Complainant Turning Hostile in Indian Criminal Trials: Evidentiary Challenges and Judicial Responses

Complainant Turning Hostile in Indian Criminal Trials: Evidentiary Challenges and Judicial Responses

1. Introduction

The phenomenon of a complainant, or any material prosecution witness, retracting from their earlier version and giving testimony adverse to the prosecution—commonly termed “turning hostile”—poses acute difficulties for criminal adjudication in India. Such volte-face frequently imperils the search for truth, undermines public faith in the justice system, and complicates the enforcement of penal law. The present article undertakes a doctrinal and jurisprudential analysis of the legal consequences of a complainant turning hostile, drawing on leading authorities of the Supreme Court and High Courts, statutory provisions of the Evidence Act, 1872 and the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, and the academic discourse on witness hostility.

2. Normative Framework

2.1 Statutory Provisions

  • Section 154, Evidence Act 1872: empowers the court, in its discretion, to permit the party who calls a witness to put questions “which might be put in cross-examination by the adverse party”, once the witness is declared hostile.
  • Section 163, Evidence Act 1872: clarifies that the party so permitted does not lose the right to rely on any part of the hostile witness’s evidence favourable to it.
  • Proviso to Section 162, CrPC 1973: restricts the use of a witness’s police-statement for corroboration; it may be used only for contradiction, not substantive proof.

2.2 Conceptual Distinctions

Indian law recognises a difference between a hostile witness (one who, by reason of animus, “injures” the case of the party calling him) and a merely unfavourable witness (one who fails to come up to expectation). The discretion under Section 154 is ordinarily exercised when hostility, not mere forgetfulness, is demonstrated.[1]

3. Judicial Treatment of Hostile Complainants

3.1 Admissibility and Weight

From Sat Paul v. Delhi Administration (1976)[2] to Neeraj Dutta v. State (NCT Delhi) (2022)[3], courts have consistently held that hostility does not render a witness’s entire testimony inadmissible. Rather, the rule of “falsus in uno, non falsus in omnibus” is inapplicable in India; the judge must separate the grain from the chaff, accepting such portions as find independent corroboration.[4]

3.2 Evidentiary Corroboration

In State of U.P. v. Ramesh Prasad Misra (1996) the Supreme Court reinstated a conviction despite key prosecution witnesses becoming hostile, because the circumstantial evidence formed a “complete chain” pointing towards guilt.[5] Likewise, Bhajju @ Karan Singh v. State of M.P. (2012) affirmed that a trustworthy dying declaration, supported by medical and forensic material, could sustain conviction notwithstanding hostile witnesses.[6]

3.3 Hostility of the Complainant

A complainant’s retraction is particularly disruptive, yet the courts have shown willingness to proceed on other evidence. In Gagan Kanojia v. State of Punjab (2006) the Supreme Court upheld conviction for child-murder although the complainant had equivocated, reasoning that the circumstantial edifice was unimpaired.[7] Conversely, where the prosecution case rested solely on the complainant’s testimony and it stood uncorroborated after hostility—as in certain corruption-trap matters—the accused has been acquitted (Sat Paul). Thus the ultimate impact turns on the residual evidentiary substratum.

3.4 Appellate Reappraisal

Appellate courts have shown readiness to overturn acquittals secured through complainant hostility if the trial court ignored other compelling evidence. State of U.P. v. Ramesh Harijan (2012) restored conviction for rape and murder, castigating the trial court for over-valuing hostile testimony and under-valuing forensic proof.[8]

4. Factors Contributing to Complainant Hostility

The Supreme Court in State of Jharkhand v. Shailendra Kumar Rai (2022) catalogued reasons ranging from threats, inducements, and “culture of compromise” to systemic delays.[9] Empirical literature echoes these concerns, noting that protracted proceedings diminish witness commitment and facilitate coercion.[10]

5. Doctrinal Synthesis of the Reference Materials

5.1 Corroborative Paradigm

  • Bhajju, Teja Ram, and Gagan Kanojia illustrate that courts look for corroborative anchors—dying declarations, recovery of weapons, forensic science—to neutralise the impact of a hostile complainant.
  • Khujji v. State of M.P. (1991) underscores that even partly adverse witnesses may still supply clinching details that corroborate independent circumstances.[11]
  • The 2025 Supreme Court decision in K.P. Tamilmaran reiterates that the judge must evaluate why a witness has turned hostile and whether portions of testimony remain credible.[12]

