Cognizance of Criminal Contempt in India

The Mechanism of Cognizance in Criminal Contempt Proceedings under Indian Law

Introduction

The power to punish for contempt of court is an essential attribute of a court of record, indispensable for upholding the majesty of law and ensuring the due administration of justice. In India, criminal contempt, as defined under Section 2(c) of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971, encompasses acts that scandalize or tend to scandalize, or lower or tend to lower the authority of any court; prejudice or interfere or tend to interfere with the due course of any judicial proceeding; or interfere or tend to interfere with, or obstruct or tend to obstruct, the administration of justice in any other manner. The process of initiating action for such contempt, known as taking cognizance, is governed by specific constitutional provisions, statutory mandates, and judicial pronouncements. This article undertakes a comprehensive analysis of the legal framework and procedural intricacies surrounding the cognizance of criminal contempt by the Supreme Court and High Courts in India, drawing heavily upon established case law and statutory provisions.

Constitutional and Statutory Framework

Constitutional Basis

The fountainhead of the power to punish for contempt for superior courts in India lies in the Constitution itself. Article 129 declares the Supreme Court to be a 'court of record' with all the powers of such a court including the power to punish for contempt of itself. Similarly, Article 215 confers upon every High Court the status of a 'court of record' with the power to punish for contempt of itself. This inherent constitutional power is fundamental to the judiciary's ability to safeguard its own dignity and ensure the unimpeded flow of justice (Dr. D.C Saxena Contemnor v. Hon'Ble The Chief Justice Of India, 1996 SCC 5 216; Delhi Judicial Service Association, Tis Hazari Court, Delhi v. State Of Gujarat And Others, 1991 SCC 4 406). The Supreme Court in Sukhdev Singh Sodhi v. Hon'Ble Chief Justice S. Teja Singh And The Hon'Ble Judges Of The Pepsu High Court Of Patiala (1954 AIR SC 186) affirmed that the power of a High Court to punish for contempt of itself is inherent and falls within its special jurisdiction.

The Contempt of Courts Act, 1971

While the constitutional provisions establish the inherent power, the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971 (hereinafter "the Act") codifies and regulates the law relating to contempt. Key provisions relevant to the cognizance of criminal contempt include:

Modes of Taking Cognizance under Section 15

Section 15 of the Act is central to understanding how cognizance of criminal contempt (other than contempt in facie curiae) is taken. It distinguishes between contempt of the Supreme Court/High Court itself and contempt of subordinate courts.

Suo Motu Cognizance by Supreme Court and High Courts (Section 15(1))

Section 15(1) explicitly empowers the Supreme Court or a High Court to take action for criminal contempt "on its own motion." This inherent power allows the superior courts to act proactively to protect the administration of justice. The information leading to suo motu cognizance can come from various sources, including media reports, complaints from individuals or legal practitioners, or reports from judicial officers (DR. H.B. MISHRA v. STATE & ORS., Delhi High Court, 2023, citing receipt of complaints and a report from the District & Sessions Judge). The Supreme Court in S.K Sarkar, Member, Board Of Revenue, U.P, Lucknow v. Vinay Chandra Misra (1981 SCC 1 436) emphasized that the High Court's authority to act suo motu is derived from constitutional provisions and the overarching language of the Act. In Amicus Curiae v. Prashant Bhushan And Another (2010 SCC 7 592), the Supreme Court considered taking suo motu cognizance based on an application by an amicus curiae drawing attention to allegedly contemptuous statements.

The Supreme Court in Delhi Judicial Service Association, Tis Hazari Court, Delhi v. State Of Gujarat And Others (1991 SCC 4 406) reaffirmed its inherent jurisdiction under Article 129 to take cognizance of contempt of subordinate courts as well, to safeguard judicial integrity. The power to act suo motu is a significant tool, but as the Gujarat High Court noted in Suo Motu v. Yatin Narendra Oza (2020), such powers are to be exercised sparingly to uphold the dignity of the institution.

Motion by Advocate General / Specified Law Officer (Section 15(1)(a), (c))

Section 15(1) also provides that the Supreme Court or a High Court may take action on a motion made by:

  • The Advocate-General (in relation to a High Court).
  • The Attorney-General or the Solicitor-General (in relation to the Supreme Court, as per the Explanation to Section 15).
  • In relation to the High Court for the Union Territory of Delhi, such law officer as the Central Government may specify (P.N Duda v. P. Shiv Shanker And Others, 1988).

The involvement of these high-ranking law officers acts as a filter, ensuring that the court's time is not consumed by frivolous or vexatious petitions. Their motion signifies a considered view that a prima facie case of criminal contempt exists.

