution of disputes in various sectors. These quasi-judicial bodies, established under diverse statutes, play a crucial role in alleviating the burden on traditional courts (Union Of India v. R. Gandhi, 2007; ROJER MATHEW v. SOUTH INDIAN BANK LTD AND ORS CHIEF MANAGER, 2018). However, a perennial question that has engaged legal scholarship and judicial scrutiny pertains to the scope and nature of powers exercisable by these tribunals, particularly those not explicitly conferred by their parent statutes – commonly referred to as 'inherent' or 'implied' powers. This article seeks to analyze the jurisprudence surrounding the inherent powers of tribunals in India, drawing upon key judicial pronouncements and legal principles.

The traditional view posits that tribunals, being creatures of statute, can only exercise powers expressly granted or those necessarily implied by the statutory scheme (Varada Iyengar v. Ramudu, 1982 MLJ 2 517). Conversely, an emerging perspective, championed notably by some High Courts, argues that tribunals discharging judicial functions must be deemed to possess certain inherent powers to do complete justice and prevent abuse of process, akin to civil courts (Paul v. Asst. Registrar, 1998; K. Mohan v. K.H Jayaprakash, 2012).

Conceptual Framework: Inherent, Implied, and Ancillary Powers

The term 'inherent powers' is often associated with civil courts, as recognized by Section 151 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, which saves the inherent power of the court to make such orders as may be necessary for the ends of justice or to prevent abuse of the process of the Court. These powers are considered to pre-exist the Code (Varada Iyengar v. Ramudu, 1982 MLJ 2 517; Punjab Merchantile Bank, Ltd. v. Kishan Singh, 1962 SCC ONLINE P&H 202). For tribunals, the discourse often shifts to 'implied' or 'ancillary' powers – those powers that are not expressly stated but are deemed essential for the effective exercise of the jurisdiction and functions explicitly conferred by the statute. The maxim "Quando lex aliquid alicui concedit, concedere videtur et id sine quo res ipsa esse non potest" (when the law gives anything to anyone, it gives also all those things without which the thing itself would be unavailable) is often invoked in this context (Collector Of Madras v. C. Logeswara Rao, 1985 SCC ONLINE MAD 212).

The Calcutta High Court in M/S. Agarwal Hardware Industries v. The Employees' State Insurance Corporation (1976) noted the lack of unanimity on whether tribunals possess inherent powers, while acknowledging that the "basic and the fundamental feature which is common to both courts and the tribunals is that they discharge judicial functions and exercise judicial powers which inherently vest in a sovereign state." This functional similarity forms a cornerstone for arguments advocating for broader powers for tribunals.

Judicial Pronouncements on Powers of Tribunals

Powers to Ensure Effective Adjudication and Procedural Fairness

The Supreme Court and various High Courts have, on several occasions, recognized powers necessary for tribunals to effectively discharge their duties, even if not explicitly spelled out in the statute.

A seminal pronouncement in this regard is Income Tax Officer, Cannanore. v. M. K. Mohammed Kunhi (1969 AIR SC 430), where the Supreme Court held that the Income Tax Appellate Tribunal (I.T.AT) possesses the implied power to grant a stay of recovery of penalties pending an appeal. The Court reasoned that such power is implicitly vested to make the appellate process effective, as "without the ability to stay proceedings, the purpose of an appeal would be undermined." This judgment established that when a statute confers a broad jurisdiction, it implicitly includes all necessary powers to effectively execute that jurisdiction.

Similarly, in Grindlays Bank Ltd. v. Central Government Industrial Tribunal And Others (1981 SCC L&S 309), the Supreme Court affirmed the Industrial Tribunal's authority to set aside an ex parte award. It held that tribunals inherently possess ancillary powers necessary to discharge their functions effectively, including rectifying procedural defects ex debito justitiae (by reason of justice) to ensure fairness. The Court emphasized that such power exists until the award becomes enforceable.

