Criminal Contempt of Court in India: A Juridical Analysis of Its Scope, Application, and Procedural Framework

Introduction

The law of contempt of court in India serves as a crucial mechanism to safeguard the dignity and authority of judicial institutions, ensuring the unimpeded administration of justice. Criminal contempt, in particular, addresses conduct that scandalizes the court, interferes with judicial proceedings, or obstructs the administration of justice. This article undertakes a comprehensive analysis of criminal contempt of court under Indian law, drawing upon seminal case law and statutory provisions. It examines the definition, scope, and various manifestations of criminal contempt, the delicate balance with fundamental rights such as freedom of speech, and the procedural framework governing such actions. The objective is to provide a scholarly exposition of this complex area of law, reflecting its contemporary understanding and application by the Indian judiciary.

Defining Criminal Contempt: Statutory and Constitutional Moorings

The edifice of criminal contempt law in India is built upon statutory definitions and constitutional sanctions, which empower superior courts to protect the judicial process.

Statutory Definition: Section 2(c) of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971

The Contempt of Courts Act, 1971 ("the Act") is the primary legislation governing contempt proceedings. Section 2(c) of the Act defines "criminal contempt" as:

"...the publication (whether by words, spoken or written, or by signs, or by visible representation, or otherwise) of any matter or the doing of any other act whatsoever which—
(i) scandalises or tends to scandalise, or lowers or tends to lower the authority of, any court; or
(ii) prejudices, or interferes or tends to interfere with, the due course of any judicial proceeding; or
(iii) interferes or tends to interfere with, or obstructs or tends to obstruct, the administration of justice in any other manner;"

This definition, as cited in numerous judicial pronouncements including Pankaj Shukla v. Anirudh Singh (Allahabad High Court, 2011) and N. ESWARANATHAN v. STATE REPRESENTED BY THE DEPUTY SUPERINTENDENT OF POLICE (Supreme Court Of India, 2025), delineates three broad categories of actions that can constitute criminal contempt. The interpretation of these categories has been the subject of extensive judicial scrutiny.

Constitutional Sanction: Articles 129 and 215

The power of the higher judiciary to punish for contempt is also rooted in the Constitution of India. Article 129 declares the Supreme Court to be a "court of record" with the power to punish for contempt of itself. Similarly, Article 215 confers corresponding power upon the High Courts. The Supreme Court, in Delhi Judicial Service Association, Tis Hazari Court, Delhi v. State Of Gujarat And Others (1991 SCC 4 406), affirmed its inherent jurisdiction as a court of record to punish for contempt, extending this power to contempt of subordinate courts to safeguard their integrity and independence. However, this power, while plenary, is not unbridled. As clarified in Supreme Court Bar Association v. Union Of India And Another (1998 SCC 4 409), the Supreme Court's contempt jurisdiction under Articles 129 and 142 does not extend to debarring an advocate from practice, which falls under the purview of the Advocates Act, 1961.

Key Facets of Criminal Contempt

The judicial interpretation of Section 2(c) of the Act has fleshed out the various actions that fall within the ambit of criminal contempt.

Scandalizing the Court or Lowering its Authority

This category involves imputations that are calculated to vilify the court or judges, thereby undermining public confidence in the judiciary. In E.M Sankaran Namboodripad v. T. Narayanan Nambiar (1970 SCC 2 325), the Supreme Court upheld the conviction of a Chief Minister for remarks suggesting judges were biased by class prejudices, holding that such statements scandalized the judiciary. The Court in Shri Baradakanta Mishra v. Registrar Of Orissa High Court And Another (1974 SCC 1 374) emphasized that contempt power extends to acts undermining confidence in the judiciary's authority, even concerning administrative functions, if they attribute mala fides or bias. However, the judiciary has also recognized that fair and temperate criticism is permissible. In P.N Duda v. P. Shiv Shanker And Others (1988 SCC 3 167), the Supreme Court held that a speech by the Law Minister, though critical of the Supreme Court's composition and decisions, did not amount to contempt as it did not impair or ridicule the administration of justice. Using "objectionable, unparliamentary and abusive" language against judges, as seen in Ajay Kumar Pandey, Advocate, Re (1998 SCC 7 248), clearly falls within this limb.

Prejudice or Interference with Judicial Proceedings

This limb targets actions that tend to improperly influence or interfere with the conduct of specific legal proceedings. Filing false affidavits or making false statements on oath in a judicial proceeding can constitute criminal contempt under Section 2(c)(ii) or (iii) by interfering with the due course of judicial proceedings or obstructing the administration of justice (Kapol Co-Operative Bank Ltd., Mumbai v. State Of Maharashtra And Others (2004 SCC ONLINE BOM 695)). Similarly, fabricating documents submitted to the court, as discussed in State Of A.P v. Mandalupu Ramaiah (2003 SCC ONLINE AP 915), directly prejudices judicial proceedings.

