Impeaching Witness Credit: An Analysis of Section 155, Indian Evidence Act

Impeaching the Credit of Witnesses in India: A Comprehensive Analysis of Section 155 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872

Introduction

The edifice of a fair trial rests significantly on the veracity of evidence presented, particularly testimonial evidence. In the adversarial system prevalent in India, the ability to challenge and scrutinize the credibility of witnesses is paramount. Section 155 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (hereinafter "IEA") provides the statutory framework for impeaching the credit of a witness. This provision is a cornerstone of trial procedure, enabling parties to expose potential unreliability, bias, or falsehood in testimony, thereby assisting the court in its quest for truth. This article undertakes a comprehensive analysis of Section 155, exploring its various facets, judicial interpretations, interplay with other legal provisions, and its evolution, drawing upon statutory language and pertinent case law.

Understanding Section 155 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872

Section 155 of the IEA delineates the methods by which the credit of a witness may be impeached. It states:

"The credit of a witness may be impeached in the following ways by the adverse party, or, with the consent of the Court, by the party who calls him:—
(1) by the evidence of persons who testify that they, from their knowledge of the witness, believe him to be unworthy of credit;
(2) by proof that the witness has been bribed, or has accepted the offer of a bribe, or has received any other corrupt inducement to give his evidence;
(3) by proof of former statements inconsistent with any part of his evidence which is liable to be contradicted;
(4) when a man is prosecuted for rape or an attempt to ravish, it may be shown that the prosecutrix was of generally immoral character. (Sub-clause (4) was omitted by Act 4 of 2003)
Explanation.—A witness declaring another witness to be unworthy of credit may not, upon his examination-in-chief, give reasons for his belief, but he may be asked his reasons in cross-examination, and the answers which he gives cannot be contradicted, though, if they are false, he may afterwards be charged with giving false evidence."

The Kerala High Court in K.V. Vijyadas v. State Of Kerala (2017) emphasized that the power conferred by Section 155 (and Section 165) of the IEA is paramount and can be exercised at any stage of the proceedings, even after closing the defence evidence, for the just decision of the case.

Key Facets of Section 155

  • Who Can Impeach: Primarily, the adverse party has the right to impeach a witness's credit. However, the party calling the witness can also do so, but only with the consent of the Court. This links to Section 154 of the IEA, which allows a party to cross-examine its own witness with the court's permission, often when the witness turns "hostile" (Sat Paul v. Delhi Administration, 1975; Mattam Ravi v. Mattam Raja Yellaiah, 2017). The Supreme Court in Sat Paul v. Delhi Administration (1975) clarified that the discretion under Section 154 is unqualified and untrammelled, and the grant of permission does not automatically mean the witness is "hostile" or that their entire testimony is washed off the record.
  • Modes of Impeachment: The section specifies distinct methods, which are generally considered exhaustive, although the principles underlying them may find broader application in assessing credibility.

Judicial Interpretation and Application of Section 155

Impeachment by Prior Inconsistent Statements (Section 155(3))

This is one of the most frequently invoked grounds. Section 155(3) allows proof of former statements inconsistent with the witness's current testimony, provided the part of the evidence is liable to be contradicted. This provision must be read in conjunction with Section 145 of the IEA, which outlines the procedure for cross-examining a witness as to previous statements in writing. The Supreme Court in Tahsildar Singh & Another v. State Of U.P. (1959) extensively discussed the use of statements made to the police under Section 162 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (CrPC) for contradicting a witness under Section 145 IEA. The Court clarified that omissions in police statements can amount to contradictions if they are significant and material. The Karnataka High Court in K.N. Kiran Kumar v. State By Mandya Rual Police (2016) also noted Sections 145 and 155 of the IEA as relevant for using previous statements.

The Supreme Court in Yusufalli Esmail Nagree v. State Of Maharashtra (1967) held that a contemporaneous tape record of a relevant conversation is admissible and can be used to shake the credit of a witness under Section 155(3) IEA, provided its accuracy and authenticity are established. The Gujarat High Court in State Of Gujarat v. Shailendra Kamalkishor Pande & Ors. (2007), dealing with the admissibility of a CD for impeaching credit under Section 155(3), observed that while admissibility is one aspect, the weight and authenticity of such electronic evidence must be cogently established by the defence.

The Allahabad High Court in Lakhna @ Lakhan Singh v. State Of U.P. (2025), citing Rammi v. State of M.P. (1999), reiterated that a previous statement made by a witness may be used to impeach his credibility in accordance with Section 155(3) of the IEA.

Impeachment by Evidence of Unworthiness of Credit (Section 155(1))

Section 155(1) permits calling other witnesses to testify that, based on their knowledge of the primary witness, they believe that witness to be unworthy of credit. The Explanation to Section 155 clarifies that such a witness cannot give reasons for this belief in examination-in-chief but can be questioned about them in cross-examination. Their answers in cross-examination regarding these reasons are final and cannot be contradicted, though a charge of perjury may lie if false. This method relates to the general reputation and disposition of the witness, a concept touched upon in Queen Empress v. Kartick Chunder Das (1887) in the context of Section 54 IEA, which deals with the relevance of bad character in criminal proceedings.

Impeachment by Proof of Bribery or Corrupt Inducement (Section 155(2))

This clause allows for impeachment by proving that the witness has been bribed, accepted an offer of a bribe, or received any other corrupt inducement to give evidence. Such proof directly attacks the witness's motive and integrity, thereby undermining their credibility. The case of Bhagwan Singh v. State Of Haryana (1976), though primarily about abetment of bribery, underscores the severe implications of corruption on the judicial process, and by extension, on the reliability of a witness involved in such acts.

