Discharge of Accused under Section 245(2) CrPC: A Procedural Safeguard

Discharge of an Accused under Section 245(2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973: An Analysis of Scope and Judicial Interpretation in India

Introduction

The Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (CrPC) meticulously lays down the procedural framework for criminal trials in India, balancing the interests of the State in prosecuting offenders with the fundamental rights of the accused. Within this framework, provisions for discharge of an accused serve as crucial safeguards against frivolous or unsubstantiated prosecutions. Section 245 CrPC, situated in Chapter XIX-B (Trial of warrant-cases by Magistrates - Cases instituted otherwise than on police report), provides for the discharge of an accused. Specifically, sub-section (2) of Section 245 empowers the Magistrate to discharge an accused "at any previous stage of the case" if the Magistrate considers the charge to be "groundless." This article undertakes a comprehensive analysis of Section 245(2) CrPC, examining its scope, the criteria for its application, and its interpretation by the Indian judiciary, drawing upon relevant statutory provisions and case law.

Statutory Framework: Sections 244, 245, and 246 CrPC

Chapter XIX-B of the CrPC outlines the procedure for trial of warrant cases instituted otherwise than on a police report (i.e., on a private complaint). The key stages relevant to discharge and framing of charges are:

  • Section 244 CrPC (Evidence for prosecution): This section mandates that when, in any warrant-case instituted otherwise than on a police report, the accused appears or is brought before a Magistrate, the Magistrate shall proceed to hear the prosecution and take all such evidence as may be produced in support of the prosecution. The Magistrate may also, on the application of the prosecution, issue summons to any of its witnesses directing them to attend or to produce any document or other thing.
  • Section 245 CrPC (When accused shall be discharged):
    • Sub-section (1) provides that if, upon taking all the evidence referred to in Section 244, the Magistrate considers, for reasons to be recorded, that no case against the accused has been made out which, if unrebutted, would warrant his conviction, the Magistrate shall discharge him.
    • Sub-section (2) states: "Nothing in this section shall be deemed to prevent a Magistrate from discharging the accused at any previous stage of the case if, for reasons to be recorded by such Magistrate, he considers the charge to be groundless."
  • Section 246 CrPC (Procedure where accused is not discharged): If, after such evidence and consideration, the Magistrate is of opinion that there is ground for presuming that the accused has committed an offence triable under this Chapter, which such Magistrate is competent to try and which, in his opinion, could be adequately punished by him, he shall frame in writing a charge against the accused.

The Supreme Court in Sunil Mehta and Another v. State Of Gujarat And Another (2013 SCC 9 209, Supreme Court Of India, 2013) emphasized the necessity of evidence under Section 244 CrPC, including the right to cross-examination, for the purpose of framing charges under Section 246 CrPC. This underscores the typical progression where charges are framed after the prosecution presents its evidence. Section 245(2) CrPC, however, carves out an exception to this general timeline.

The Ambit of "At Any Previous Stage" under Section 245(2) CrPC

The phrase "at any previous stage of the case" in Section 245(2) CrPC is pivotal to its interpretation and application. It signifies that the power to discharge under this sub-section is not contingent upon the completion of evidence under Section 244 CrPC, unlike the power under Section 245(1) CrPC.

The Supreme Court in Ajoy Kumar Ghose v. State Of Jharkhand And Another (2009 SCC 14 115, Supreme Court Of India, 2009) explicitly clarified the distinction. The Court noted that under Section 245(1), the Magistrate has the advantage of evidence led by the prosecution under Section 244. However, "under Section 245(2) CrPC, a Magistrate can discharge the accused at any previous stage of the case, if he finds the charge to be groundless." (Ajoy Kumar Ghose v. State Of Jharkhand And Another, para 22, as provided in Ref 9). The Court further elaborated that Section 245(2) permits discharge "at any stage prior to recording evidence, provided the charge is groundless." (Ajoy Kumar Ghose v. State Of Jharkhand And Another, 2009 SCC 14 115, Analysis section, Ref 7).

This interpretation was emphatically reiterated by the Supreme Court in VISHNU KUMAR SHUKLA v. THE STATE OF UTTAR PRADESH (Supreme Court Of India, 2023, Ref 11 & 12). The Court stated: "The situation under Section 245(2) CrPC is, however, different. There, under sub-section (2), the Magistrate has the power of discharging the accused at any previous stage of the case i.e. even before such evidence is led... The Magistrate can take this decision before the accused appears or is brought before the court or the evidence is led under Section 244 CrPC. The words appearing in Section 245(2) CrPC 'at any previous stage of the case', clearly bring out this position."

