In the case of Raman & Manthan v. The State of Maharashtra, it was observed that in case a child is in conflict with law as per the Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Act, 2015, then he can seek for Anticipatory bail under section 438 of CrPC.
The case background involves a single judge who rejected the anticipatory bail plea made by two siblings, aged 16 and 14 respectively. Noting that the applicants fell under the JJ Act's definition of "Child in Conflict with Law" and as a result, their request for anticipatory bail under Section 438 of the Cr.P.C. was unmaintainable.
Given the divergent opinions of the court's single justices, the subject was referred to the division bench.
The division bench cited decisions that established the standard under which application made pursuant to Section 438 of the Cr.P.C. is not maintainable on behalf of a child who is in violation of the law. Furthermore, the JJ Act makes no explicit mention of anticipatory bail. In truth, the JJ Act does not mention "arrest" in relation to a child who has broken the law. The JJ Act is a useful piece of legislation that cannot be used to restrict a child's rights, the court stated in other judgments that have taken the position that such an application is maintainable.
In light of this, the court stated that a basic interpretation of Article 14 of the Indian Constitution would demonstrate that any protection afforded under the law to any person also applies to children as defined by the JJ Act. Because of the early protection provided by Section 438 of the Criminal Procedure Code, even a kid who is in trouble with the law has the right to apply for this remedy during or even before an inquiry.
Although Article 14 guarantees equality before the law, Assistant Public Prosecutor AV Deshmukh contended that the JJ Act makes a meaningful distinction for the protection of minors, making a fair categorization admissible. He said that the JJ Act was for the benefit of children and that it was derived from Article 15(3) of the Indian Constitution. According to the APP, the JJ Act sees them as victims rather than criminals, hence a distinct special procedure is offered.
He also argued that the JJ Act supersedes all other laws, including the Cr.P.C. Section 438 of the Cr.P.C. was not applicable to a child in conflict with the law under the JJ Act because the word "arrest" was not used in Sections 10 and 12 or, for that matter, in any other provision relating to a child under the JJ Act.
In this regard, the Court pointed out that Section 3(viii) of the JJ Act prohibits the use of adversarial or accusing language in proceedings involving a child. The word "arrest" is never used in relation to a child. In actuality, the Cr.P.C. interchanges the terms "arrest" with "apprehension."
The JJ Act does not contain any provisions similar to those found in Section 438 of the Cr.P.C., according to the court's ruling, and that the JJ Act's Sections 10 and 12 constitute a full code. It was said that once a youngster who is thought to be in trouble with the law is caught, Sections 10 and 12 come into effect. Accordingly, they speak about the "post" apprehension stage while the "pre" apprehension stage is not mentioned. Therefore, they are not allowed to be in conflict with Section 438 of the Cr.P.C.
The court concluded by stating that the JJ Act would have prevailed over the Cr.P.C if it had included a mechanism similar to Section 438 of the Cr.P.C. But if no specific procedure similar to Section 438 of the Criminal Procedure Code is set down, the rules of the Cr.P.C. shall apply.