If the informant and the investigating officer is the same person, the accused is entitled to an acquittal: Supreme Court

If the informant and the investigating officer is the same person, the accused is entitled to an acquittal: Supreme Court

Case Title: Mohanlal v. State of Punjab

A three-judge bench of the Supreme Court definitively ruled that the informant and the investigator in NDPS cases cannot be the same individual.

If the informant and the investigating officer were the same individuals, it would be against the concepts of fairness, fair play, and a fair inquiry. 

Is it required for the accused to show bias in such a situation, particularly in light of statutes like the NDPS Act that have a reverse standard of proof? A three-judge bench consisting of Justice Ranjan Gogoi, Justice R. Banumathi, and Justice Navin Sinha examined this issue.

The two-judge panel of the Supreme Court had ruled in State by Inspector of Police, Narcotics Intelligence Bureau, Madurai, Tamilnadu v. Rajangam that the investigating officer who had captured the accused could not have probed the matter. The Supreme Court has reached a different conclusion in two cases, Surender v. State of Haryana and Hardip Singh v. State of Punjab. Rajangam’s case was set aside by the court in Surender v. State of Haryana on the grounds that additional police were looking into the issue.

It further observed that numerous High Courts had voiced divergent opinions.

The single bench view in Naushad case was overturned by a division bench of the Kerala High Court in Kader v. State of Kerala, which noted that the NDPS Act proceedings would not be invalidated by the fact that the detecting officer is also the investigating officer or that an officer with equivalent rank is looking into the case and filing a report with the court in the absence of evidence of specific prejudice to the accused.

The Apex Court panel, upholding the opinion of the single bench in this matter, stated that the position taken by the Kerala High Court in Kader (above) did not meet their approbation. It amounted to maintaining that the FIR was infallible truth, which turned the investigation into an absurdity at the very least.

The bench then proceeded to lay down the law with certainty. It said: "It is therefore held that a fair investigation, which is but the very foundation of a fair trial, necessarily postulates that the informant and the investigator must not be the same person. Justice must not only be done but must appear to be done also. Any possibility of bias or a predetermined conclusion has to be excluded. This requirement is all the more imperative in-laws carrying a reverse burden of proof.”

'If an informant police official in a criminal prosecution, especially when carrying a reverse burden of proof, makes the allegations, is himself asked to investigate, serious doubts will naturally arise with regard to his fairness and impartiality. It is not necessary that bias must actually be proved. It would be illogical to presume and contrary to normal human conduct, that he would at the end of the investigation submit a closure report to conclude false implication with all its attendant consequences for the complainant himself. The result of the investigation would therefore be a foregone conclusion,” Justice Navin Sinha observed in the judgment speaking for the bench.