The power of a Debt Recovery Tribunal to pass injunction orders, even if not specifically mentioned in Section 19(6) of the Recovery of Debts Due to Banks and Financial Institutions Act, 1993, was upheld in Allahabad Bank, Calcutta v. Radha Krishna Maity And Others (1999 SCC 6 755). The Supreme Court observed that the Tribunal's powers were wider than those of a civil court (subject to limitations) and it could go beyond the Code of Civil Procedure, provided it observed principles of natural justice.

The power to regulate its own procedure, including referring matters to a larger bench in case of conflicting opinions or doubts, was recognized for the Customs, Excise and Gold (Control) Appellate Tribunal (CEGAT) in Union Of India And Another v. Paras Laminates (P) Ltd. (1990 SCC 4 453). The Court interpreted Section 129-C of the Customs Act, 1962, to include express and implied powers for the Tribunal to regulate its proceedings effectively, balancing consistency with the need to correct errors.

In Commissioner Of Customs And Central Excise, Ahmedabad v. Kumar Cotton Mills (P) Ltd. And Another (2005 SCC 13 296), the Supreme Court acknowledged that provisions like sub-section (2-A) of Section 35-C of the Central Excise Act, 1944, were made to curb dilatory tactics, implicitly supporting the tribunal's role in managing its proceedings efficiently.

The Andhra Pradesh High Court in Maganti Suryanarayana v. Board Of Revenue, Government Of A.P. (1975) held that tribunals, like courts, have inherent powers to pass orders for the ends of justice, citing the Income Tax Appellate Tribunal's power to set aside an ex parte decree passed on merits if sufficient cause for non-appearance is shown.

Powers to Recall, Review, and Rectify Orders

The power to review an order on its merits is generally considered a creature of statute and not an inherent power. In Budhia Swain And Others v. Gopinath Deb And Others (1999 SCC 4 396), the Supreme Court clarified that the OEA Collector lacked inherent review powers beyond the statutory provisions (Section 38-A of the Orissa Estates Abolition Act, 1951), which limited review to clerical or arithmetical errors. However, the Court did acknowledge the inherent power to recall orders obtained by fraud, misrepresentation, or significant jurisdictional errors.

This distinction was further elaborated in Kapra Mazdoor Ekta Union v. Birla Cotton Spinning And Weaving Mills Ltd. And Another (2005 SCC 13 777). The Supreme Court held that an Industrial Tribunal could recall its award before it became enforceable under Section 17-A of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, particularly for procedural defects. However, a merit-based review requires explicit statutory authorization, which was absent. The Court, referencing *Grindlays Bank*, affirmed that procedural reviews are generally inherent.

The scope of rectification powers was examined in Honda Siel Power Products Ltd. v. Commissioner Of Income Tax, Delhi (2007 SCC 12 596). The Supreme Court held that the Income Tax Appellate Tribunal (ITAT) was within its rights under Section 254(2) of the Income Tax Act, 1961, to rectify a mistake apparent from the record (overlooking a binding precedent), distinguishing this from a review on merits. This power ensures that no party is prejudiced by evident mistakes.

Conversely, the CEGAT in Ahmedabad Manufacturing & Calico Printing Co. Ltd. v. Collector Of Customs, Bombay (1985) took a stricter view, stating that what is not specifically provided for in the Act (regarding review beyond limited rectification) cannot be inferred, and Rule 41 of its Procedure Rules related to interim orders or directions, not final orders.

Limitations and Contrasting Judicial Approaches

Despite the trend towards recognizing necessary powers, some judicial pronouncements emphasize a stricter interpretation. The Madras High Court in Varada Iyengar v. Ramudu (1982 MLJ 2 517) drew a sharp distinction: "The conception of inherent powers is opposed to statute-created jurisdictions... Tribunals appointed under statutes... are creatures of statute... they owe their existence as well as the definition of their powers to the statute." While acknowledging that incidental or ancillary powers might be read into a statute, the court stated, "the doctrine of implied powers is quite different from imputing to the tribunals any inherent powers." This view was echoed by the Jammu and Kashmir High Court in Mohinder Singh Others v. State Through Accountability Commission Others (2013), citing *Varada Iyengar*.