Obstruction of the Administration of Justice

This is a residuary category covering acts that obstruct justice in a manner not specifically covered by the other two limbs. A significant example is the abuse of the process of the court. The Supreme Court in Advocate General, State Of Bihar v. M/S Madhya Pradesh Khair Industries And Another (1980 SCC 3 311) held that repetitive filings and strategic litigation to nullify court orders and obstruct justice constituted criminal contempt. This principle was reiterated in Vijaya Bank Employees Housing Co-Operative Society Ltd. v. Muneerappa (1990 SCC ONLINE KAR 563). Misleading the court through wrong assertions to gain undue advantage, as noted in M/S CHITHRA WOODS MANORS WELFARE ASSOCIATION v. SHAJI AUGUSTINE (Supreme Court Of India, 2025), though primarily in a civil contempt context, can also amount to obstructing the administration of justice if it perverts the course of justice.

Contempt on the Face of the Court

Conduct within the courtroom that scandalizes the court or interferes with proceedings can be summarily dealt with as contempt "in facie curiae." In SHIKHA KANWAR v. RAJAT KANWAR (Delhi High Court, 2024), reprehensible and impermissible language used by a respondent in court, leading to scandalizing the court and interfering with the course of justice, was held to constitute criminal contempt on the face of the court.

Criminal Contempt and Fundamental Rights: The Balancing Act

Freedom of Speech and Expression v. Contempt

A critical aspect of contempt law is its interface with the fundamental right to freedom of speech and expression guaranteed under Article 19(1)(a) of the Constitution. This right, however, is not absolute and is subject to reasonable restrictions under Article 19(2), including restrictions in relation to contempt of court. The judiciary has consistently sought to balance these competing interests. In E.M Sankaran Namboodripad, the Supreme Court clarified that while criticism is permissible, it must not cross into territory that maligns the judiciary or obstructs justice. The judgment in Shri Baradakanta Mishra also delved into this intricate balance, with Justice Krishna Iyer, in his separate opinion, advocating for a more liberal interpretation to protect legitimate criticism.

Permissible Criticism v. Contemptuous Allegations

The line between legitimate criticism and contempt is often nuanced. As established in P.N Duda v. P. Shiv Shanker, fair and reasonable criticism of judicial judgments, even if robust, does not constitute contempt, provided it does not attribute malice or intent to undermine judicial authority. The Court in Baradakanta Mishra noted that contempt is not a means to protect judges personally but to uphold the integrity of the judicial system. The focus is on whether the criticism is aimed at improving the administration of justice or is calculated to lower its authority.

Distinctions and Intersections

Criminal Contempt v. Civil Contempt

It is essential to distinguish criminal contempt from civil contempt. Section 2(b) of the Act defines "civil contempt" as "wilful disobedience to any judgment, decree, direction, order, writ or other process of a court or wilful breach of an undertaking given to a court" (N. ESWARANATHAN v. STATE REPRESENTED BY THE DEPUTY SUPERINTENDENT OF POLICE). As explained in Dr. Bimal Chandra Sen Petitioner v. Kamla Mathur (Delhi High Court, 1982), civil contempt is essentially remedial and coercive, aimed at enforcing court orders, whereas criminal contempt is more punitive, addressing conduct that attacks the authority or integrity of the court itself. While civil contempt is primarily a wrong to the party entitled to the benefit of the court order, criminal contempt is a sinning against the majesty of the law (Advocate General Bihar v. M.P Khair Industries, cited in Dr. Bimal Chandra Sen).

Criminal Contempt v. Professional Misconduct of Advocates

The Supreme Court, in Supreme Court Bar Association v. Union Of India And Another (1998 SCC 4 409), definitively clarified that its power to punish for contempt of court does not extend to imposing disciplinary sanctions on advocates, such as suspending their license to practice. Such disciplinary actions for professional misconduct fall exclusively within the jurisdiction of the Bar Councils under the Advocates Act, 1961. An act of an advocate may amount to contempt of court, and for that, the court can punish the advocate. However, if the same act also constitutes professional misconduct, the appropriate Bar Council must take separate disciplinary proceedings.

Procedural Framework and Judicial Approach

Initiation of Criminal Contempt Proceedings

Section 15 of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971, lays down the procedure for initiating criminal contempt proceedings. The Supreme Court or a High Court may take action on its own motion or on a motion made by (a) the Advocate-General, or (b) any other person with the consent in writing of the Advocate-General (State Of C.G. v. S.K.Thakur (Chhattisgarh High Court, 2017)). The requirement of the Advocate-General's consent for private petitions acts as a filter against frivolous or vexatious applications (P.N. Duda v. P. Shiv Shanker; Vijaya Bank Employees Housing Co-Operative Society Ltd. v. Muneerappa).

Jurisdiction over Contempt of Subordinate Courts

Section 10 of the Act empowers every High Court to exercise the same jurisdiction, powers, and authority, in accordance with the same procedure and practice, in respect of contempts of courts subordinate to it as it has and exercises in respect of contempts of itself. As per Section 15(2), in the case of criminal contempt of a subordinate court, the High Court may take action on a reference made to it by the subordinate court or on a motion made by the Advocate-General (DR. H.B. MISHRA v. STATE & ORS. (Delhi High Court, 2023)). The Supreme Court also has inherent power to punish for contempt of subordinate courts (Delhi Judicial Service Association).

