In a case titled Sukh Dutt Ratra vs State of Himachal Pradesh, the Supreme Court held that forcible dispossession of private property of a person without following the due process of law is violative of both constitutional and human rights.
The Court further noted that “While the right to property is no longer a fundamental right, it is pertinent to note that at the time of dispossession of the subject land, this right was still included in Part III of the Constitution. The right against deprivation of property unless in accordance with procedure established by law, continues to be a constitutional right under Article 300-A.”
The cardinal principle of law is that no one’s land can be taken except by following the due procedure established by law is not new. It dates back to the 1700s when a decision in the case of Entick v. Carrington[1] read that the State has a higher responsibility to demonstrate that it has acted within the purview of law and has not tarnished the basic principle of rule of law.
It was further reiterated by the Court that when it comes to the acquisition of private property, the threshold of legality must be met, even more strictly when the acquiring party is the State.
The Court also relied on a case it decided previously- the State of Uttar Pradesh and Ors. v. Dharmander Prasad Singh and Ors. held:
“A lessor, with the best of title, has no right to resume possession extra-judicially by use of force, from a lessee, even after the expiry or earlier termination of the lease by forfeiture or otherwise. The use of the expression 're-entry' in the lease deed does not authorise extrajudicial methods to resume possession. Under law, the possession of a lessee, even after the expiry or its earlier termination is juridical possession and forcible dispossession is prohibited; a lessee cannot be dispossessed otherwise than in due course of law. In the present case, the fact that the lessor is the State does not place it in any higher or better position. On the contrary, it is under an additional inhibition stemming from the requirement that all actions of Government and Governmental authorities should have a 'legal pedigree'”.
It was further held that there cannot be a ‘limitation’ to doing justice and held that the State cannot shield itself behind the principle of delay and laches. The court further went on to explain the principle of delay and laches from its decision in Maharashtra State Road Transport Corporation v. Balwant Regular Motor Service wherein it was held that the doctrine of laches in Courts of Equity is not a technical or an arbitrary doctrine and …………… “in every case, if an argument against relief, which otherwise would be just, is founded upon mere delay, that delay of course not amounting to a bar by any statute of limitations, the validity of that defence must be tried upon principles substantially equitable. Two circumstances, always important in such cases, are, the length of the delay and the nature of the acts done during the interval, which might affect either party and cause a balance of justice or injustice in taking the one course or the other, so far as relates to the remedy.”
After hearing the matter at length, the Court observed that- Delay and laches cannot be raised in a case of a continuing cause of action, or if the circumstances shock the judicial conscience of the Court. The power to condone the delay is a discretionary power of the Court and it should be exercised judiciously so as to balance the wheels of justice.
Concluding that the forcible dispossession of a person of their private property without following due process of law, was violative of both their human right and constitutional right under Article 300-A, this court allowed the appeal.
[1] [1765] EWHC (KB) 198