High Courts have consistently followed this line of reasoning. The Allahabad High Court in Manoj Dalmia v. State Of U.P. And Another (Allahabad High Court, 2011, Ref 24), citing earlier precedents like Cricket Association of Bengal v. State of West Bengal (1971 (3) SCC 239), affirmed that "under Section 245(2) Cr.P.C, the Magistrate can discharge the accused at any previous stage, i.e, even before any evidence is recorded under Section 244(1) Cr.P.C." Similarly, the Madras High Court in Assistant Commissioner Of Income-Tax, City Circle Vii (Investigation), Chennai-34 Petitioner v. N.K Mohamed Ali (Madras High Court, 2010, Ref 13) held that a petition for discharge under Section 245(2) CrPC would be maintainable at a stage prior to recording of evidence under Section 244 CrPC. The Allahabad High Court in Mohd. Ibrahim Petitioner v. State Of U.P And Another S (2013 SCC ONLINE ALL 224, Allahabad High Court, 2013, Ref 20) also observed that for considering discharge under Section 245(2), the Magistrate is not obliged to wait for prosecution evidence under Section 244 CrPC.

This power can be invoked even after the issuance of summons and appearance of the accused. The Punjab & Haryana High Court in Hybrid Seeds And Pesticides, Abohar v. State Of Punjab (1997 SCC ONLINE P&H 839, Punjab & Haryana High Court, 1997, Ref 23) noted that a summoning order, being interim, could be effectively addressed by seeking discharge under Section 245(2) CrPC if the complaint was an abuse of process. This is particularly significant in light of the Supreme Court's ruling in Adalat Prasad v. Rooplal Jindal And Others (2004 SCC 7 338, Supreme Court Of India, 2004, Ref 5) and Subramanium Sethuraman v. State Of Maharashtra And Another (2005 SCC CRI 242, Supreme Court Of India, 2004, Ref 6), which held that a Magistrate has no power to recall/review an order issuing process under Section 204 CrPC, and the accused must seek remedies under other provisions, such as discharge.

The Criterion of a "Groundless" Charge

The linchpin for invoking Section 245(2) CrPC is the Magistrate's satisfaction, for reasons to be recorded, that the charge is "groundless." The term "groundless" is not explicitly defined in the CrPC, but judicial pronouncements offer guidance.

The Supreme Court in VISHNU KUMAR SHUKLA v. THE STATE OF UTTAR PRADESH (Ref 11 & 12) clarified that when considering discharge under Section 245(2) CrPC before evidence is led, "There is no question of any consideration of evidence at that stage, because there is none." This implies that the determination of "groundless" is made on the basis of the complaint, any statements recorded during inquiry under Sections 200 and 202 CrPC, and the documents, if any, filed along with the complaint. If these materials, taken at face value, do not disclose the commission of any offence or if the allegations are patently absurd, inherently improbable, or legally barred, the charge may be considered groundless.

The Madras High Court in J. Ranganathan, Second Income-Tax Officer v. M.S Bhavani (Madras High Court, 1993, Ref 15) interpreted "groundless" to mean "that the evidence must be such that no conviction can be rested on it." While this phrasing might suggest an evidentiary assessment, in the context of a pre-Section 244 stage, "evidence" would refer to the material on record before the commencement of prosecution evidence in trial, i.e., the complaint and initial inquiry materials. The court also cautioned that a petition for discharge under 245(2) could not be entertained "without recording any evidence or ascertaining from any other documentary evidence," implying that the decision cannot be in a vacuum and must be based on the available complaint record.

Analogous principles can be drawn from discharge provisions in other contexts. For instance, in K. Ramakrishna And Others v. State Of Bihar And Another (2000 SCC 8 547, Supreme Court Of India, 2000, Ref 2), dealing with discharge under Section 239 CrPC (in cases instituted on a police report), the Supreme Court observed that "if upon the admitted facts and the documents relied upon by the complainant or the prosecution and without weighing or sifting of evidence, no case is made out, the criminal proceedings instituted against the accused are required to be dropped or quashed." This threshold, focusing on whether a prima facie case is even made out from the initial materials, resonates with the concept of a "groundless" charge.

