Default bail is not a mere statutory right, but part of the procedure established by law under Article 21 of the Constitution of India: Supreme Court

Default bail is not a mere statutory right, but part of the procedure established by law under Article 21 of the Constitution of India: Supreme Court

Case Title: Fakhrey Alam v. State of Uttar Pradesh

The Supreme Court noted that attempting to file a supplemental charge sheet relating to UAPA offences does not allow the time frame for investigation stipulated under Section 167 of the Code of Criminal Procedure to be extended.

When granting default bail to Fakhrey Alam, who was charged under Section 18 of the UAPA Act, the panel of Justices Sanjay Kishan Kaul and R. Subhash Reddy emphasised that default bail under the first proviso of Section 167(2) of the Cr.P.C. is a basic right and not just a statutory right.

The document/supplementary charge sheet required by the UAPA Act was not filed in this instance even within the allotted 180 days; instead, it was filed 211 days after the deadline had passed.

The court further stated that because the UAPA Act has severe penalties, default bail is not merely a legislative privilege but rather a requirement of the legal process as set forth in Article 21 of the Indian Constitution.

In light of Bikramjit Singh v. State of Punjab, the court made the following observation in the present case:

"We need only emphasize what is already observed in Bikramjit Singh case (supra) that default bail under first proviso of Section 167(2) of the Cr.P.C. is a fundamental right and not merely a statutory right as it is, a procedure established by law under Article 21 of the Constitution. Thus, a fundamental right is granted to an accused person to be released on bail once the conditions of the first proviso to Section 167(2) of the Cr.P.C. are fulfilled. In fact, in the majority judgment of this Court it has been held that an oral application for grant of default bail would suffice. "

The accused in this case also argued that the Chief Judicial Magistrate in Lucknow could not have granted 180 days for the filing of the charge sheet because the special courts alone have jurisdiction over offences under the UAPA Act, whose cases are handed over to the NIA, and this aspect is no longer res integra in light of this Court's decision in the case of Bikramjit Singh v. State of Punjab. The State argued that the decision in the Bikramjit Singh case (supra) applied to the circumstances that prevailed in the State of Punjab, but that in the State of Uttar Pradesh, the Special Chief Judicial Magistrate was the court that had jurisdiction. It was only recently—roughly a month ago—that special Courts had been made aware of their existence. The court concurred with the state's argument in this regard and noted that the circumstances in the State of Uttar Pradesh are unique and that no designated special courts are really in operation.