Commissions of Inquiry under the Commissions of Inquiry Act, 1952: Constitutional Foundations, Jurisdictional Boundaries, and Judicial Review

Commissions of Inquiry under the Commissions of Inquiry Act, 1952: Constitutional Foundations, Jurisdictional Boundaries, and Judicial Review

1. Introduction

The Commissions of Inquiry Act, 1952 (hereinafter “the 1952 Act”) constitutes a pivotal instrument in Indian public law, enabling the Union and State executives to constitute fact-finding bodies for matters of “definite public importance”. Although ostensibly administrative, such commissions often investigate politically sensitive or constitutionally significant controversies and their proceedings can impinge upon individual rights, federal relations, and the doctrine of separation of powers. This article critically analyses the legal architecture governing the appointment, powers, and judicial oversight of Commissions of Inquiry, drawing upon leading Supreme Court and High Court precedents.

2. Constitutional & Statutory Framework

2.1 Legislative Competence

The 1952 Act draws legitimacy from Entry 94, List I (inquiries for Union purposes) and Entry 45, List III (concurrent competence) of the Seventh Schedule.[1] Section 3(1) empowers the “appropriate Government” to appoint a Commission when, in its opinion, an inquiry into any definite matter of public importance is necessary.[2]

2.2 Nature of Commissions

Early jurisprudence emphasised the non-judicial character of commissions. In Ram Krishna Dalmia v. Justice S.R. Tendolkar, the Supreme Court held that a commission “does not possess judicial powers and its recommendations are non-binding”.[3] Subsequent cases—including International Forest Co. and Subramanian Swamy v. Arun Shourie—reaffirm that a commission is a “fact-finding body” established “for the information of the executive’s own mind”.[4]

3. Appointment Power and Federal Dynamics

3.1 Central–State Interface

Section 3 provisos impose a comity-based restriction: where a Central Commission is functioning, no State Commission may inquire into the same matter, and vice-versa, absent Central consent. The Supreme Court’s decision in State of Karnataka v. Union of India upheld the Centre’s power to appoint a parallel commission because the terms of reference were distinct, thereby avoiding statutory overlap.[5]

3.2 Gubernatorial Authority

Krishna Ballabh Sahay v. Commission of Inquiry clarified that a Governor continuing in office under the proviso to Article 156(3) can validly constitute a commission notwithstanding a change in the State ministry.[6]

4. Legal Character: Administrative, Quasi-Judicial or Judicial?

Whether commissions exercise “judicial power” has practical implications for (a) appellate jurisdiction under Article 136, (b) contempt, and (c) applicability of procedural safeguards.

  • Article 136 Perspective. The plurality in Bharat Bank Ltd. v. Employees of Bharat Bank drew a distinction between tribunals exercising adjudicatory power and purely investigatory bodies. The majority’s scepticism toward treating Industrial Tribunals as “courts” foreshadowed later reluctance to classify commissions as judicial.[7]
  • Contempt Jurisdiction. In Subramanian Swamy v. Arun Shourie, the Court held that criticism of a commission report does not ipso facto amount to contempt of court because a commission is not a “court” within the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971.[8]
  • False-Evidence Prosecutions. Nevertheless, Sections 4, 5(4) of the Act deem commissions to be civil courts for limited purposes (e.g., offences under §§ 175–180, 228 IPC). In Dr Baliram Hiray v. Justice B. Lentin the Court wrestled with whether perjury before a commission attracts Section 195 CrPC; the decision underscores the hybrid character of commissions—possessing court-like powers but lacking full judicial status.[9]

5. Procedural Powers and Due-Process Safeguards

5.1 Powers Analogous to Civil Courts

Section 4 confers authority to summon witnesses, compel production of documents, and administer oaths. Section 5 empowers the Government to enlarge a commission’s powers (e.g., seize records). These provisions underpin the investigatory efficacy of commissions but also raise concerns about procedural fairness when reputations are at stake.

5.2 Rights of Persons Affected

Section 8-B mandates that any person whose conduct is in question, or whose reputation is likely to suffer, shall receive a reasonable opportunity of being heard and to cross-examine witnesses. The Madras High Court in U. Dakshinamoorthy stressed that although a commission is not adjudicatory, Section 8-B embeds principles of natural justice.[10]

6. Modification, Dissolution, and Reconstitution

Section 7 permits the appropriate Government to declare that a commission “shall cease to exist” when its continued existence is unnecessary. In Sri Kanti Ganguly the Calcutta High Court held that where a commission’s term lapses without extension and no report is traceable, cessation occurs ipso facto, obviating a formal Section 7 notification.[11]

Reconstitution raises subtler issues. In State of M.P. v. Ajay Singh, the Supreme Court limited the State’s power to “replace” a commissioner, ruling that Section 21 of the General Clauses Act could not be invoked to defeat the 1952 Act’s specific scheme, save for extension of time.[12]

