Case Title: M. Ravindran v. The Intelligence Officer
According to the Supreme Court, the prosecutor cannot prevent the execution of the accused's inalienable right by filing a final report, an additional complaint, or a report requesting an extension of time after the accused has already requested default bail.
While allowing an appeal against a Madras High Court decision, the bench of Justices Uday Umesh Lalit, Mohan M. Shantanagoudar, and Vineet Saran provided the following legal position summary:
The accused is said to have "availed of" or asserted his right to be freed on default bail, accumulating after expiration of the predetermined time limit for inquiry, whenever he submits an application for bail under the Proviso to Section 167(2). After obtaining the necessary information from the public prosecutor as mentioned above and upon the expiration of 180 days or the extended period, as the case may be, if the accused applies for bail under Section 167(2) of the CrPC read with Section 36A (4) of the NDPS Act, the court must immediately release him on bail without further delay. By taking swift action, the prosecution will be prevented from undermining the law's requirement that the accused be released on bail in the event of an investigation agency’s default.
The right to be released on default bail remains enforceable if the accused has requested it, regardless of the status of the bail application, the subsequent filing of the charge sheet or a report asking the court for an extension of time, the filing of the charge sheet during the interregnum while a higher court is considering a challenge to the rejection of the bail application, or any other circumstance.
The right to default bail would be forfeited if the accused does not request it when the opportunity arises and a charge sheet, supplemental complaint, or report requesting an extension of time is then presented to the magistrate. Although the accused may still be freed on bail under other sections of the CrPC, the Magistrate would be free to take cognizance of the matter or allow further time for the investigation's conclusion, as the case may be.
By virtue of Explanation I to Section 167(2), the actual release of the accused from detention is reliant on the instructions given by the competent Court granting bail, regardless of the default bail decision made by the Court. If the accused does not post bail and/or abide by the bail order's terms and conditions within the time frame set by the court, his continuing detention in jail is legal.
In this case, the High Court had dismissed the default bail application, noting that the accused could not have benefited from the fact that he had timely submitted his bail petition just because the said application had not been resolved by the time the new complaint was filed. The Apex Court considered the following issues in the appeal: (a) Whether the subsequent filing of a second complaint by the investigating agency abrogates the appellant's indefeasible right under Section 167(2) of the CrPC; and (b) Whether the Court should take into consideration the time of filing of the application for bail, based on default of the investigating agency or the time of disposal of the application for bail while answering (a).
The Court noted that the verdict in Uday Mohanlal Acharya v. State of Maharashtra, addressed both of these concerns. According to this, Section 167(2) must be construed in a way that furthers the fundamental promise made in Article 21 that life and personal liberty would be protected from arbitrary and unlawful imprisonment.
According to the Constitution Bench's ruling in Sanjay Dutt v. State through C.B.I., the accused's inalienable right to a default bail is only enforceable before the challan is filed; if it has already been waived, it does not survive or continue to be enforceable after the challan is filed. The bench then spoke about what the phrase "if not already availed of" meant in the Sanjay Dutt ruling. The State cited the ruling in Pragya Singh Thakur v. State of Maharashtra, in which it was determined, citing Sanjay Dutt v. State through C.B.I., that where a bail application is made based on the prosecution's failure to file a charge sheet within the allotted time, the right to bail would be forfeited if the prosecution later files one before the application is reviewed and the accused is released.
The minimal notice cannot be abused by public prosecutors to "purchase extra time"
"The observations made in Sanjay Dutt (supra) to the effect that the application for default bail and any application for extension of time made by the Public Prosecutor must be considered together are, in our opinion, only applicable in situations where the Public Prosecutor files a report seeking extension of time prior to the filing of the application for default bail by the accused. In such a situation, notwithstanding the fact that the period for completion of the investigation has expired, both applications would have to be considered together. However, where the accused has already applied for default bail, the Prosecutor cannot defeat the enforcement of his indefeasible right by subsequently filing a final report, additional complaint or report seeking extension of time."
According to the circumstances in the case, the accused had requested default bail on the 181st day of his detention, and it was only after that, that a new complaint was brought. The bench concluded that the accused was qualified for bail release despite the later filing of another allegation.