The Contours of Copyright in Cinematograph Films: An Analysis of Originality, Infringement, and Ownership under Indian Law

Introduction

The cinematograph film occupies a unique and complex position within the framework of the Indian Copyright Act, 1957 ("the Act"). As a composite work, it amalgamates various forms of intellectual property, including literary works (scripts), musical works (scores and songs), and artistic works, into a singular, cohesive creation. The Act recognizes a cinematograph film as a distinct subject matter of copyright, separate from its constituent parts. This special status gives rise to critical legal questions concerning the nature of the work, the standards for originality and infringement, and the locus of ownership. This article provides a comprehensive analysis of these core facets of copyright law as applied to cinematograph films in India. It examines the statutory framework and traces the evolution of judicial interpretation, with a particular focus on the foundational principles of ownership established by the Supreme Court and the significant, unresolved judicial divergence regarding the threshold for infringement.

The Nature and Ownership of Copyright in Cinematograph Films

A Unique 'Work' under the Act

The Copyright Act, 1957, accords specific recognition to cinematograph films. Section 13(1)(b) stipulates that copyright shall subsist in "cinematograph films". The definition in Section 2(f) is inclusive, stating that a "cinematograph film" includes any work produced by a process analogous to cinematography, including a video film, and its accompanying sound track (P. Thulasidas v. K. Vasanthakumari, 1991; State Of A.P v. Nagoti Venkataramana, 1996). The judiciary has affirmed that a film is a distinct class of work, and the copyright subsisting in it is independent of the copyrights in the underlying literary, dramatic, or musical works from which it may be derived (Section 13(4); Petitioner v. Respondent, Madras High Court, 2012).

For copyright to subsist, the work must be "original". However, in the context of copyright law, originality does not demand inventive thought but rather that the work originates from the author through the application of skill, labour, and intelligence (Mrf Limited v. Metro Tyres Limited, 2019). A cinematograph film is thus considered an original work, an "intellectual creation" that is more than the sum of its parts. However, this protection is not absolute. Section 13(3)(a) of the Act clarifies that copyright shall not subsist in a cinematograph film if a substantial part of it infringes the copyright in any other work.

The Primacy of the Producer as the First Owner

A cornerstone of copyright law in the Indian film industry is the principle governing ownership. While the author of a work is generally its first owner, the Act carves out a specific rule for cinematograph films. Section 2(d)(v) defines the "author" in relation to a cinematograph film as its "producer". Consequently, pursuant to Section 17, the producer is deemed the first owner of the copyright in the film.

This principle was authoritatively settled by the Supreme Court of India in Indian Performing Right Society Ltd. v. Eastern Indian Motion Pictures Association And Others (1977). The Court held that when a composer or lyricist is commissioned by a film producer to create a musical or literary work for incorporation into a cinematograph film, the producer, in the absence of a contract to the contrary, becomes the first owner of the copyright in the film, which includes the right to perform the work in public. This interpretation, flowing from provisos (b) and (c) to Section 17, effectively vests a comprehensive "bundle of rights" in the producer (Warner Bros. Entertainment Inc. v. Santosh V.G., 2009). This position has been consistently reaffirmed, solidifying the producer's preeminent status as the primary rights-holder (Saregama Ltd. v. The New Digital Media & Ors., 2017; Petitioner v. Respondent, 2012).

The Scope of Infringement: A Tale of Two High Courts

The Foundational Test: Substantial Similarity and the Idea-Expression Dichotomy

The seminal case of R.G Anand v. Delux Films And Others (1978) established the fundamental test for copyright infringement in India. The Supreme Court elucidated the "idea-expression dichotomy," clarifying that copyright protects the specific expression of an idea, not the idea itself. Therefore, mere similarity of themes or concepts is insufficient to ground a claim of infringement. The Court formulated an "impression test," holding that infringement occurs only if a lay observer would, upon viewing the two works, inevitably conclude that the subsequent work is a copy of the original. The focus is on whether the defendant has produced a "substantial and material" imitation of the plaintiff's protected expression, assessing similarity in quality rather than mere quantity.

The Judicial Divergence on 'Copy' of a Cinematograph Film

While the R.G. Anand test provides a general framework, its application to cinematograph films has led to a significant and unresolved conflict between the High Courts of Bombay and Delhi concerning the meaning of "to make a copy of the film" under Section 14(1)(c)(i) of the Act.

In Star India Private Limited v. Leo Burnett (India) Private Limited (2002), the Bombay High Court adopted a narrow interpretation. It held that for a cinematograph film, an infringing "copy" must be an actual physical reproduction made through a process of duplication. The court reasoned that creating an entirely new and independent film, even if it bears substantial similarities to another, does not constitute making a "copy" in the sense intended by the statute. This view distinguishes the copyright in a film from that in literary or dramatic works, where non-literal copying can amount to infringement.

Conversely, in Mrf Limited v. Metro Tyres Limited (2019), the Delhi High Court explicitly disagreed with the Star India ruling. It held that an infringing copy of a cinematograph film does not have to be an exact duplicate. Instead, a "substantial/material copy" that appropriates the core creative elements of the original film would suffice to constitute infringement. The Court reasoned that the narrow interpretation of the Bombay High Court fails to protect a cinematograph film as an "original work" and an "intellectual creation." Further, invoking the Berne Convention, the Delhi High Court advocated for a purposive construction of the Act, arguing that international law supports protecting the film's creative substance, not merely its physical fixation. This divergence has created considerable legal uncertainty, as the definitive interpretation of what constitutes an infringing "copy" of a film awaits clarification from the Supreme Court.

The Bundle of Rights and Their Exploitation

The copyright vested in the producer of a cinematograph film is a "bundle of exclusive rights" as enumerated in Section 14(c) of the Act. These include the right to make a copy of the film, the right to sell or give on hire any copy of the film, and the right "to communicate the film to the public." The concept of "communication to the public" has been interpreted broadly. In Garware Plastics And Polyester Ltd., Bombay v. Telelink (1989), the Bombay High Court held that the transmission of films via a Cable TV network to subscribers' homes constitutes public communication, and is an infringement if done without a license.

Furthermore, this bundle of rights is divisible. In Video Master v. Nishi Productions (1997), the court clarified that different classes of rights, such as exclusive video rights and satellite broadcasting rights, are distinct and can be assigned or licensed separately. An act permissible under a satellite broadcast license, for instance, would not infringe upon separately held video rights. However, these rights are not perpetual and attach only to a completed work. The Delhi High Court in Time Warner Entertainment Company, L.P v. Columbia Pictures Industries Inc. & Others (2007) held that a copyright owner cannot claim infringement or obtain an omnibus injunction for a "future work" that has not yet been completed and come into existence.

Conclusion

The legal framework governing copyright in cinematograph films under the Indian Copyright Act, 1957, is multifaceted. The judiciary has firmly established the producer as the first owner of copyright, a principle that underpins the commercial and creative operations of the film industry. The law also recognizes the film as a distinct work of authorship, deserving of protection for the skill and labour invested in its creation. However, a critical doctrinal schism persists regarding the standard for infringement. The conflicting interpretations of the term "copy" by the Bombay and Delhi High Courts in Star India and MRF Limited, respectively, represent a significant point of legal ambiguity. Until the Supreme Court of India resolves this issue, the precise boundary between permissible inspiration and impermissible appropriation in filmmaking will remain contested, posing challenges for both creators and adjudicators in the dynamic landscape of Indian cinema.