It is crucial to distinguish "groundless" under Section 245(2) from the standard under Section 245(1), which applies after all prosecution evidence under Section 244 is taken. Section 245(1) involves assessing whether "no case against the accused has been made out which, if unrebutted, would warrant his conviction." This is a higher threshold involving evaluation of evidence led during trial. In contrast, "groundless" under Section 245(2) implies an inherent lack of substance in the accusation from the outset, apparent without delving into detailed trial evidence (Ajoy Kumar Ghose v. State Of Jharkhand And Another, Ref 7, 9; VISHNU KUMAR SHUKLA v. THE STATE OF UTTAR PRADESH, Ref 11, 12).

Procedural Aspects and Judicial Discretion

The power under Section 245(2) CrPC is discretionary, to be exercised by the Magistrate based on recorded reasons. This ensures that the power is not used arbitrarily.

  • Application by Accused or Suo Motu: While typically invoked on an application by the accused, the wording "if... he considers the charge to be groundless" suggests that a Magistrate might also exercise this power suo motu if the circumstances warrant.
  • Hearing the Complainant: Principles of natural justice would generally require that the complainant be heard before an order of discharge is passed, as an order of discharge terminates the proceedings. The spirit of Bhagwant Singh v. Commissioner Of Police ((1985) 2 SCC 537, cited in Vishnu Kumar Tiwari (S) v. State Of Uttar Pradesh, Ref 3), which mandates hearing the informant before accepting a final report leading to closure, could be extended by analogy.
  • Personal Appearance of Accused: Courts have shown flexibility regarding the personal appearance of the accused for moving a discharge application under Section 245(2) CrPC. The Allahabad High Court in Smt. Urmila Tiwari v. State Of U.P. And Another (2017 AHC 5412, Allahabad High Court, 2017, Ref 21) permitted the applicant to move the discharge application through counsel, with safeguards. Similarly, the Kerala High Court in Shahida Beevi v. The State Of Kerala (2008 KERLT 1 206, Kerala High Court, 2007, Ref 22) observed that the petitioner could be permitted to appear through counsel for the purpose of a Section 245(2) application, and personal presence need only be insisted upon if the discharge claim fails.
  • Challenging Summons Indirectly: Given that a Magistrate cannot recall their own summons (Adalat Prasad, Ref 5), Section 245(2) provides a crucial avenue for an accused, who believes the summons was issued on groundless charges, to seek termination of proceedings at an early stage before the Magistrate.

Some older High Court decisions, such as Devi Chand Bishan Chand v. State Of U.P. (Allahabad High Court, 1984, Ref 18), had expressed reservations about "shortcut" discharges under Section 245(2) without any evidence being recorded. However, the subsequent, more definitive pronouncements by the Supreme Court in Ajoy Kumar Ghose (Ref 7, 9) and VISHNU KUMAR SHUKLA (Ref 11, 12) have clarified that Section 245(2) indeed contemplates discharge even before evidence under Section 244 CrPC is led, provided the charge is found to be groundless based on the initial complaint record.

Conclusion

Section 245(2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, stands as a significant procedural tool in the hands of the Magistrate to prevent abuse of the process of the court and to protect individuals from the rigours of a baseless criminal trial in warrant cases instituted otherwise than on a police report. The judiciary, particularly the Supreme Court of India, has consistently interpreted this provision to allow for the discharge of an accused at any stage prior to the recording of evidence under Section 244 CrPC, if the Magistrate, for reasons to be recorded, considers the charge to be groundless. This determination is to be made based on the complaint, initial statements, and accompanying documents, without requiring the prosecution to first lead evidence as mandated for a discharge under Section 245(1) CrPC.

The clarity provided by judgments such as Ajoy Kumar Ghose and VISHNU KUMAR SHUKLA reinforces the distinct nature and purpose of Section 245(2) CrPC. It serves not only as a filter against unwarranted prosecutions but also as a vital remedy for the accused, especially in light of the limitations on the Magistrate's power to recall summons. By enabling early termination of proceedings where the accusation itself lacks fundamental merit, Section 245(2) CrPC upholds the principles of fair trial and ensures that judicial time and resources are not expended on manifestly groundless cases.