Evidentiary Value of Dog Tracking in Indian Criminal Jurisprudence

The Evidentiary Value of Dog Tracking in Indian Criminal Jurisprudence: An Analytical Review

Introduction

The utilisation of trained canines, or 'sniffer dogs', for tracking scents at crime scenes to identify or locate culprits, contraband, or missing persons is a well-established investigative practice globally and in India. This technique, often referred to as dog tracking evidence, leverages the acute olfactory senses of dogs. While invaluable as an investigative aid, its admissibility and, more critically, its evidentiary weight in Indian criminal trials have been subjects of considerable judicial deliberation. The Indian judiciary has grappled with balancing the potential utility of such evidence against the fundamental principles of criminal jurisprudence, including the rights of the accused and the requirement for evidence to be reliable and verifiable. This article undertakes a comprehensive analysis of the legal status of dog tracking evidence in India, drawing upon key judicial pronouncements and relevant legal principles.

Historical Context and Early Judicial Scrutiny

The Supreme Court of India first extensively considered the evidentiary value of dog tracking in Abdul Rajak Murtaja Dafedar v. State Of Maharashtra (1969 SCC 2 234). In this seminal judgment, the Court, while not categorically ruling out its admissibility, expressed significant reservations about its reliability. It was observed that "in the present state of scientific knowledge evidence of dog tracking even if admissible, is not ordinarily of much weight." This cautious approach stemmed from several inherent limitations. As highlighted in cases like Eknath So Vitthal Wakle v. The State Of Maharashtra (Bombay High Court, 2007), drawing from Abdul Rajak, the primary objections include: first, the dog cannot be subjected to cross-examination, and its handler's testimony reporting the dog's actions is essentially hearsay; second, there's a judicial apprehension that the life and liberty of individuals should not hinge on "canine inferences"; and third, such evidence might have a dramatic and potentially prejudicial impact on the trier of fact, disproportionate to its actual probative value.

The Nature of Dog Tracking Evidence: Scientific or Sui Generis?

A pivotal question in evaluating dog tracking evidence is its classification. Unlike forensic evidence derived from established scientific methodologies like DNA analysis or chemical testing, dog tracking evidence involves the behaviour of an animal. The Supreme Court in State Of Uttar Pradesh v. Ram Balak And Another (2008 SCC CR 3 1111), and the Bombay High Court in Babu Magbul Shaikh v. State Of Maharashtra (1992 SCC ONLINE BOM 386), articulated a crucial distinction. These courts noted that "the behaviour of chemicals, blood corpuscles and bacilli contains no element of conscious volition or deliberate choice. But dogs are intelligent animals with many thought processes similar to the thought processes of human beings and wherever you have thought processes there is always the risk of error, deception and even self-deception." This inherent element of volition and potential for error differentiates canine evidence from purely scientific expert testimony, which typically falls under Section 45 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872.

While some international precedents, such as R. v. Montgomery (1866 NI 100), cited in Ram Balak, have described the dog as a "tracking instrument" with the handler merely reporting its movements, Indian courts have generally been more circumspect. The evidence is primarily that of the dog handler who observes and interprets the dog's behaviour, making the handler's credibility, training, and experience, along with the dog's own credentials, paramount if the evidence is to be given any consideration.

Admissibility and Evidentiary Weight: A Cautious Approach with Conditional Acceptance

The admissibility of dog tracking evidence is generally not barred under the Indian Evidence Act, 1872, potentially falling under the relevancy provisions of Section 7 (facts which are the occasion, cause or effect of facts in issue) or Section 9 (facts necessary to explain or introduce relevant facts). However, its evidentiary weight remains a contentious issue, with a discernible pattern of caution, especially from the Supreme Court, alongside a more nuanced, conditionally receptive approach from some High Courts.