Adherence to Natural Justice and Procedural Fairness

Proceedings in criminal contempt, being quasi-criminal, must adhere to the principles of natural justice. The alleged contemnor must be provided with a fair opportunity to defend themselves. As held in DR. H.B. MISHRA v. STATE & ORS., citing Sahdeo Vs State of U.P. (2010) 3 SCC 705, contempt proceedings primarily adhere to natural justice, allowing courts to establish their own procedure provided it is equitable and unbiased. The alleged contemnor must be informed of the charges and the materials against them (Manish Tewari @ Manish Tiwary v. 1. The State Of Jharkhand (Jharkhand High Court, 2018)).

The Element of 'Intention'

Generally, intention (mens rea) is not an essential ingredient for establishing the offence of criminal contempt, particularly for scandalizing the court or interfering with the administration of justice. It is enough if the action complained of is inherently likely to have such an effect. However, intention or motive may be considered for mitigation or aggravation of the sentence (Kapol Co-Operative Bank Ltd., Mumbai v. State Of Maharashtra And Others).

Judicial Restraint: The "Wise Economy" Principle

The judiciary has often emphasized the need for caution and restraint in exercising contempt powers. Justice V.R. Krishna Iyer in S. Mulgaokar (1978) 3 SCC 339 advocated for "wise economy of the use of the contempt power." This principle, reiterated in cases like COURT ON ITS OWN MOTION v. SURJEET SINGH (Punjab & Haryana High Court, 2024), suggests that the power to punish for contempt ought to be exercised only where "silence is no longer an option." Furthermore, availing legitimate legal remedies or raising a legal challenge to an order, even if ultimately unsuccessful, does not typically amount to criminal contempt (COURT ON ITS OWN MOTION v. SURJEET SINGH, citing State of U.P. versus Association of Retired Supreme Court and High Court Judges at Allahabad (2024)).

Specific Manifestations of Criminal Contempt

Abuse of Judicial Process

As established in Advocate General, State Of Bihar v. M/S Madhya Pradesh Khair Industries, systematically filing baseless applications or engaging in repetitive litigation to circumvent court orders and frustrate the legal process constitutes an abuse of the court's process and amounts to criminal contempt. This is because such actions are "calculated to hamper the due course of a judicial proceeding or the orderly administration of justice" (Vijaya Bank Employees Housing Co-Operative Society Ltd. v. Muneerappa).

Making False Statements and Fabricating Evidence

Filing false affidavits or making false statements on oath in judicial proceedings is a serious form of contempt. The Supreme Court in Dhananjay Sharma v. State of Haryana (AIR 1995 SC 1795), cited in State v. A C Agrawal (Allahabad High Court, 2001), laid down that such acts amount to criminal contempt. This is because they mislead the court and interfere with the administration of justice (Kapol Co-Operative Bank Ltd.). Similarly, fabricating documents and presenting them to the court is a blatant attempt to pervert the course of justice (State Of A.P v. Mandalupu Ramaiah). Committing fraud on the court can also invite proceedings for criminal contempt (HAJI MOHAMMAD MAQBOOL NATH v. STATE OF J AND K AND ORS. (Jammu and Kashmir High Court, 2022), citing S.P. Chengalvaraya Naidu v. Jagannath (1994)).

Attacks on Judicial Integrity and Impartiality

Casting aspersions on the impartiality and integrity of judges, attributing motives to their judicial functions, or using scurrilous and abusive language against them constitutes a grave form of criminal contempt. This was evident in Ajay Kumar Pandey, Advocate, Re, where intemperate language was used against various judicial officers. In E.M Sankaran Namboodripad, allegations of class bias against judges were held to be contemptuous. Even language in an application drafted by an advocate, if attributable to a judge and contemptuous, can lead to criminal contempt proceedings (High Court On Its Own Motion v. 1. Shri Dattatray Narayan Samant (Bombay High Court, 2011), citing M.Y Shareef v. Judges of the Nagpur High Court (AIR 1955 SC 19)).

Conclusion

The law of criminal contempt in India is a vital instrument for preserving the sanctity and efficacy of the judicial system. It aims to ensure that courts can administer justice without fear, favour, or obstruction. The Contempt of Courts Act, 1971, and the constitutional powers of the superior courts provide a robust framework for addressing conduct that undermines judicial authority or interferes with the due course of justice. However, the judiciary has consistently recognized the need to balance this power with fundamental rights, particularly the freedom of speech and expression. The jurisprudence evolved through landmark cases demonstrates a commitment to applying contempt law judiciously, with restraint, and in adherence to principles of natural justice. While fair criticism of the judiciary is a hallmark of a healthy democracy, actions that scandalize the court, prejudice proceedings, or obstruct justice are rightly met with the coercive power of contempt, thereby upholding the rule of law and maintaining public confidence in the judiciary.