The challenge lies in balancing the principle that tribunals are creatures of statute with the functional necessity for them to administer justice effectively. As observed in M/S. Agarwal Hardware Industries v. The Employees' State Insurance Corporation (1976), there is no unanimity in judicial pronouncements on this issue.

The Progressive Stance of the Kerala High Court

A significant line of cases from the Kerala High Court has advocated for a more expansive view of tribunal powers. In Cheru Ouseph v. Kunjipathumma (1981 KLT 495), a judgment frequently cited, M.P. Menon, J. powerfully argued:

"What, after all, is the inherent power saved by S. 151 of the Code of Civil Procedure? A court is constituted for doing justice and must be deemed to possess all powers as may be necessary to do the right and undo wrongs in the course of administration of justice... And therefore, where a tribunal exercises the same kind of power i.e., part of the judicial power of the State, as the Supreme Court has observed, why should it be denied similar inherent or residuary powers?"

This reasoning was endorsed in subsequent Kerala High Court decisions like Paul v. Asst. Registrar (1998), which quoted Chandrasekhara Menon, J. from Dy. Conservator v. Sarojini (1981 KLN 28): "Inherent jurisdiction is there even with tribunals of limited jurisdiction." Further, in Abdulla v. Rent Controller (1984 SCC ONLINE KER 181), the court observed that "functions of Tribunals are as vital in the life of the people as functions of courts. It is therefore increasingly being recognized that such tribunals must be treated as possessing inherent power for the performance of their duties and for the purpose of doing justice between the parties." This sentiment was reiterated in K. Mohan v. K.H Jayaprakash (2012), suggesting a reconsideration of the traditional approach to tribunal powers if their usefulness is not to be belittled.

The Madras High Court in Collector Of Madras v. C. Logeswara Rao (1985 SCC ONLINE MAD 212) also opined that judicial and quasi-judicial tribunals adjudicating rights "must possess inherent powers, apart from the express provisions of the law, which are necessary for their existence and for the proper discharge of the duties imposed upon them by law," including the power to review to correct patent errors.

Powers of Execution and Contempt

The question of whether tribunals possess inherent powers to execute their own orders or punish for contempt has also been debated. In Braj Foundation v. S Govt. Of U.P. Ors. (National Green Tribunal, 2014), the NGT, citing the Supreme Court in State of Karnataka v. Vishwabharathi House-Building Coop. Society (2003) 2 SCC 412, observed that "courts or tribunals must be held to possess power to execute their own orders." The NGT further deliberated on whether its power of contempt could be treated as inherent, given its constitutional genesis (Articles 323B and 253).

The Supreme Court in Municipal Corporation Of Greater Mumbai (S) v. Ankita Sinha And Others (S) (2021), while discussing the National Green Tribunal Act, noted that the NGT was permitted to lay down its own procedure and was not bound by the rules of evidence, indicating a degree of procedural autonomy, though the power of judicial review akin to Article 226 was deliberately omitted.

Conclusion

The jurisprudence on the inherent powers of tribunals in India reflects an ongoing evolution from a rigid "creature of statute" doctrine towards a more functional approach. While the power to review decisions on merits is largely held to be statutory, the Supreme Court and various High Courts have increasingly recognized implied or ancillary powers essential for tribunals to effectively adjudicate disputes, ensure procedural fairness, prevent abuse of process, and do substantial justice. Landmark cases like M. K. Mohammed Kunhi and Grindlays Bank have paved the way for acknowledging powers such as granting stays and setting aside ex-parte orders, even in the absence of express statutory provisions.

The distinction between courts and tribunals remains, and the source of tribunals' powers continues to be primarily their enabling statutes. However, the judicial trend indicates a pragmatic recognition that if tribunals are to fulfill their mandate of delivering specialized and efficient justice, they must be equipped with powers necessary to make their proceedings meaningful and their orders effective. The progressive views, particularly from the Kerala High Court, suggest a continuing dialogue on equating the functional necessity of powers for tribunals with those traditionally associated with courts. Ultimately, the scope of such powers will continue to be delineated by courts on a case-by-case basis, interpreting the specific statutory framework governing each tribunal while upholding the principles of justice and procedural fairness.