Supreme Court's Consistent Stance

The Supreme Court has maintained a consistent line of cautious appraisal:

  • In Abdul Rajak Murtaja Dafedar v. State Of Maharashtra (1969 SCC 2 234), it was laid down that such evidence is "not ordinarily of much weight."
  • Gade Lakshmi Mangaraju Alias Ramesh v. State Of A.P. (2001 SCC 6 205) acknowledged the investigative utility of tracker dogs but reiterated judicial reservations. The Court highlighted a "fourfold criticism": the impossibility of cross-examining the dog, the impropriety of making human liberty dependent on animal sensibilities, the possibility of canine error, and the lack of definitive scientific pronouncement on the accuracy of canine tracking. It was emphasized that dog tracking evidence, if considered, forms only one part of the larger body of circumstantial evidence.
  • State Of Uttar Pradesh v. Ram Balak And Another (2008 SCC CR 3 1111) explicitly reaffirmed the principle from Abdul Rajak, stating, "evidence of dog tracking, even if admissible, is not ordinarily of much weight."
  • Dinesh Borthakur v. State Of Assam (2008 SCC 5 697) further underscored the "inherent frailties" in such evidence, noting, "Investigating exercises can afford to make attempts or forays... but judicial adjudication has to be evidence-based." The Court cited the lack of scientific certainty and the risk of misrepresentation or wrong inference from the dog's behaviour.

High Court Perspectives: Varying Degrees of Receptivity

While generally aligning with the Supreme Court's caution, some High Courts have shown a willingness to accord greater weight to dog tracking evidence, provided stringent foundational requirements are met.

  • The Bombay High Court, in particular, has offered a more developed jurisprudence. In Babu Magbul Shaikh v. State Of Maharashtra (1992 SCC ONLINE BOM 386), the Court acknowledged the "orthodox view" that such evidence has limited utility but also pointed to a "modern trend" where, with proper safeguards, it could be "of an extremely high calibre." The judgment meticulously outlined these safeguards.
  • This was reiterated in Pandian Kanappan Nadar And Another v. The State Of Maharashtra (Bombay High Court, 1993), where Saldanha, J., opined that if the dog's pedigree, selection, rigorous training, and the handler's expertise are established, the evidence of a dog successfully pointing out a criminal "is of an extremely high calibre and a Court would place heavy reliance on it."
  • However, other High Court judgments have maintained a more conservative stance. The Karnataka High Court in Imran Khan v. State of Karnataka (2013), citing Supreme Court precedents, held that dog tracking evidence cannot be given much weight and a conviction cannot be solely based upon it. Similarly, the Bombay High Court in STATE OF MAHARASHTRA v. SUBHASH S/O ZINGAJI KHADE (2006) termed it a "weak piece of evidence," especially if compromised by factors like multiple handling of an object used for scent. The Madras High Court in Micheal Alias Nai Micheal v. State Represented By (2010) noted that corroboration is generally sought for such evidence.

Essential Safeguards and Foundational Requirements

For dog tracking evidence to carry any significant weight, courts, particularly the Bombay High Court in Babu Magbul Shaikh, have emphasized the necessity of establishing a strong foundation. These safeguards include:

  • A reliable and complete record of the tracking process, typically through a detailed Panchnama prepared contemporaneously.
  • The Panchnama must be properly proved in court and corroborated by the testimony of the dog handler.
  • There should be no material discrepancies between the Panchnama and the handler's deposition.
  • The handler's evidence must withstand the scrutiny of cross-examination.
  • Comprehensive details regarding the dog, such as its breed, pedigree, specific training for tracking, past performance record, achievements, and reliability, should be placed before the court, supported by documentary evidence if available.
  • Consideration of factors like the freshness of the scent and whether the tracking area was crowded or contaminated.

