Evidentiary Value and Admissibility of a Co-Accused's Statement Against Other Accused in Indian Law

Introduction

The administration of criminal justice in India places paramount importance on the principles of fair trial and the presumption of innocence. Within this framework, the evidentiary value of statements made by a co-accused, particularly those implicating other accused persons, presents a complex legal challenge. While such statements can sometimes offer crucial insights into a criminal enterprise, their inherent unreliability necessitates stringent judicial scrutiny. The primary statutory provision governing this area is Section 30 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872. This article seeks to analyze the legal position concerning the statement of a co-accused against other accused, drawing heavily upon landmark judicial pronouncements and statutory principles prevalent in Indian law.

The Foundational Principle: Section 30 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872

Section 30 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872, provides that when more persons than one are being tried jointly for the same offence, and a confession made by one of such persons affecting himself and some other of such persons is proved, the Court may take into consideration such confession as against such other persons as well as against the person who makes such confession. The expression "may take into consideration" is pivotal, indicating a discretionary power vested in the court, rather than mandating the acceptance of such a confession as conclusive proof. The conditions precedent for the applicability of this section are: (i) a joint trial of the persons concerned; (ii) for the same offence; and (iii) the statement must be a confession affecting the maker as well as the other co-accused.

Judicial Scrutiny: Nature and Limitations of Co-Accused Confessions

Not Substantive Evidence and Inherent Weakness

The judiciary in India has consistently held that a confession of a co-accused is not substantive evidence against the other accused persons. In the seminal case of Kashmira Singh v. State Of Madhya Pradesh (1952 SCC 0 159), the Supreme Court of India established that such confessions hold a weaker evidentiary value. The Court reasoned that these confessions are not made under oath, are not tested by cross-examination on behalf of the accused against whom they are sought to be used, and the maker often has a strong motive to falsely implicate others to exculpate himself or to mitigate his own culpability.

This principle was earlier enunciated by the Privy Council in Bhuboni Sahu v. The King (1949 AIR PC 257), which clarified that a confession by a co-accused does not qualify as evidence under Section 3 of the Indian Evidence Act, as it is not given under oath or subject to cross-examination. The Privy Council advocated for a "rule of prudence" in relying on such statements. The Supreme Court in State Through Superintendent Of Police, Cbi/Sit v. Nalini And Others (1999 SCC 5 253), while dealing with confessions under Section 15 of the Terrorist and Disruptive Activities (Prevention) Act, 1987 (TADA), reiterated that the evidence of the confession of a co-accused is not required to be given on oath, nor is it given in the presence of the accused, and its veracity cannot be tested by cross-examination. The Patna High Court in State Of Bihar v. Deepak Kumar (Patna High Court, 2016) also emphasized the marked difference in probative value, stating that a co-accused's confession is no evidence at all against the non-maker and cannot be the foundation for their conviction.

The Indispensable Requirement of Corroboration

Given the inherent weaknesses, courts have underscored the necessity of independent corroboration before a co-accused's confession can be used against others. Kashmira Singh (1952) stressed that such confessions require corroboration from other independent evidence. Similarly, Bhuboni Sahu (1949) highlighted the need for corroboration in material particulars. The Bombay High Court in Gopal Govind Chogale v. The Assistant Collector Of Central Excise And Another (Bombay High Court, 1985) observed that a co-accused is "obviously not better than an accomplice" and their statement has its own infirmities. It reiterated the well-settled principle that accomplice evidence requires independent corroboration in material particulars, or at least in the minimum to the general structure, and such corroboration must clearly tend to the involvement of the accused.

