Doctrine of “Similarly Situated Persons” in Indian Constitutional Jurisprudence

Doctrine of “Similarly Situated Persons” in Indian Constitutional Jurisprudence

Introduction

The phrase “similarly situated persons” has become a touchstone for determining the legality of differential treatment under Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution of India. Whether the question arises in the context of service benefits, reservation policies, pension schemes, or public contracting, Indian courts routinely ask: are the affected individuals similarly situated with respect to the purpose of the law or policy? This article undertakes a critical examination of the doctrine’s evolution, doctrinal foundations, and contemporary contours, drawing upon leading judgments of the Supreme Court and various High Courts, with special focus on Union of India v. M. Selvakumar (2017) and allied authorities.

Constitutional & Statutory Foundations

Article 14 guarantees equality before the law and equal protection of the laws. The guarantee, however, is not absolutist; it permits reasonable classification so long as two requirements are met: (i) the classification is founded on an intelligible differentia, and (ii) the differentia bears a rational nexus with the object sought to be achieved.[1] Article 16 extends the equality mandate to public employment, proscribing discrimination and ensuring equality of opportunity. Directive Principles—particularly Article 39(d) (equal pay for equal work)—act as interpretive beacons, enabling courts to concretise equality obligations.[2]

Early Articulation: From Classification to Purpose-Oriented Similarity

In State of West Bengal v. Anwar Ali Sarkar (1952), the Supreme Court invalidated an unrestricted power to refer cases to Special Courts, holding that unguided discretion violated Article 14.[3] The case supplied the classic two-pronged test but also hinted that classification must be tethered to legislative purpose. Subsequent decisions—E.P. Royappa (1973) and Maneka Gandhi (1978)—recast equality as a guarantee against arbitrariness itself, thereby broadening the relevance of “similarly situated” beyond rigid compartments.[4]

The Purpose-Centric Test of Similarity

Justice Mathew’s oft-quoted formulation—that a reasonable classification “includes all persons who are similarly situated with respect to the purpose of the law”[5]—has been reiterated by multiple High Courts,[6] providing the doctrinal bridge between traditional classification and substantive equality. Modern courts therefore evaluate whether:

  • Persons share a homogeneous status vis-à-vis the policy objective (e.g., elimination of public mischief or achievement of positive public good); and
  • No arbitrary exclusion or under-inclusion undermines that objective.

Equality in Socio-Economic Benefits

Pay, Pension, and Horizontal Parity

In Randhir Singh v. Union of India (1982) the Court crystalised “equal pay for equal work,” holding that departmental segmentation could not justify pay disparity among identically placed drivers.[7] D.S. Nakara v. Union of India (1982) struck down a pension revision that excluded pre-cut-off retirees, reasoning that all pensioners formed a single class and the date-based exclusion lacked nexus to the welfare objective.[8]

Reservation & Attempts: The Selvakumar Paradigm

Union of India v. M. Selvakumar (2017) involved challenge by physically-handicapped OBC aspirants seeking ten Civil Services attempts, equal to the general-category disabled candidates. The Supreme Court held that horizontal reservation cuts across vertical categories; fixing seven attempts for all disabled candidates except SC/ST (who enjoy unlimited attempts) was neither arbitrary nor discriminatory.[9] The judgment underscores that persons may be similarly situated within a horizontal category yet legitimately differentiated on a vertical axis so long as the policy objective—balancing opportunity with administrative efficacy—remains intact.

Promotion & Seniority

In Ajit Singh Januja v. State of Punjab (1996) the Court clarified that accelerated promotion through reservation does not entitle reserved candidates to intrude upon general-category seniority once the quota is satisfied.[10] The ruling harmonises equality with meritocracy by distinguishing among employees similarly situated in cadre seniority, thereby preventing reverse discrimination.

Extension of Judicial Relief: From Individual to Class

A recurring question is whether relief granted to a successful litigant must be extended automatically to others who did not litigate. In State of Karnataka v. C. Lalitha (2006) and Arvind Kumar Srivastava (2015) the Supreme Court held that persons similarly situated should ordinarily receive equal treatment; however, laches, acquiescence, or judgments in personam may justify denial.[11] Recent cases such as Rushibhai Pathak (2022) reaffirm the “normal rule–exception” framework, obligating authorities to pro-actively equalise benefits in “judgment in rem” situations.[12]

Wrongful Parity and the “Two Wrongs” Limitation

The doctrine is not licence to replicate illegality. State of Haryana v. Ram Kumar Mann (1997) rejected a claim for reinstatement solely because three others had been wrongly reinstated; equality demands parity in rights, not in perpetuation of wrongs.[13]

Operationalising the Doctrine

Evidentiary Burden

The claimant bears the initial onus to establish factual parity on relevant parameters—cadre, tenure, functional duties, or statutory status. The State must then justify any differential treatment by demonstrating a rational nexus with policy objectives.

Policy-Making Latitude v. Judicial Review

Courts tread cautiously where classification stems from complex policy choices. Selvakumar reaffirmed that unless manifestly arbitrary, policy calibrations—such as number of examination attempts—lie within executive discretion.[9]

Contemporary Challenges

The proliferation of affirmative action measures, contractual employment models, and targeted welfare schemes intensifies debates on who is “similarly situated.” Digital governance and data analytics may soon enable more granular—yet constitutionally defensible—classifications. Conversely, indiscriminate extension of benefits risks fiscal strain and administrative chaos.

Conclusion

The doctrine of “similarly situated persons” remains the judicial fulcrum for reconciling equality with classification. Its purposive orientation—requiring that all those equally placed with respect to the law’s objective be treated alike—enables nuanced balancing of social justice and administrative pragmatism. Future adjudication must continue to safeguard against both under-inclusion and over-extension, ensuring that Article 14’s promise of substantive equality does not devolve into mechanical symmetry or arbitrary largesse.

Footnotes

  1. Classic formulation reiterated in State of West Bengal v. Anwar Ali Sarkar, AIR 1952 SC 75.
  2. See Articles 38 & 39(d); Randhir Singh v. Union of India, (1982) 1 SCC 618.
  3. Anwar Ali Sarkar, supra.
  4. E.P. Royappa v. State of Tamil Nadu, (1974) 4 SCC 3; Maneka Gandhi v. Union of India, (1978) 1 SCC 248.
  5. Justice Mathew in Ambica Mills, quoted in Sadashiv Karu Jamdade v. State of Maharashtra, (1976) Bom HC.
  6. Rajkot Engineering Association v. Tax Advocates Association, (1986) Guj HC.
  7. Randhir Singh v. Union of India, (1982) 1 SCC 618.
  8. D.S. Nakara v. Union of India, (1983) 1 SCC 305.
  9. Union of India v. M. Selvakumar, (2017) 3 SCC 504.
  10. Ajit Singh Januja v. State of Punjab, (1996) 2 SCC 715.
  11. State of Karnataka v. C. Lalitha, (2006) 2 SCC 747; State of U.P. v. Arvind Kumar Srivastava, (2015) 1 SCC 347.
  12. Rushibhai Jagdishbhai Pathak v. Bhavnagar Municipal Corporation, (2022) SCC OnLine SC 641.
  13. State of Haryana v. Ram Kumar Mann, (1997) 3 SCC 321.