Essential Ingredients for Conviction under Section 307 of the Indian Penal Code

Essential Ingredients for Conviction under Section 307 of the Indian Penal Code

Introduction

Section 307 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 (“IPC”) criminalises an attempt to commit murder. Although the victim ultimately survives, liability attaches where the accused’s conduct, coupled with the requisite mental element, is so serious that—had death ensued—the act would have amounted to murder. Indian courts have repeatedly distilled the “essential ingredients” that the prosecution must establish. This article critically analyses those ingredients, drawing on leading Supreme Court and High Court authorities, with particular emphasis on the doctrinal formulation in State of Maharashtra v. Kashirao[1] and its subsequent reaffirmation.

Statutory Framework

Section 307 IPC reads in material part:

“Whoever does any act with such intention or knowledge, and under such circumstances that, if by that act he caused death, he would be guilty of murder, shall be punished…”[2]

The provision imports the mens rea of murder described in Section 300 IPC but criminalises the attempt. It therefore demands proof of (i) a culpable mental state; and (ii) an overt act sufficiently proximate to the commission of murder, yet falling short of actual homicide.

Judicial Standard: The Kashirao Formulation

In Kashirao the Supreme Court set out a three-fold test, now widely cited by courts across India (and reiterated most recently in SHOYEB RAJA v. State of M.P.[3]):

  • the death of a human being was attempted;
  • such death was attempted to be caused by, or in consequence of, the act of the accused; and
  • that act was done with the intention of causing death, or with the intention of causing bodily injury (a) that the accused knew to be likely to cause death, or (b) that was sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death; or the accused committed an act so imminently dangerous that it would probably cause death or such bodily injury, without excuse for incurring the risk.

These ingredients unite the physical act (actus reus) with one of three alternative mental states (mens rea). Failure to prove any limb is fatal to the charge.

Dissecting the Mens Rea

(a) Intention to Cause Death

The primary pathway to liability is a direct intention to kill. In Om Prakash v. State of Punjab[4] the Court held that a person commits an offence under Section 307 “when he has an intention to commit murder and, in pursuance of that intention, does an act towards its commission”. The focus rests on the accused’s subjective state of mind, to be inferred from surrounding circumstances.

(b) Knowledge of Likely Death

Where proof of a specific intention is elusive, knowledge that the chosen bodily injury is “likely to cause death” suffices. The firearms-related decision in State of M.P. v. Kanha @ Omprakash[5] illustrates this: despite only a thigh wound, use of a gun at close range demonstrated clear knowledge of probable fatality.

(c) Imminently Dangerous Act

A third category captures acts so perilous that death would probably result. The classic exposition is found in Sarju Prasad v. State of Bihar[6], where the Court stressed that even absent serious hurt, undertaking an act “so imminently dangerous” with no lawful excuse falls within Section 307.

Role of Actual Injury and Weapon Used

A recurring misconception is that grievous or life-threatening harm must be proved. Both Kashirao and Kanha reject that view, clarifying that “proof of grievous or life-threatening hurt is not a sine qua non”[5]. Nevertheless, physical injuries, nature of the weapon, and the part of the body targeted remain valuable indicia of intent, as emphasised in Jage Ram v. State of Haryana[7].

Actus Reus: Overt Act and Proximity

Section 307 requires an act towards commission of murder; it need not be the last or penultimate step. In Mangi Lal v. State of Rajasthan[8] the High Court affirmed that an “attempt, in order to be criminal, need not be the penultimate act”. What matters is that the act is unequivocally directed to the fatal objective.

Collective Liability: Sections 34 and 149 IPC

Where multiple actors participate, courts frequently invoke Section 34 (common intention) or Section 149 (common object). Parsuram Pandey v. State of Bihar[9] underscores that mere presence at the scene is insufficient; the prosecution must link each accused to a shared design encompassing an intention to kill. Conversely, in State of M.P. v. Saleem[10] the Supreme Court upheld convictions under Sections 307/34, placing weight on coordinated assaults against a public servant.

Sentencing Considerations

Once guilt is established, sentencing must be proportionate. In Saleem, the Supreme Court criticised the High Court’s undue leniency, reminding that serious assaults on public functionaries warrant stern punishment[10]. Likewise, Kashirao emphasised that injuries, weapons, and societal impact ought to guide quantum of sentence, reinforcing deterrence.

Differentiating Section 307 from Section 324

Section 324 IPC penalises voluntarily causing hurt by dangerous weapons, absent the murderous intent pivotal to Section 307. Kanha demonstrates the analytical boundary: the High Court’s re-categorisation to Section 324 was reversed because the intention to kill, inferred from firearm use, elevated the offence back to Section 307.

Evidentiary Threshold at the Charging Stage

At the stage of framing charges, courts do not conduct a meticulous trial-level evaluation. As reiterated in State of Delhi v. Gyan Devi[11] (cited in SHOYEB RAJA), it is enough that the record discloses material suggesting a Section 307 offence; detailed scrutiny is reserved for trial. This procedural latitude prevents premature discharge in serious cases.

Contemporary Developments

The 2024 decision in SHOYEB RAJA refreshes the jurisprudence by restating the Kashirao test and emphasising that pressing a victim’s mouth and nose with intent to suffocate squarely engages Section 307. High Courts have already begun applying the decision, as seen in Maniram Sonwani[12] and Yogendra Kumar Dheewar[13].

Conclusion

The essential ingredients of Section 307 IPC, consolidated in Kashirao and reaffirmed in the latest Supreme Court pronouncements, require the prosecution to establish (i) an attempt to cause death, (ii) by an overt act of the accused, (iii) animated by one of the specified murderous mental states. Actual fatal injuries are not indispensable; intent is the fulcrum, to be gleaned from the totality of circumstances—weapon wielded, body part targeted, motive, nature of assault, and surrounding facts. Courts must vigilantly apply these principles to avoid both over-criminalisation (where intent is absent) and under-criminalisation (where serious attempts are diluted to lesser charges). The doctrinal clarity forged through decades of jurisprudence continues to balance individual culpability with societal interests in deterring lethal violence.

Footnotes

  1. State of Maharashtra v. Kashirao & Ors., (2003) 10 SCC 434.
  2. Indian Penal Code, 1860, s. 307.
  3. SHOYEB RAJA v. State of Madhya Pradesh, S.C. (2024).
  4. Om Prakash v. State of Punjab, AIR 1961 SC 1782.
  5. State of M.P. v. Kanha @ Omprakash, (2019) 3 SCC 605.
  6. Sarju Prasad v. State of Bihar, AIR 1965 SC 843.
  7. Jage Ram v. State of Haryana, (2015) 11 SCC 366.
  8. Mangi Lal v. State of Rajasthan, 2023 SCC OnLine Raj ***.
  9. Parsuram Pandey & Ors. v. State of Bihar, (2004) 13 SCC 189.
  10. State of M.P. v. Saleem @ Chamaru & Anr., (2005) 5 SCC 554.
  11. State of Delhi v. Gyan Devi & Ors., (2000) 8 SCC 239.
  12. Maniram Sonwani @ Bablu v. State of Chhattisgarh, 2024 SCC OnLine Chh ***.
  13. Yogendra Kumar Dheewar v. State of Chhattisgarh, 2025 SCC OnLine Chh ***.