Deciding on Merits: The Judicial Prohibition on Dismissing Criminal Revisions for Default in Indian Law

Introduction

The administration of criminal justice in India is founded upon the cardinal principle that substantive justice must prevail over procedural technicalities. A critical manifestation of this principle lies in the handling of petitions and appeals when a party fails to appear. This article examines the jurisprudential evolution and the settled legal position concerning the dismissal of a criminal revision petition for default of appearance. It argues that Indian courts, through a series of authoritative pronouncements, have unequivocally established that a criminal revision cannot be dismissed for non-prosecution. Instead, the court is under a positive obligation to examine the record and decide the matter on its merits. This analysis delves into the foundational principles established for criminal appeals and their subsequent, explicit extension to criminal revisions, the procedural mechanisms for restoring improperly dismissed revisions, and the overarching judicial duty to uphold the integrity of the justice system.

The Foundational Principles: Criminal Appeals and the Duty of the Appellate Court

The legal framework governing criminal revisions is best understood by first examining the principles laid down for criminal appeals, which have served as the bedrock for subsequent jurisprudence. The Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (CrPC), particularly Sections 385 and 386, outlines the procedure for hearing appeals. A long-standing debate in Indian law concerned whether an appellate court could dismiss an appeal for non-prosecution if the appellant or their counsel was absent.

An early and significant authority on this point is Shyam Deo Pandey And Others v. State Of Bihar (1971 SCC 1 855). The Supreme Court held that an appellate court could not summarily dismiss an appeal without perusing the complete record of the case. The mere absence of the appellant did not absolve the court of its duty to evaluate the merits comprehensively. This established a clear mandate for judicial application of mind.

However, a conflicting view emerged in Ram Naresh Yadav v. State of Bihar (AIR 1987 SC 1500), where it was held that a criminal appeal could be dismissed for default. This created considerable judicial ambiguity until the law was definitively settled by a three-Judge Bench of the Supreme Court in Bani Singh And Others v. State Of U.P. (1996 SCC 4 720). The Court in Bani Singh overruled Ram Naresh Yadav and held that the plain language of Sections 385 and 386 CrPC does not contemplate dismissal for default. Once an appeal is admitted, the court must engage with its merits. The Court reasoned:

"The plain language of Section 385 makes it clear that if the Appellate Court does not consider the appeal fit for summary dismissal, it 'must' call for the record and Section 386 mandates that after the record is received, the Appellate Court may dispose of the appeal after hearing the accused or his counsel. Therefore, the plain language of Sections 385-386 does not contemplate dismissal of the appeal for non-prosecution."

This principle has been consistently followed. In cases like Saravanan v. Krishnaveni (Madras High Court, 2025), courts have reiterated that if an accused's counsel is absent, the court is obliged to proceed with the hearing, if necessary by appointing an amicus curiae, but cannot dismiss the appeal for default. This underscores that the duty is not merely procedural but a substantive obligation to ensure justice is done.

Extension of the Principle to Criminal Revisions

While the law was settled for criminal appeals, the question remained whether the same logic applied to criminal revisions filed under Sections 397 and 401 of the CrPC. The Supreme Court provided a conclusive answer in Madan Lal Kapoor v. Rajiv Thapar And Others (2007 SCC 7 623). In this case, a criminal revision petition had been dismissed by the High Court "in default for non-prosecution." The Supreme Court, setting aside this order, unequivocally extended the principle from Bani Singh to revisions. The Court observed:

"The matter relates to administration of criminal justice. As held by this Court, a criminal matter cannot be dismissed for default and it must be decided on merits... In our opinion the same reasoning applies to criminal revisions also, and hence a criminal revision cannot also be dismissed in default."

This judgment is the locus classicus on the subject. It solidifies the position that the nature of the proceeding—being a part of the criminal justice system—is paramount. The court's supervisory role in a revision is to correct miscarriage of justice, a duty that cannot be abdicated due to a party's absence. This position has been rigorously applied by various High Courts. For instance, the Chhattisgarh High Court in Laxmi Prasad Soni v. State Of Chhattisgarh (2014) and the Delhi High Court in Nisha Sharma And Ors. v. Vinod Kumar Sharma (1989) have directly relied on this Supreme Court mandate to hold that a criminal revision cannot be dismissed in default.

