Discharge of Accused Under Section 245(2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973

The Power of Discharge Under Section 245(2) CrPC: A Critical Procedural Safeguard in Complaint Cases

Introduction

The Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 ("CrPC") provides a comprehensive framework governing the investigation, inquiry, and trial of criminal offences in India. Within this framework, the provisions relating to the discharge of an accused person serve as a crucial check against frivolous, vexatious, or unfounded prosecutions. In the context of warrant cases instituted otherwise than on a police report (commonly known as complaint cases), Section 245 of the CrPC delineates the power of a Magistrate to discharge an accused. This provision is bifurcated into two distinct scenarios: discharge after the recording of prosecution evidence under sub-section (1), and discharge at a preliminary stage under sub-section (2). It is the latter provision, Section 245(2), that forms the nucleus of this analysis. This article critically examines the scope, timing, and judicial interpretation of the power of discharge under Section 245(2), arguing that it represents a vital, albeit sometimes misunderstood, procedural safeguard that empowers Magistrates to terminate proceedings where the charge is manifestly "groundless," thereby protecting individuals from the rigours of an unwarranted trial.

The Statutory Framework: Differentiating Section 245(1) and 245(2)

Chapter XIX of the CrPC outlines the procedure for the trial of warrant cases by Magistrates. A fundamental distinction is drawn between cases instituted on a police report (Sections 238-243) and those instituted otherwise than on a police report (Sections 244-247). Section 245, which falls under the latter category, provides:

245. When accused shall be discharged.—
(1) If, upon taking all the evidence referred to in section 244, the Magistrate considers, for reasons to be recorded, that no case against the accused has been made out which, if unrebutted, would warrant his conviction, the Magistrate shall discharge him.
(2) Nothing in this section shall be deemed to prevent a Magistrate from discharging the accused at any previous stage of the case if, for reasons to be recorded by such Magistrate, he considers the charge to be groundless.

The distinction between the two sub-sections is pivotal. As clarified by the Supreme Court in Sheonandan Paswan v. State of Bihar and Others (1986), sub-section (1) operates at a post-evidence stage. It comes into play only after the Magistrate has taken "all the evidence referred to in Section 244," which is the evidence produced by the prosecution. At this juncture, the test for discharge is stringent: the Magistrate must conclude that "no case against the accused has been made out which, if unrebutted, would warrant his conviction."

In stark contrast, sub-section (2) provides a more flexible and preliminary remedy. It empowers the Magistrate to discharge the accused "at any previous stage of the case." This power is not contingent upon the completion of prosecution evidence. The operative standard for invoking Section 245(2) is the Magistrate's consideration that the charge is "groundless." In both scenarios, the statute mandates that the Magistrate must record reasons for the order of discharge, ensuring judicial accountability and transparency (Sheonandan Paswan v. State of Bihar & Ors, 1986).

Judicial Interpretation of "At Any Previous Stage"

The temporal scope of Section 245(2), encapsulated in the phrase "at any previous stage of the case," has been the subject of extensive judicial deliberation. The definitive pronouncement on this issue came from the Supreme Court in Ajoy Kumar Ghose v. State of Jharkhand and Another (2009). The Court held that the power under Section 245(2) is exercisable even before the commencement of evidence under Section 244. It clarified the procedural sequence: in a complaint case, after the accused appears, the Magistrate proceeds under Section 244 to hear the prosecution and take its evidence. It is before this stage that Section 245(2) can be invoked.

The Supreme Court in Ajoy Kumar Ghose affirmed the long-standing principle established in Cricket Association of Bengal v. State of West Bengal (1971), where the Court, interpreting the analogous provision in the old Code, upheld the Magistrate's jurisdiction to discharge an accused at a preliminary stage. This interpretation has been consistently followed by various High Courts. For instance, the Kerala High Court in Manmohan Malhotra v. P.M. Abdul Salam and Another (1994) explicitly stated that since the section empowers a Magistrate to pass such an order "at any previous stage," it is not necessary that evidence should have been adduced. Similarly, the Delhi High Court in M.G. Attri v. S.K. Jain (2013) reiterated this established legal position, confirming that a Magistrate is entitled to discharge an accused under Section 245(2) if the charge is found to be groundless, even before evidence is recorded under Section 244(1).

