Hostile Witnesses in Indian Criminal Trials: Doctrinal Evolution, Evidentiary Value, and Reform Imperatives

1. Introduction

The phenomenon of a “hostile witness” – a witness who resiles from, contradicts, or materially departs from a prior statement – has long challenged the administration of criminal justice in India. Judicial pronouncements reveal recurring patterns of intimidation, inducement, delay, and a pervasive “culture of compromise.”^[1] This article critically examines the statutory architecture, the layered jurisprudence of the Supreme Court and High Courts, and policy considerations surrounding hostile witnesses, with particular focus on the evidentiary value of such testimony and the responsibilities it imposes upon trial and appellate courts.

2. Statutory Framework

• Section 154, Indian Evidence Act 1872: empowers the court, on request, to permit the party who calls a witness to put any question permissible in cross-examination.^[2]
• Sections 145–155, Evidence Act: regulate contradictions (s. 145), impeachment of credibility (s. 155) and corroboration requirements.
• Sections 161 & 164, Code of Criminal Procedure 1973: provide the pre-trial statements that often become the benchmark against which hostility is assessed.

The statute is notably silent on the expression “hostile”, leaving its contours to judicial exposition.

3. Jurisprudential Evolution

3.1 Early Approach: Credibility Tests and Judicial Caution

In Emperor v. Haradhan (1933) the Patna High Court articulated the principle that cross-examination of one’s own witness is an “extraordinary phenomenon” which must be sparingly permitted, yet once allowed, the whole evidence remains on record for such value as it commands.^[3] Four decades later, Sat Paul v. Delhi Administration reaffirmed that interested or adverse witnesses require “enhanced scrutiny”, but their evidence cannot be jettisoned wholesale; the court must separate the grain from the chaff.^[4]

3.2 Consolidation: Partial Reliability Doctrine

The Supreme Court in Bhagwan Singh v. State of Haryana firmly established that the testimony of a hostile witness is admissible and can ground a conviction if the trustworthy portion finds corroboration.^[5] This doctrine was reiterated in Khujji Surendra Tiwari v. State of M.P., where despite two eyewitnesses turning hostile, corroborative medical and circumstantial evidence sustained the conviction.^[6]

3.3 Contemporary Refinement: Appellate Re-appraisal and Hostility

More recent cases illustrate nuanced appellate engagement. In State of U.P. v. Ramesh Prasad Misra, the Supreme Court faulted the High Court for a “superficial examination” of hostile witnesses and restored the conviction after its own holistic appraisal.^[7] Similarly, State of U.P. v. Ramesh Harijan underscored that appellate courts must not treat hostility as fatal where other evidence inspires confidence.^[8]

4. Analytical Issues Posed by Hostile Testimony

4.1 Threshold for Declaring Hostility

A witness is not hostile merely because aspects of testimony favour the accused.^[9] The court must discern deliberate animus or unwillingness to speak the truth. The Supreme Court cautioned in Rabindra Kumar Dey v. State of Orissa that an “unguarded moment of truth” cannot trigger hostility.^[10]

4.2 Evidentiary Value and Corroboration

The governing rule is qualitative: courts may accept whatever portion of a hostile witness’s evidence they find reliable after “closest scrutiny”.^[5] In Selvaraj v. State of Tamil Nadu the Court convicted the accused relying on the examination-in-chief of witnesses who later retracted in cross-examination, since medical evidence supported the earlier version.^[11]

4.3 Systemic Causes of Hostility

Judicial observations identify several factors: threats, inducements, prolonged trials, lack of witness protection, and social pressures.^[1] The Court in The State of Jharkhand v. Shailendra Kumar Rai catalogued these reasons, linking them to the “culture of compromise” in serious offences.^[12]

4.4 Impact on Burden of Proof

While the prosecution bears the burden to prove guilt beyond reasonable doubt, hostility does not inevitably create a presumption of innocence. The doctrine articulated in State v. Sanjeev Nanda permits reliance on credible fragments of hostile evidence, thus preserving prosecutorial efficacy.^[13]

