Dismissal of Complaint under Section 204(4) CrPC: Procedural Finality, Remedies, and Jurisprudential Trends

Dismissal of Complaint under Section 204(4) CrPC: Procedural Finality, Remedies, and Jurisprudential Trends

Introduction

Section 204 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (“CrPC”) governs the issuance of process once a Magistrate finds “sufficient ground for proceeding”.[1] Sub-section (4) empowers the Magistrate to dismiss the complaint when statutory process-fees or other requisite fees are not paid “within a reasonable time”.[2] Although apparently narrow, the provision raises recurrent questions concerning (i) the juridical nature of such dismissal, (ii) the remedies available to the complainant, (iii) the status and rights of the accused, and (iv) the interface between Section 204(4) and allied provisions such as Sections 203 and 256 CrPC. This article critically analyses the statutory text and the principal Indian jurisprudence—particularly the Kerala, Madras, Punjab & Haryana and Madhya Pradesh lines of authority—while situating the debate within the broader architecture of criminal procedure.

Statutory Framework

2.1 Textual Setting

Section 204(4) reads:

“When by any law for the time being in force any process-fees or other fees are payable, no process shall be issued until the fees are paid and, if such fees are not paid within a reasonable time, the Magistrate may dismiss the complaint.” (emphasis supplied)
The dismissal is thus premised on an antecedent default by the complainant, distinguishing it from Section 203 (dismissal for absence of sufficient ground) and Section 256(1) (dismissal after appearance of the accused when the complainant remains absent).

2.2 Comparative Provisioning

  • Section 203: Dismissal at the pre-process stage for want of prima facie ground—obligatory recording of reasons.
  • Section 204(4): Dismissal post-cognizance but pre-issuance for non-payment of fees—no express mandate to record reasons, yet the duty flows from Section 354(1)(b).
  • Section 256(1): Dismissal (amounting to acquittal) after summons has been served and on date fixed for accused’s appearance, conditioned on complainant’s absence.

Jurisprudential Evolution

3.1 Early Recognition of Limited Magistrate Power

In Abdul Nabi v. Gulam Murthuza Khan (1966), the erstwhile Andhra Pradesh High Court underscored that, once cognizance is taken and Section 203 stage is crossed, the next statutory “landing” for termination is only Section 253(2) (now Section 256).[3] Though decided under the old Code, the reasoning foreshadowed the contemporary insistence that Section 204(4) operates in a sui generis space and cannot be conflated with an acquittal.

3.2 Kerala Line: Tom Thomas Doctrine

The seminal decision in Tom Thomas v. Abdul Lathief (Ker HC, 2006)[4] held that dismissal under Section 204(4) is not tantamount to an acquittal; consequently, an appeal under Section 378 CrPC is impermissible and the appropriate remedy is revision under Sections 397/399 or an inherent-powers petition under Section 482. The Court reasoned that, had Parliament intended an acquittal, it would have so declared as it did in Section 256. This view has been reaffirmed in Krishnankutty v. Ramani (Ker HC, 2021)[5] and followed in allied contexts involving Section 138 Negotiable Instruments Act (Chelladurai, 2017).

3.3 Madras Perspective: Anandha Vadivelu and Subsequent Clarifications

The Madras High Court in Anandha Vadivelu v. Kannappan (2011) adopted the Kerala position, expressly approving Tom Thomas and confirming that only a revision lies.[6] More recently, in Monotech Systems Ltd. v. Shree Graphics (2023), the Court reiterated that although a revision is the normal remedy, Section 482 jurisdiction can be invoked in appropriate cases to restore the complaint where dismissal was mechanical.[7]

3.4 Punjab & Haryana Approach: Focus on Accused’s Locus Standi

In Gurdeep Singh v. State of Haryana (2001) the High Court addressed a collateral but important issue: whether the person proposed to be summoned is entitled to be heard in the complainant’s revision challenging a Section 204(4) dismissal.[8] Relying on Supreme Court precedent (Vadilal Panchal, 1960), it held that, because the accused had not yet entered appearance, he enjoyed no statutory right of audience. The decision thus preserves the complainant’s revisionary remedy unencumbered by premature contest from the putative accused.

3.5 Madhya Pradesh View: Bhagwati Stone Crusher

The Madhya Pradesh High Court in M/s Bhagwati Stone Crusher v. Sheikh Nizam Mansoori (2020) confronted the mischaracterisation of a Section 204(4) dismissal as an acquittal by a Sessions Court.[9] On appeal, the High Court restored conceptual clarity, holding that “dismissal” is not “acquittal” and that an appeal under Section 378(4) is therefore not maintainable.