Limited Utility: Lending Assurance to Other Evidence

The established judicial approach is that a co-accused's confession can, at best, be used to "lend assurance" to other evidence that is already on record. As held in Kashmira Singh (1952), quoting Sir Lawrence Jenkins in Emperor v. Lalit Mohan Chuckerbutty (38 Cal. 559), such a confession can be used to "lend assurance to other evidence against a co-accused." This principle was reaffirmed by the Supreme Court in Manoj Kumar Soni v. THE STATE OF M.P. (Supreme Court Of India, 2023), which cited the Constitution Bench decision in Haricharan Kurmi v. State of Bihar (AIR 1964 SC 1184). The Court in Haricharan Kurmi elaborated that the proper approach is to first consider the other evidence against the accused person. If this evidence is satisfactory and the court is inclined to hold that it may sustain the charge, the court may then turn to the co-accused's confession to assure itself that the conclusion it is inclined to draw from the other evidence is right. The Delhi High Court in Kunal Singh Petitioner v. Cbi (Delhi High Court, 2016) also reiterated that such a statement can only be used for lending reassurance if there is other substantive evidence.

Inadmissibility as Sole Basis for Conviction or Framing Charges

It is a settled tenet of law that a conviction cannot be based solely on the confession of a co-accused. Kashmira Singh (1952) explicitly stated that such a confession cannot form the foundation of a conviction. This principle extends even to the stage of framing charges. The Bombay High Court in Gopal Govind Chogale (1985) held that a confession of a co-accused cannot be the foundation even for the purpose of framing a charge, a view consistently taken in several other decisions of that court, including Harbans Singh Kripalsingh v. M.K Chakraborty (Criminal Revision Application No. 461 of 1979). The Rajasthan High Court in Kishan Singh v. State Of Raj.—(61) (Rajasthan High Court, 1995), dealing with statements under the Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985 (NDPS Act), held that a confessional statement of a co-accused cannot be the sole basis for framing charges against other accused persons in the absence of independent affirmative evidence. The Supreme Court in Union Of India v. Bal Mukund And Others (2009 SCC 12 161) also noted, in the context of the NDPS Act, that the confessional statements of co-accused cannot form the basis of another accused's conviction.

Specific Categories of Co-Accused Statements

Exculpatory Statements Implicating Co-Accused

The evidentiary value diminishes further if the statement made by an accused is primarily exculpatory for themselves but implicates a co-accused. In P KRISHNA MOHAN REDDY v. THE STATE OF ANDHRA PRADESH (Supreme Court Of India, 2025), the Supreme Court observed that even if an exculpatory statement of one accused implicates another co-accused, it cannot be taken into consideration against such co-accused. The Court reasoned that no credibility can be attached to such a statement, especially because it is not made on oath, not in the presence of the co-accused, cannot be tested by cross-examination, and its exculpatory nature militates against the foundational principle (explained in Bhuboni Sahu (1949)) that permits considering a co-accused's statement – i.e., the sincerity derived from self-implication.

Statements under Special Legislations

Special statutes sometimes contain provisions regarding confessions. Under TADA, Section 15 made certain confessions admissible. In Nalini (1999), the Supreme Court clarified that confessional statements made admissible under Section 15 of TADA can be used against a co-accused only in the same manner and subject to the same conditions as stipulated in Section 30 of the Evidence Act, including the requirement of a joint trial. However, in Sanjay Dutt (A-117) (S) v. The State Of Maharashtra, Through Cbi (Stf), Bombay (S) (Supreme Court Of India, 2013), the Court, citing Nazir Khan v. State of Delhi ((2003) 8 SCC 461), observed that confessional statements made by a co-accused (under TADA) can be used to convict a person, and it is only as a rule of prudence that the Court should look for corroboration elsewhere. This suggests a potentially broader scope under TADA, though the need for caution and corroboration remains.

Regarding the NDPS Act, in Union Of India v. Bal Mukund And Others (2009), the Supreme Court questioned how a statement made by an accused under Section 67 of the NDPS Act could be applied against a co-accused if Section 30 of the Evidence Act was not applicable. The Rajasthan High Court in Kishan Singh (1995) held that a confessional statement under Section 67 of the NDPS Act is admissible against the maker but cannot be the sole basis for framing charges against a co-accused without independent evidence.