4.5 Appellate Scrutiny

Hostility often complicates appellate review. Yet, if the trial court’s view is a “possible” one, appellate interference is circumscribed. N. Vijayakumar v. State of T.N. and Jafarudheen v. State of Kerala reaffirm this restraint, particularly when key witnesses have turned hostile and the remaining evidence is equivocal.^[14]

5. Integration of Primary Reference Materials

• Babulal Bhagwan Khandare v. State of Maharashtra illustrates that even where multiple eyewitnesses support the prosecution, corroboration from hostile testimony can fortify findings on common intention under s. 34 IPC.^[15]
• In Madhya Pradesh Electricity Board v. Vidhya Bhushan Saxena, although a civil-service matter, the Court excluded adverse confidential reports written by a superior with insufficient acquaintance – an administrative parallel to criminal hostility where credibility is compromised.^[16]
• Koli Chunilal Savji v. State of Gujarat demonstrates that hostile or inconsistent attitudes toward dying declarations do not negate their evidentiary worth if other circumstances assure reliability.^[17]
• The High Court decisions in Dinkar Sukhdeo Dambale and Central Bureau of Investigation v. Rajesh Chaudhary emphasise that hostility must rest on conscious deviation, not mere admissions in cross-examination.^[18]

6. Policy and Reform Perspectives

Recognising that procedural tools alone cannot combat hostility, the Supreme Court has endorsed legislative and executive measures. The Witness Protection Scheme 2018, declared enforceable under Article 141, promises identity change, relocation, and financial aid, yet its implementation is uneven. Fast-track trials and technological aids (video-link testimony under s. 275 CrPC) can mitigate delay-induced hostility, as highlighted in K.P. Tamilmaran v. State, where an eighteen-year lapse preceded final judgment.^[19]

7. Conclusion

Indian courts have consistently refused to adopt a blanket rule of exclusion for hostile witnesses. The judicial task is evaluative, not eliminative: to sift the credible from the incredible, to corroborate where possible, and to ensure that intimidation or inducement does not thwart substantive justice. While jurisprudence has equipped courts with doctrinal tools, systemic reforms—robust witness protection, expeditious trials, and heightened accountability for interference—remain indispensable to curb the menace of hostility and to uphold the integrity of criminal adjudication.

8. Footnotes

1. The State of Jharkhand v. Shailendra Kumar Rai @ Pandav Rai, (2022) SC, para 44.
2. Indian Evidence Act 1872, s. 154.
3. Emperor v. Haradhan, AIR 1933 Pat 585.
4. Sat Paul v. Delhi Administration, (1976) 1 SCC 727.
5. Bhagwan Singh v. State of Haryana, (1976) 1 SCC 389.
6. Khujji Surendra Tiwari v. State of M.P., (1991) 3 SCC 627.
7. State of U.P. v. Ramesh Prasad Misra, (1996) 10 SCC 360.
8. State of U.P. v. Ramesh Harijan, (2012) 5 SCC 777.
9. Central Bureau of Investigation v. Rajesh Chaudhary, 2016 SCC OnLine Raj 4063.
10. Rabindra Kumar Dey v. State of Orissa, (1976) 4 SCC 233.
11. Selvaraj v. State, (2015) 2 SCC 662.
12. The State of Jharkhand v. Shailendra Kumar Rai @ Pandav Rai, (2022) SC.
13. State Through PS Lodhi Colony v. Sanjeev Nanda, (2012) SCC OnLine SC 118.
14. N. Vijayakumar v. State of Tamil Nadu, 2021 SCC OnLine SC 53; Jafarudheen v. State of Kerala, (2022) 8 SCC 440.
15. Babulal Bhagwan Khandare v. State of Maharashtra, (2005) 10 SCC 404.
16. M.P. Electricity Board v. V.B. Saxena, (1997) 10 SCC 227.
17. Koli Chunilal Savji v. State of Gujarat, (1999) 9 SCC 562.
18. Dinkar Sukhdeo Dambale v. State of Maharashtra, 2006 SCC OnLine Bom 1063.
19. K.P. Tamilmaran v. State, 2025 SC (forthcoming law report).