Motion by Any Other Person with Consent of Advocate General / Specified Law Officer (Section 15(1)(b), (d))

A private individual can also move the Supreme Court or a High Court for initiating criminal contempt proceedings, but this is subject to a crucial precondition: obtaining the consent in writing of the Advocate-General (or the Attorney-General/Solicitor-General for the Supreme Court, or the specified law officer for Delhi High Court). This requirement is mandatory. The Supreme Court in Bal Thackrey v. Harish Pimpalkhute And Others (2005 SCC 1 254) emphasized the non-compliance with this mandatory procedural requisite, setting aside a High Court judgment where consent was not obtained. The Court highlighted that this procedural safeguard is designed to prevent frivolous or politically motivated actions and that the absence of such consent renders contempt petitions non-maintainable.

The Supreme Court in Muthu Karuppan, Commissioner Of Police, Chennai v. Parithi Ilamvazhuthi And Another (2011 SCC 5 496) reiterated that the "whole object of prescribing procedural mode of taking cognizance is to safeguard the valuable time of the Court from being wasted by frivolous contempt petitions." The Bombay High Court in Charanjeet Chanderpal v. The State Of Maharashtra & Ors. (2015) acknowledged a petition seeking cognizance of criminal contempt, referencing cases like P.N Duda and Bal Thackrey which underscore these procedural requirements.

Cognizance of Contempt of Subordinate Courts (Section 15(2))

Section 15(2) deals specifically with criminal contempt of a subordinate court. It states that the High Court may take action:

  • On a reference made to it by the subordinate court.
  • On a motion made by the Advocate-General (or, in relation to a Union Territory, by such Law Officer as the Central Government may specify).

A notable point of interpretation arose concerning whether a High Court can take suo motu cognizance of contempt of a subordinate court, as Section 15(2) does not expressly mention "on its own motion," unlike Section 15(1). The Supreme Court in S.K Sarkar, Member, Board Of Revenue, U.P, Lucknow v. Vinay Chandra Misra (1981 SCC 1 436) definitively clarified this. The Court held that despite the absence of an explicit suo motu provision in Section 15(2), the High Court's inherent authority under Article 215 and its power under Section 10 of the Act enable it to take suo motu cognizance of contempt of subordinate courts. The Court reasoned that the absence of such wording in Section 15(2) does not negate this inherent power. This position was reiterated by the Madras High Court in High Court Of Madras v. R.M. Subramanian (2013), which stated that "the High Court has power of taking cognizance of criminal contempt of a subordinate court suo motu notwithstanding the fact that Section 15(2) ... does not expressly confer such power." The Delhi High Court in DR. H.B. MISHRA v. STATE & ORS. (2023) also affirmed this, noting that the court took suo motu cognizance of alleged contempt in subordinate courts based on complaints and a judicial report.

However, the Madras High Court in High Court Of Madras v. R.M. Subramanian (2013) also cautioned that this method of suo motu cognizance for subordinate court contempt "ought to be resorted to sparingly and only where the contempt concerned is of a serious nature."

Procedural Aspects and Judicial Scrutiny Post-Cognizance

Nature of Contempt Proceedings

Once cognizance is taken, the ensuing proceedings have distinct characteristics. The Delhi High Court in Court On Its Own Motion v. State & Others (2008) outlined several principles: contempt jurisdiction is sui generis, special, and summary. Proceedings are quasi-criminal in nature. While mens rea may not always be necessary to prove (especially in cases of constructive contempt, as discussed in V.C Govindaswami Mudali v. B. Subba Reddy, Andhra Pradesh High Court, 1986, regarding strict liability pre-1960 UK Act), the act complained of must be "deliberate and contumacious." Crucially, the standard of proof is that of "proof beyond a reasonable doubt," as an alleged contemnor may face imprisonment (Court On Its Own Motion v. State & Others, 2008; Muthu Karuppan, Commissioner Of Police, Chennai v. Parithi Ilamvazhuthi And Another, 2011 SCC 5 496).

Adherence to Natural Justice

Given the quasi-criminal nature and potential for severe penalties, adherence to principles of natural justice is paramount. The alleged contemnor must be "duly informed, with sufficient particularity, of the allegations against him so that he may effectively defend himself" (Court On Its Own Motion v. State & Others, 2008). The Delhi High Court in DR. H.B. MISHRA v. STATE & ORS. (2023), citing Sahdeo Vs State of U.P. and Ors. (2010 (3) SCC 705), emphasized that proceedings under the Act primarily adhere to natural justice, allowing courts to establish their own equitable and unbiased procedure, not strictly bound by the Cr.P.C. and the Evidence Act.