Distinction from Statements under Section 313 CrPC

The statement of an accused recorded under Section 313 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (CrPC), serves a different purpose: to enable the accused personally to explain any circumstances appearing in the evidence against them. Such statements are not confessions to be used against a co-accused under Section 30 of the Evidence Act. The Calcutta High Court in Ibra Akanda And Ors. v. Emperor (Calcutta High Court, 1944) deprecated the use of a statement of one accused in his examination under Section 342 CrPC (of the old Code) as evidence against his co-accused. Several recent judgments from the Rajasthan High Court, such as Shakir v. State Of Rajasthan, Moinuddin v. State Of Rajasthan, Khalid Husain v. State Of Rajasthan, and Parvez v. State Of Rajasthan (all 2023), clarify that while a statement under Section 313 CrPC can be taken into consideration, it is not strictly evidence in the case, and conviction cannot be based merely on such a statement.

Retracted Confessions

A retracted confession of a co-accused is viewed with even greater caution. In Kalyan Chandra Sarkar v. Rajesh Ranjan Alias Pappu Yadav And Another (2005 SCC 2 42), the Supreme Court, while considering bail, noted arguments concerning the evidentiary value of a retracted confession of a co-accused, implying its weakened status. The Madras High Court in Rajesh Salecha v. Intelligence Officer, Narcotic Control Bureau, South Zone, Chennai (2009 SCC ONLINE MAD 599) also indicated that retracted statements are weaker.

Procedural Pre-requisites: The Joint Trial Mandate

A fundamental pre-requisite for invoking Section 30 of the Evidence Act is that the accused persons must be undergoing a joint trial for the same offence. The Supreme Court in Nalini (1999) affirmed that both Section 30 of the Evidence Act and Section 15 of TADA require a joint trial of the accused making the confession and the co-accused, abettor, or conspirator. The Madras High Court in Rajesh Salecha (2009) explicitly stated that a confession statement of a co-accused could be used against other accused where there is a joint trial; if the basic requirement of a joint trial is lacking (e.g., if the case against the confessing accused has been split up and they are acquitted or convicted separately), their statement cannot be marked or used as evidence against the remaining accused in a subsequent trial.

Broader Implications and Judicial Approach

The cautious approach towards co-accused statements reflects the judiciary's commitment to upholding fair trial standards. While not directly on co-accused statements, the Supreme Court in State Of Rajasthan v. Raja Ram (2003 SCC 8 180) reinforced the stringent standards required for convicting an individual, particularly based on circumstantial evidence, emphasizing that acquittals based on reasonable doubt should not be overturned without compelling reasons. This underlying principle of requiring robust and reliable evidence is pertinent.

In State Of Maharashtra v. Damu (2000 SCC CRI 1088), the Supreme Court, while upholding convictions based on confessions, was careful to distinguish the use of a confession against its maker versus its use against a co-accused, implicitly reaffirming the principles laid down in cases like Kashmira Singh (1952). The Madras High Court in First Income-Tax Officer v. Radhakrishna Stores, Statonery And Book Merchants And Others (1997 SCC ONLINE MAD 1188) made a general assertion that a confession statement given by a co-accused cannot be made use of against other accused. An early recognition of the principle in Section 30 can be seen in Ishwar Das v. Bhagwan Das (1934 SCC ONLINE ALL 99), where the Allahabad High Court noted that the statement of one accused under certain circumstances might be taken into account against other co-accused.

Conclusion

The legal position in India regarding the evidentiary value of a statement made by a co-accused against other accused is well-crystallized. Such statements, governed by Section 30 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872, are not considered substantive evidence. They are inherently weak due to the lack of oath and opportunity for cross-examination, and the potential for the maker to have ulterior motives. The judiciary has consistently mandated that such statements cannot form the sole basis for conviction or even for framing charges against a co-accused. Their utility is primarily confined to "lending assurance" to other independent and reliable evidence that already points towards the guilt of the co-accused. The requirement of a joint trial is an indispensable prerequisite. This cautious and restrictive approach adopted by Indian courts underscores the commitment to safeguarding the rights of the accused and ensuring that convictions are based on evidence that meets high standards of reliability and proof, thereby preventing miscarriages of justice. The principles laid down in landmark cases like Kashmira Singh v. State Of Madhya Pradesh and Bhuboni Sahu v. The King continue to guide judicial discourse in this critical area of criminal jurisprudence.