5.2 Evidentiary Exclusions and Safeguards

The misuse of police-statements for corroboration, deprecated in Sat Paul, continues to invite appellate censure. Similarly, the proviso to Section 162 CrPC was relied upon in Teja Ram to invalidate the High Court’s reasoning that signatures obtained on seizure-memos vitiated the evidence.[13]

5.3 Policy Dimensions: Compromise & Quashment

High Courts have occasionally quashed rape-prosecutions upon compromise and impending hostility (e.g., Silambarasan; Dinesh Kumar). This practice, though justified by notions of restorative justice, risks legitimising coercive settlements and diluting statutory offences where compromise is legally impermissible.[14]

6. Comparative and Academic Perspectives

While English law historically disallowed cross-examination of one’s own witness without leave, the Indian Evidence Act incorporated that flexibility from inception, reflecting a functionalist approach. Academic critiques (e.g., Bakshi’s study on “culture of compromise” in rape trials)[15] advocate systemic reforms: witness-protection, expedited trials, and stringent perjury enforcement to curb hostile attrition.

7. Recommendations

  1. Statutory Witness-Protection: Enactment of a comprehensive witness protection statute, expanding upon the existing scheme notified in 2018, to safeguard complainants from intimidation.
  2. Time-bound Trials: Legislative or judicially enforced timelines for serious offences to mitigate delay-induced hostility.
  3. Perjury Prosecution: Strict invocation of Sections 191–195 IPC against complainants who wilfully falsify testimony after due assurance of safety.
  4. Video-Linked Testimony: Wider use of remote deposition under Section 275(1) CrPC to minimise physical contact with accused persons.
  5. Judicial Training: Enhanced orientation of trial judges on nuanced evaluation of partially hostile evidence, following the principles distilled in Bhagwan Singh v. State of Haryana (1976) and subsequent case-law.

8. Conclusion

The Indian judiciary has crafted a resilient doctrinal matrix to confront the challenge of complainant hostility: retaining admissibility, insisting on corroboration, and calibrating the weight accorded to such testimony. Yet procedural and socio-economic factors that precipitate hostility remain potent. Meaningful reform must therefore address both legal doctrine and the structural realities that impel complainants to renege. Until then, the courts will continue to rely on the meticulous evidentiary balancing articulated in the cases analysed above to ensure that justice is neither thwarted by intimidation nor compromised by uncritical reliance on tainted testimony.

Footnotes

  1. See Sri Rabindra Kumar v. State of Orissa, (1976) 4 SCC 233 (criteria for hostility).
  2. Sat Paul v. Delhi Administration, (1976) 1 SCC 727.
  3. Neeraj Dutta v. State (Govt. of NCT Delhi), (2022) SCC OnLine SC 1724.
  4. Bhagwan Singh v. State of Haryana, (1976) 1 SCC 389.
  5. State of U.P. v. Ramesh Prasad Misra & Anr., (1996) 10 SCC 360.
  6. Bhajju @ Karan Singh v. State of M.P., (2012) 4 SCC 327.
  7. Gagan Kanojia & Anr. v. State of Punjab, (2006) 13 SCC 516.
  8. State of U.P. v. Ramesh Harijan, (2012) 5 SCC 777.
  9. State of Jharkhand v. Shailendra Kumar Rai @ Pandav Rai, (2022) SCC OnLine SC 1492.
  10. Pratiksha Bakshi, “Justice is a Secret: Compromise in Rape Trials”, 44(3) Contributions to Indian Sociology 207 (2010).
  11. Khujji @ Surendra Tiwari v. State of M.P., (1991) 3 SCC 627.
  12. K.P. Tamilmaran v. State, (2025) SCC OnLine SC (to be reported).
  13. State of Rajasthan v. Teja Ram, (1999) 3 SCC 507.
  14. See, e.g., Silambarasan v. State, 2015 SCC OnLine Mad 13763.
  15. Bakshi, supra note 10.