3.6 Intersection with Supreme Court Dicta on Magistrate’s Post-Summoning Powers

While the Supreme Court has not squarely ruled on Section 204(4), its decisions delimiting Magistrate powers post-summons—Adalat Prasad v. Rooplal Jindal (2004)[10] and Subramanium Sethuraman v. State of Maharashtra (2004)[11]—strengthen the inference that the Code draws sharp procedural boundaries. These cases hold that, once process is issued and the accused appears, the Magistrate lacks authority to recall summons except via higher-court intervention. By parity, the discretion granted by Section 204(4) is strictly textual and cannot be expanded to foreclose the complainant’s statutory remedies or to create rights in favour of an accused who is yet to be summoned.

Procedural Consequences of a Section 204(4) Dismissal

4.1 Nature of the Order

  • Not an Acquittal – prevailing view across High Courts; word “dismiss” contrasts with “acquit” used in Section 256.
  • Interlocutory vis-à-vis Revisional Jurisdiction – Following Mohit Alias Sonu (SC, 2013),[12] orders materially affecting complainant’s right to prosecute are non-interlocutory; hence revision is competent despite Section 397(2) bar.
  • No Prejudice to Accused – because process has not issued, the accused lacks locus under Sections 401(2) / 398 proviso.

4.2 Available Remedies

  1. Revision to Sessions Court/High Court under Sections 397–399 CrPC (favoured by Tom Thomas, Gurdeep Singh, Bhagwati Stone Crusher).
  2. Inherent Powers under Section 482 CrPC (permissible but exceptional: Monotech Systems).
  3. Fresh Complaint – doctrinally open, subject to abuse-of-process scrutiny (Chitto Adhikari, 1949).

4.3 Standard of Appellate/Supervisory Review

Revisional courts examine whether the Magistrate: (i) granted a “reasonable time” for payment, (ii) applied judicial mind to the cause for default, and (iii) recorded reasons consonant with Section 354(1)(b). Mechanical dismissal without notice or in the face of partial compliance has been deprecated as contrary to the justice-advancing purpose of procedural law (State of Haryana v. Ram Singh, 1996 P&H).[13]

Conceptual Distinctions: Sections 203, 204(4) and 256

StageGround of TerminationNature of OrderRemedy
Section 203No sufficient ground after inquiryDismissal (speaking order)Revision (accused no locus)
Section 204(4)Non-payment of fees pre-issuanceDismissal (administrative default)Revision / 482
Section 256(1)Complainant absent on date fixed after serviceAcquittalAppeal under §378(4)

Policy Considerations and Critique

While Section 204(4) serves as a discipline-inducing mechanism against dilatory litigants, an overly rigid application may unjustly frustrate meritorious prosecutions, particularly in economic-offence complaints where service costs are significant. Judicial discretion—within the statutory text—ought therefore to be exercised in line with the Supreme Court’s broader guidance that procedural tools “advance, not stifle, justice” (Associated Cement Co. Ltd. v. Keshvanand, 1998).[14]

Conclusion

The jurisprudence uniformly recognises that dismissal under Section 204(4) CrPC is procedurally terminal but not substantively final. It neither absolves the accused nor forecloses the complainant; instead, it interposes a gate-keeping mechanism conditioned on diligence. Revisional oversight—rather than an appellate regime—is the constitutionally coherent remedy, preserving both expedition and fairness. Given divergent magisterial practices, a clarificatory amendment requiring recording of brief reasons and mandating a prefatory notice to the complainant may foster uniformity without diluting the Section’s deterrent purpose.

Footnotes

  1. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, §204.
  2. Ibid., §204(4).
  3. Abdul Nabi v. Gulam Murthuza Khan, AIR 1966 AP 134.
  4. Tom Thomas v. Abdul Lathief, (2006) SCC OnLine Ker 518.
  5. Krishnankutty v. Ramani, 2021 (3) KLT 905.
  6. Anandha Vadivelu v. Kannappan, 2011 SCC OnLine Mad 537.
  7. M/s Monotech Systems Ltd. v. Shree Graphics, 2023 SCC OnLine Mad XXXX.
  8. Gurdeep Singh v. State of Haryana, 2001 SCC OnLine P&H 121.
  9. M/s Bhagwati Stone Crusher v. Sheikh Nizam Mansoori, 2020 SCC OnLine MP XXXX.
  10. Adalat Prasad v. Rooplal Jindal, (2004) 7 SCC 338.
  11. Subramanium Sethuraman v. State of Maharashtra, (2004) 13 SCC 324.
  12. Mohit Alias Sonu v. State of U.P., (2013) 7 SCC 789.
  13. State of Haryana v. Ram Singh, 1996 SCC OnLine P&H 1376.
  14. Associated Cement Co. Ltd. v. Keshvanand, (1998) 1 SCC 687.