Challenges and Criticisms of Dog Tracking Evidence

The judicial skepticism towards dog tracking evidence is rooted in several well-articulated challenges and criticisms:

  • Hearsay Nature: As the dog cannot testify or be cross-examined, its handler reports its actions. This is often viewed as a form of hearsay, a concern voiced since Abdul Rajak and reiterated in Dinesh Borthakur and Eknath So Vitthal Wakle.
  • Canine Volition and Potential for Error: The "conscious volition" of dogs, as noted in Ram Balak and Babu Magbul Shaikh, introduces an element of unpredictability and the risk of error, misjudgment of smell, or even deception, unlike inanimate scientific instruments (Gade Lakshmi Mangaraju).
  • Lack of Scientific Certainty: The Supreme Court has repeatedly pointed to the "present state of scientific knowledge" (Abdul Rajak) and "little knowledge and much uncertainty as to the precise faculties which enable police dogs to track and identify criminals" (Gade Lakshmi Mangaraju, Dinesh Borthakur).
  • Handler's Influence and Interpretation: There is a possibility of misrepresentation or erroneous inference by the dog handler, who interprets the dog's behaviour (Dinesh Borthakur). The handler's own biases or expectations could inadvertently influence the dog or the interpretation of its actions.
  • Susceptibility to External Factors: The reliability of scent tracking can be compromised by various external factors, including weather conditions, the time elapsed since the scent was laid, contamination of the scene, or tracking in overly crowded areas (Babu Magbul Shaikh; STATE OF MAHARASHTRA v. SUBHASH S/O ZINGAJI KHADE).
  • Fundamental Concerns about Liberty: A recurring theme is the judicial reluctance to allow the "life and liberty of a human being" to be significantly dependent on "canine inferences" (Abdul Rajak, Dinesh Borthakur).

Dog Tracking Evidence as Corroborative and Circumstantial

Given its inherent limitations, dog tracking evidence in India is almost universally regarded as corroborative rather than primary or conclusive proof. It is rarely, if ever, considered sufficient on its own to sustain a conviction (Imran Khan v. State of Karnataka, 2013). Its principal value lies in its ability to support or strengthen other pieces of evidence within a chain of circumstances. As observed in Gade Lakshmi Mangaraju, the dog’s tracking, even if considered, is but one component that, along with other independent strands of evidence, might contribute to establishing guilt beyond reasonable doubt. Cases like Lalit Kumar Yadav Alias Kuri v. State Of Uttar Pradesh (2014 SCC 11 129) illustrate the detailed manner in which dog tracking is used during investigation, where the dog "Raja" led the police to the accused. Similarly, in State Of Maharashtra v. Mangilal (2009 SCC CR 3 1111), the Supreme Court noted that "Police dog traced the scent from the place of incident to the house of the accused" as one of the links in the chain of incriminating circumstances. The overall assessment of such evidence is thus intrinsically linked to the strength and completeness of the entire circumstantial case presented by the prosecution.

Comparative Glance

Indian courts have occasionally taken note of the position of dog tracking evidence in other jurisdictions. As mentioned in Babu Magbul Shaikh and Ram Balak, such evidence is reportedly admitted and relied upon in Canada, Scotland, and England, while the position in the United States has been conflicting. While this international context provides a broader perspective, the Indian judiciary has primarily developed its own cautious and nuanced approach, tailored to the principles of its domestic evidence law and criminal justice system.

Conclusion

The legal status of dog tracking evidence in Indian criminal jurisprudence reflects a careful balancing act. While generally admissible, it is consistently treated as evidence of a weak character, "not ordinarily of much weight." Its primary utility is recognized more in the realm of investigation, guiding law enforcement agencies, rather than as substantive proof in judicial adjudication. For dog tracking evidence to have any probative value, it must be heavily corroborated by other independent and reliable evidence. Furthermore, the meticulous fulfillment of stringent foundational requirements concerning the dog's training, pedigree, performance, the handler's expertise, and the integrity of the tracking process (evidenced by a comprehensive Panchnama and handler testimony) is an indispensable prerequisite. The "conscious volition" of canines remains a significant conceptual hurdle, distinguishing this form of evidence from more objective scientific testimony. Ultimately, the Indian judiciary, while acknowledging the potential of trained dogs as an investigative tool, prioritizes the safeguarding of an accused's rights and the high standard of proof required in criminal trials, thereby circumscribing the evidentiary role of dog tracking within these fundamental tenets.