Court's Discretion and Caution

The power to punish for contempt is to be wielded with utmost care and circumspection. Courts should not be "hypersensitive and take umbrage at every trivial misdemeanor" (Court On Its Own Motion v. State & Others, 2008). Action for contempt should only be taken if there is a "substantial interference in the administration of justice." The Gujarat High Court in Suo Motu v. Yatin Narendra Oza (2020) stressed that contempt powers are to be exercised sparingly. Similarly, the Karnataka High Court in Shaik Mohiddin v. Section Officer, Keb (1994), citing Perspective Publications (P) Ltd. v. The State of Maharashtra (AIR 1971 SC 221), noted that summary jurisdiction must be exercised with great care and caution, and only when necessary for the proper administration of law and justice. The Chhattisgarh High Court in State Of C.G. v. S.K.Thakur (2017) observed that jurisdiction for contempt should be invoked cautiously in exceptional and most appropriate cases, and closed proceedings where the respondent's actions were deemed to advance, rather than interfere with, the administration of justice.

Limitation for Initiation (Section 20)

Section 20 of the Act introduces a period of limitation: "No court shall initiate any proceedings for contempt, either on its own motion or otherwise, after the expiry of a period of one year from the date on which the contempt is alleged to have been committed." The Supreme Court in Pallav Sheth v. Custodian And Others (2001 SCC 7 549) dealt with this provision, discussing its interplay with the constitutional powers under Articles 129 and 215. The initiation of proceedings marks the point from which this limitation is considered.

Role of Supreme Court and High Court Rules

Section 23 of the Act empowers the Supreme Court and High Courts to frame rules for regulating their procedure in contempt matters, provided such rules are not inconsistent with the Act. The Supreme Court, for instance, has the "Rules to Regulate Proceedings for Contempt of the Supreme Court, 1975." Rule 3 of these rules, as discussed in Amicus Curiae v. Prashant Bhusan & Anr (Supreme Court Of India, 2010 - Tehelka case), outlines how the Court may take action: (a) suo motu, (b) on a petition by the Attorney General or Solicitor General, or (c) on a petition by any person with the written consent of the Attorney General or Solicitor General. The case highlighted the procedural importance of these rules in the context of taking cognizance. Similarly, High Courts have their own contempt rules, such as the Madras High Court Contempt of Court Rules, 1975, mentioned in Muthu Karuppan, Commissioner Of Police, Chennai v. Parithi Ilamvazhuthi And Another (2011 SCC 5 496), which prescribe procedures for initiating contempt and steps to be adhered to.

Challenges and Considerations

The exercise of contempt jurisdiction, particularly for criminal contempt, involves navigating delicate balances. A primary consideration is the balance between the fundamental right to freedom of speech and expression under Article 19(1)(a) of the Constitution and the need to maintain the dignity and authority of the judiciary. As observed in Dr. D.C Saxena Contemnor v. Hon'Ble The Chief Justice Of India (1996 SCC 5 216), while healthy criticism is permissible, personal attacks and unsubstantiated allegations undermining judicial authority can constitute contempt.

Preventing the misuse of contempt law is another significant challenge. The procedural safeguards in Section 15, especially the requirement for the Advocate General's consent for private petitions, are crucial in filtering out frivolous or motivated complaints, as emphasized in Bal Thackrey v. Harish Pimpalkhute And Others (2005 SCC 1 254) and Muthu Karuppan (2011 SCC 5 496). Ensuring procedural fairness within a summary jurisdiction framework also remains a key judicial responsibility.

The point at which reporting on criminal proceedings may constitute contempt is also a nuanced area, as touched upon in People's Union For Civil Liberties And Another (s) v. State Of Maharashtra And Others (s) (Supreme Court Of India, 2023), which noted discussions around whether this point commences with arrest or with the filing of a charge-sheet/cognizance by the court.

Conclusion

The cognizance of criminal contempt in India is a meticulously structured process, rooted in constitutional authority and regulated by the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971, and rules framed thereunder. Section 15 of the Act provides distinct pathways for initiating proceedings: suo motu action by the superior courts, motions by designated law officers, or motions by private individuals with the requisite consent of such law officers. The judiciary has consistently interpreted these provisions to uphold both its inherent powers and the procedural safeguards designed to prevent abuse and ensure fairness. The power to take cognizance, especially suo motu, is recognized as vital for maintaining the integrity of the judicial process, including that of subordinate courts. However, this power is coupled with a profound responsibility to exercise it with caution, restraint, and adherence to the principles of natural justice, ensuring that contempt jurisdiction serves its true purpose: to protect the administration of justice and maintain public confidence in the rule of law, rather than to stifle bona fide criticism or settle personal scores. The jurisprudence underscores a commitment to a high standard of proof and careful scrutiny before holding an individual guilty of criminal contempt, reflecting the quasi-criminal nature of such proceedings.