The Allahabad High Court in Vishwa Nath Jiloka and Others v. Ist Munsif Lower Criminal Court, Bahraich and Other (1989) gave the phrase a wide import, holding that an accused, upon appearance, can claim discharge on grounds of technical defects (like want of sanction) or the inherent improbability of the complaint, without the need for any additional evidence. This underscores that the stage for considering a discharge under Section 245(2) arises as soon as the accused appears and is able to demonstrate the groundlessness of the charge.

The Standard of "Groundless": A Comparative Analysis

The cornerstone of a Section 245(2) discharge is the Magistrate's satisfaction that the charge is "groundless." While the CrPC does not define this term, judicial precedents have interpreted it to mean that the allegations in the complaint, coupled with the statements recorded under Sections 200 and 202 CrPC, do not disclose the essential ingredients of the alleged offence, or that the allegations are so patently absurd or inherently improbable that no prudent person can ever reach a just conclusion that there is sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused.

The standard for discharge varies across different provisions of the CrPC, reflecting the different stages and types of cases.

  • Section 227 (Sessions Cases): The Judge shall discharge the accused if he "considers that there is not sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused."
  • Section 239 (Warrant Cases on Police Report): The Magistrate shall discharge the accused if he "considers the charge against the accused to be groundless."
  • Section 245(2) (Warrant Cases on Complaint): The Magistrate may discharge if he "considers the charge to be groundless."

The Supreme Court in cases like State of T.N. v. N. Suresh Rajan & Ors (2014) and State Through Deputy Superintendent of Police v. R. Soundirarasu (2022) has observed that notwithstanding the differences in language, the court at the pre-evidence discharge stage is required to ascertain whether a *prima facie* case exists for proceeding against the accused. This principle, articulated authoritatively in R.S. Nayak v. A.R. Antulay (1986), forms the bedrock of the discharge jurisprudence. Therefore, a "groundless" charge is one where the materials on record are insufficient to establish a *prima facie* case.

This aligns with the principles applied for quashing proceedings under Section 482 CrPC. In All Cargo Movers (India) Private Limited v. Dhanesh Badarmal Jain (2007), the Supreme Court quashed proceedings where the complaint failed to establish the requisite fraudulent or dishonest intent for a criminal offence, distinguishing it from a civil breach of contract. Similarly, in Monaben Ketanbhai Shah v. State of Gujarat (2004), proceedings were terminated because the complaint lacked the necessary averments to attract vicarious liability under Section 141 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881. A charge that is so fundamentally deficient as to warrant quashing under Section 482 would undoubtedly be considered "groundless" for the purpose of discharge under Section 245(2).

The Magistrate's Role: Beyond a Mechanical Function

The exercise of power under Section 245(2) is a judicial function that demands a careful application of mind. The Magistrate cannot act as a mere "post office," mechanically dismissing discharge applications or framing charges. As observed in the context of summons cases in Arun Gupta v. J.P. Meena (2023), the court is bound by law to apply its mind to determine if a prima facie case is made out. This principle applies with equal, if not greater, force to warrant cases.

A crucial question that often arises is whether considering a discharge under Section 245(2) amounts to a review or recall of the summoning order, which is barred by the Supreme Court's decision in Adalat Prasad v. Rooplal Jindal (2004). The High Courts have clarified this position. The Kerala High Court in Manmohan Malhotra opined that an order issuing process is of an interim nature, and considering discharge upon the appearance of the accused is not a review but the exercise of a distinct statutory power. The summoning order is passed ex-parte, without the benefit of hearing the accused. Section 245(2) provides the first opportunity for the accused to be heard on the merits of the complaint, and the Magistrate is duty-bound to consider these submissions. The mandatory requirement to record reasons further ensures that the decision is reasoned and not arbitrary.

Conclusion

Section 245(2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, is a potent and indispensable tool in the administration of criminal justice. The jurisprudence, crystallized by the Supreme Court in Ajoy Kumar Ghose v. State of Jharkhand, has firmly established that this power can be exercised at any stage before the recording of prosecution evidence, upon the Magistrate's satisfaction that the charge is "groundless." This standard, while requiring a less detailed inquiry than a trial, mandates a thorough prima facie assessment of the complaint and the materials on record. It serves as a critical filter, weeding out baseless and vexatious prosecutions at the threshold and saving the accused from the ordeal of a protracted and unwarranted trial. By entrusting Magistrates with this discretionary power, subject to the safeguard of recording reasons, the law strikes a fine balance between the interests of the complainant in seeking justice and the fundamental right of an individual to be protected from frivolous litigation.