7. Intersection with Other Legal Regimes

7.1 Impact on Criminal & Disciplinary Proceedings

Commissions neither pre-empt criminal prosecution nor confer immunity. Yet publication of findings may prejudice fair-trial rights. The Calcutta High Court in Gokulananda Roy refused to injunct a commission despite parallel criminal investigations, holding subject-matters sufficiently distinct.[13]

Conversely, findings can trigger departmental discipline. Union of India v. K.K. Dhawan clarified that quasi-judicial acts of civil servants remain amenable to disciplinary proceedings when tainted by mala fides or gross negligence.[14]

7.2 Special Courts and Exclusive Jurisdiction

The doctrine of exclusive jurisdiction, as articulated in A.R. Antulay v. R.S. Nayak, illustrates judicial vigilance against encroachment upon legislatively designated forums. Analogously, appointing commissions must respect statutory fora; a commission cannot usurp the jurisdiction of a Special Judge under the Prevention of Corruption Act.[15]

8. Judicial Review Standards

Courts have evolved a nuanced standard: they will not lightly interfere with the executive’s formation of opinion under Section 3, yet will quash inquiries tainted by malafides, arbitrary classification, or colourable exercise of power (Art. 14).

  • Ram Krishna Dalmia supplies the canonical test—classification must rest on intelligible differentia with rational nexus to the inquiry’s objective.[16]
  • Andaleeb Sehgal recognises wide executive discretion but underscores the duty to observe Section 8-B safeguards once individual conduct is examined.[17]
  • Peela Pothi Naidu illustrates that revival or extension of a dormant commission must abide by statutory constraints and past judicial directions.[18]

9. Contemporary Challenges and Reform Proposals

Despite their utility, commissions often suffer from protracted timelines, politicisation, and weak enforcement of recommendations. Suggested reforms include:

  1. Statutory sunset clauses limiting extensions beyond a fixed cumulative period, subject to transparent justification before the legislature.
  2. Mandatory interim reporting to enhance public transparency and legislative oversight.
  3. Clearer guidelines on appointment criteria to insulate nominations from partisan considerations.
  4. Strengthening follow-up mechanisms—e.g., statutory obligation on the executive to publish an “action-taken report” within a prescribed period, akin to Section 3(4)’s requirement but with enforceable sanctions.

10. Conclusion

Commissions of Inquiry occupy a distinctive niche in India’s constitutional scheme: neither courts nor mere departmental committees, they combine robust inquisitorial powers with an essentially recommendatory mandate. Jurisprudence from Dalmia through Karnataka and Subramanian Swamy delineates their legal contours—affirming broad executive discretion tempered by constitutional limitations, procedural fairness, and judicial review. Future reforms should aim to bolster efficacy while preserving the delicate balance between administrative expediency and individual rights.

Footnotes

  1. Constituent competence recognised in Ram Krishna Dalmia v. Justice S.R. Tendolkar, AIR 1958 SC 538.
  2. Commissions of Inquiry Act, 1952, s. 3(1).
  3. Ram Krishna Dalmia v. Justice S.R. Tendolkar, AIR 1958 SC 538.
  4. International Forest Co. v. CIT, (1974) J&K HC; M.V. Rajwade v. Dr S.M. Hassan, AIR 1954 Nag 71; Subramanian Swamy v. Arun Shourie, (2014) 12 SCC 344.
  5. State of Karnataka v. Union of India, (1977) 4 SCC 608.
  6. Krishna Ballabh Sahay v. Commission of Inquiry, (1969) 1 SCC 258.
  7. Bharat Bank Ltd. v. Employees of Bharat Bank, AIR 1950 SC 188.
  8. Subramanian Swamy v. Arun Shourie, (2014) 12 SCC 344.
  9. Dr Baliram Waman Hiray v. Justice B. Lentin, (1988) 4 SCC 419.
  10. U. Dakshinamoorthy v. Commission of Inquiry, (1979) 1 MLJ 306 (Mad HC).
  11. Sri Kanti Ganguly v. State of W.B., (2016) Cal HC.
  12. State of Madhya Pradesh v. Ajay Singh, (1993) 1 SCC 302.
  13. Gokulananda Roy v. Tarapada Mukherjee, 1972 SCC OnLine Cal 31.
  14. Union of India v. K.K. Dhawan, (1993) 2 SCC 56.
  15. A.R. Antulay v. R.S. Nayak, (1988) 2 SCC 602.
  16. Ram Krishna Dalmia v. Justice S.R. Tendolkar, AIR 1958 SC 538.
  17. Andaleeb Sehgal v. Union of India, (2006) Delhi HC.
  18. Peela Pothi Naidu v. State of A.P., 2005 SCC OnLine AP 334.