Interplay with Section 162 CrPC and Section 288 CrPC

The use of previous statements, especially those recorded by the police under Section 161 CrPC, is governed by Section 162 CrPC, which generally bars their use except for contradiction under Section 145 IEA (Tahsildar Singh & Another v. State Of U.P., 1959; V.K. Mishra And Another v. State Of Uttarakhand And Another, 2015). The Supreme Court in Sat Paul v. Delhi Administration (1975) also cautioned against the improper use of police statements for corroboration, emphasizing their limited use for contradiction.

A crucial distinction arises with Section 288 CrPC. While Section 155 IEA allows previous statements to be used for impeaching credit (i.e., to show the witness is unreliable), Section 288 CrPC allows the court, in its discretion, to treat evidence given by a witness in the committal court as substantive evidence in the trial, even if the witness gives different testimony at trial. The Bombay High Court in Emperor v. Maruti Joti Shinde (1921) and Fakira v. King Emperor (1937) clarified that statements admitted under Section 288 CrPC become substantive evidence and are not merely for contradiction under Section 155 IEA.

Application in Specific Contexts

In Munnabee Shoukat Tadvi v. The State Of Maharashtra (2015), the accused took recourse to Section 155 of the IEA to examine an independent witness to depose about the signature on a Nikahnama, thereby attempting to impeach the credibility related to a dying declaration. Furthermore, Section 291-A CrPC, concerning the identification report of a Magistrate, provides that if such a report contains statements to which Section 155 IEA applies, those statements shall be used in accordance with Section 155 (SONYA @ UMESH NANDKUMAR METKARI v. THE STATE OF MAHARASHTRA, 2021).

The Evolution of Section 155: The Deletion of Sub-clause (4)

A significant amendment to Section 155 was the omission of its sub-clause (4). This sub-clause originally permitted, in prosecutions for rape or attempted rape, evidence to be adduced to show that the prosecutrix was of "generally immoral character." This provision was widely criticized for its inherent gender bias, its tendency to shift focus from the accused's conduct to the victim's character, and for perpetuating harmful stereotypes that could deter victims from reporting sexual offences.

Recognizing these grave concerns and based on recommendations from the Law Commission of India (notably in its 84th and 172nd reports), Parliament enacted the Indian Evidence (Amendment) Act, 2002 (Act 4 of 2003), which, inter alia, deleted sub-clause (4) of Section 155. The District Court in State (Through Cid Cs North Goa) Complainant v. Tarunjit Tejpal Accused (2021) extensively discussed this amendment, noting that its object was to prevent defence counsel from questioning the prosecutrix in a rape case about her general character to impeach her credibility. This amendment was a crucial step towards a more victim-sensitive approach in sexual assault trials and aligned with the evolving understanding of consent and dignity. Concurrently, a proviso was added to Section 146 of the IEA, explicitly stating that in a prosecution for rape or attempt to commit rape, it shall not be permissible to put questions in the cross-examination of the prosecutrix as to her general immoral character or previous sexual experience with any person for proving consent or the quality of consent.

Distinction: Impeachment v. Substantive Evidence

It is crucial to understand that evidence adduced under Section 155 is primarily for the purpose of impeaching the credit of a witness – that is, to show that the witness is unreliable and their testimony should not be believed, or believed with caution. Generally, the impeaching material (e.g., a prior inconsistent statement) does not become substantive evidence of the truth of the facts stated therein. For instance, if a witness's prior statement 'X' is used to contradict their current testimony 'Y', the prior statement 'X' serves to discredit 'Y', but 'X' itself does not automatically prove the truth of its contents. However, as noted earlier, there are exceptions, such as statements admitted under Section 288 CrPC, which can be treated as substantive evidence (Emperor v. Maruti Joti Shinde, 1921).

The Supreme Court in Sat Paul v. Delhi Administration (1975) observed that even when a witness is cross-examined and contradicted by the party calling him (with court's leave), their evidence cannot, as a matter of law, be treated as washed off the record altogether. It is for the judge of fact to consider whether the witness stands thoroughly discredited or can still be believed in part.

Conclusion

Section 155 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872, is a vital tool in the pursuit of justice, empowering parties to rigorously test the credibility of witnesses. Its provisions, allowing impeachment through evidence of unworthiness, proof of corruption, or prior inconsistent statements, are fundamental to the adversarial process. Judicial pronouncements have consistently refined its application, ensuring a balance between the right to confront and discredit witnesses and the need to prevent misuse of these procedures. The significant amendment deleting sub-clause (4) reflects a progressive evolution of the law, particularly in safeguarding the dignity of victims of sexual offences.

The power under Section 155, when exercised judiciously and in conjunction with other relevant provisions like Section 145 IEA and various sections of the CrPC, helps the courts to sift chaff from grain, thereby enhancing the quality of adjudication and reinforcing faith in the legal system. The careful scrutiny of witness testimony, facilitated by Section 155, remains an indispensable element of fair trial in India.

References

(Note: Some case citations like Piare Dusadh, State Of Maharashtra v. Dnyaneshwar Laxman Rao Wankhede, Hardip Kaur, Mayur Arora, Ajay Rai were not directly integrated as their primary focus was on other sections or general principles less central to a direct analysis of Section 155's core mechanisms, though they contribute to the broader understanding of evidence and procedure. The aim was to keep the article focused on Section 155 while drawing from the most pertinent references.)