The Allahabad High Court, in case of Raj Kishore @ Pappu v. State of U.P observed that the provisions of Section 106 of the Evidence Act cannot be invoked to place the onus of explaining how the deceased died in presence of the murder suspect because there is insufficient proof that he was there at home with the victim at the relevant time.
The main accusation against the defendant was that he murdered Anima, the sister-in-law of the informant (the deceased). While the deceased husband, Narendra, was a laborer in Delhi, Raj Kishore also known as Pappu, the accused and appellant, used to live in the hamlet and had drinking problems.
Additionally, it was claimed that the appellant used to pester the deceased for cash and harass her for funds from her husband. The informant (PW-1) and his wife Anita (PW-2) learned that the accused was abusing Anima on July 23, 2003, the day of the occurrence, in exchange for money that her husband had provided her two days before.
After receiving information, the informant and his wife Anita hurried over to Anima's house where they saw the accused fleeing from the hut on the first level. They walked upstairs and found Anima's body lying there with injuries on her neck.
However, the appellant stated that he was watering the plants and primarily disputed being in the residence at the time in question.
The Court began by stating that it had not been established beyond a reasonable doubt whether the deceased's husband had provided money to her two or three days before the incident. The Court further noted that nobody else had been questioned to determine whether the appellant had a problem with alcohol, other from PW1 and PW-2.
After carefully reviewing the evidence, the Court particularly said that the prosecution had failed to establish beyond a reasonable doubt that PW-1 and PW-2 saw the accused-appellant racing out of the hut before they discovered the dead man there.
The Court cited the Supreme Court's observation in the case of Shivaji Chintappa Patil vs. State of Maharashtra , where it was determined that Section 106 of the Evidence Act might be utilized to place the burden of proof on the accused and noted that:
"...Section 106 of the Evidence Act does not absolve the prosecution of discharging its primary burden of proving the prosecution case beyond reasonable doubt...only when the prosecution has led evidence which, if believed, will sustain a conviction, or which makes out a prima facie case, that the question arises of considering facts of which the burden of proof would lie upon the accused."
In light of this, the Court determined that the provisions of Section 106 of the Evidence Act cannot be invoked to place the burden of proof on the accused to explain why the deceased suffered ante-mortem injuries in the absence of convincing evidence that the appellant was present in the house or hut at the relevant time.
Because of this, the Court determined that the prosecution had failed to establish the charge against the appellant beyond a reasonable doubt and that the accused-appellant was thus qualified to receive the benefit of the doubt in the case. As a result, the appeal was upheld, and the defendant was cleared.