The Power of Restoration and the Interplay with Section 362 CrPC

A consequential question arises: if a court erroneously dismisses a criminal revision for default, can it recall its own order? This query engages with Section 362 of the CrPC, which bars a court from altering or reviewing its judgment or final order disposing of a case, except to correct a clerical or arithmetical error. At first glance, this provision appears to be an absolute bar on restoration.

However, the judiciary has interpreted that an order of dismissal for default is not a "judgment or final order disposing of a case" on its merits. As established in cases like Emperor v. Bansgopal (1933 SCC ONLINE ALL 288) and Ramautar Thakur And Others v. State Of Bihar (1956 SCC ONLINE PAT 104), a dismissal for a procedural default is distinct from a judgment rendered after due application of mind to the substance of the case. Therefore, the bar under Section 362 CrPC is not attracted.

The Supreme Court affirmed this stance in Vishnu Agarwal v. State Of Uttar Pradesh And Another (2011 SCC 14 813). In this case, the High Court had recalled its own order dismissing a criminal revision for default. The Supreme Court upheld the High Court's action, thereby implicitly holding that a dismissal for default is not an unalterable final order under Section 362. The power to recall such an order is often traced to the inherent powers of the High Court under Section 482 CrPC. As held in Madhu Limaye v. State Of Maharashtra (1978 SCC CRI 1 10), inherent powers are to be exercised to prevent abuse of the process of any court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice. Since dismissing a revision for default is itself contrary to the law laid down in Madan Lal Kapoor, recalling such an order is a necessary step to secure the ends of justice.

The Gauhati High Court in Haji Sabajuddin Ahmed v. Banamali Das (1982 GLR 1 722) deliberated on this very issue, concluding that Section 482 CrPC could be invoked to restore a revision dismissed for default, as the prohibition in Section 362 does not apply to such orders which are not judgments on merits.

Distinguishing Revisional Jurisdiction from Appellate Jurisdiction

It is pertinent to note that the scope of revisional jurisdiction is narrower than that of appellate jurisdiction. As clarified in cases like State Of Maharashtra v. Sujay Mangesh Poyarekar (2008 SCC 9 475), an appeal involves a rehearing on both law and fact, whereas a revision is a supervisory power to rectify any patent illegality, jurisdictional error, or perversity in the findings of the subordinate court. The revisional court does not substitute its own findings for that of the lower court unless the decision is manifestly erroneous.

This distinction strengthens the argument against dismissal for default. The very purpose of revision is to ensure that subordinate courts act within the bounds of law. This duty of supervision is owed to the legal system itself. Therefore, the absence of the petitioner, who is often the aggrieved party seeking correction of a legal error, should not prevent the High Court from examining the record to satisfy itself about the legality and propriety of the impugned order. The obligation is not just to the litigant but to the administration of justice as a whole.

Conclusion

The law in India is now firmly settled that a criminal revision, much like a criminal appeal, cannot be dismissed for default of appearance or non-prosecution. The authoritative pronouncements in Bani Singh v. State of U.P. and its explicit extension to revisions in Madan Lal Kapoor v. Rajiv Thapar have established a non-negotiable judicial duty. Courts exercising criminal jurisdiction are mandated to decide matters on their merits after a thorough perusal of the record. An order dismissing a revision for default is legally untenable and constitutes a failure to exercise jurisdiction.

Furthermore, such an erroneous order is not a "judgment or final order" on merits as contemplated by Section 362 of the CrPC and can be recalled or restored. The High Court can exercise its inherent powers under Section 482 CrPC to rectify the error and ensure that justice is not defeated by procedural lapses. This body of jurisprudence reflects a deep-seated commitment of the Indian legal system to substantive fairness, ensuring that the doors of justice remain open for a decision on the merits, which is the ultimate aim of any judicial proceeding.