Attachment and Exemption under Section 60 CPC

Attachment and Exemption under Section 60 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908: A Jurisprudential Analysis

1 . Introduction

Section 60 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (“CPC”) is the statutory fulcrum that governs what property of a judgment-debtor can, and cannot, be proceeded against in execution. While its opening limb is facilitative—authorising attachment and sale of “all saleable property”—the proviso carves out strategically important exemptions grounded in social welfare and public policy. Judicial interpretation of this provision reveals a delicate balance between the creditor’s right to realise a decree and the debtor’s right to minimum subsistence and human dignity. This article critically analyses the scope, rationale, and contemporary challenges of Section 60 CPC, integrating leading Supreme Court and High Court pronouncements as well as sector-specific recovery statutes.

2 . Statutory Framework

Section 60(1) CPC renders “lands, houses, goods, money, bank notes, cheques, bills of exchange, hundis, promissory notes, government securities, bonds or other securities for money, debts, shares in a corporation and all other saleable property” liable to attachment and sale. The expansive sweep is immediately curtailed by a multipart proviso listing exemptions, including—inter alia—(a) tools of artisans, (b) necessary wearing apparel, (c) houses of agriculturists/labourers/domestic servants, (g) pensions and gratuities, and (i) portions of salary.[1] Subsequent amendments (notably the 1976 Amendment Act) widened protection, inserted Explanations V & VI on “agriculturist,” and introduced sub-section (1A) rendering agreements waiving exemptions void.

3 . Underlying Rationale

The exemptions embed a constitutional commitment to socio-economic justice. They preserve a debtor’s livelihood (tools of trade), shelter (residential house of vulnerable classes), and post-retirement sustenance (pension/gratuity). Courts have repeatedly underscored this welfare objective, emphasising that execution cannot reduce a citizen to destitution.[2]

4 . Judicial Construction of Key Exemptions

4.1 Retirement Benefits

In Radhey Shyam Gupta v. Punjab National Bank the Supreme Court held that fixed-deposit receipts sourced from pension and gratuity retained their protected character; the High Court’s deviation from the original decree by attaching them constituted a jurisdictional error.[3] Earlier, Union of India v. Jyoti Chit Fund broadened locus standi, allowing the Government (as trustee of provident funds) to resist attachment in furtherance of public policy.[4] Administrative fora have applied the same principle: the Central Administrative Tribunal in A. Saidulu ruled that gratuity cannot be withheld or attached except in the narrow confines of disciplinary rules.[5]

4.2 Residential Houses of Vulnerable Classes

  • Agriculturists: In Pokhar Singh v. Tula Ram the Allahabad High Court emphasised that the phrase “not liable to attachment or sale” implies a double prohibition; even if wrongful attachment occurs, sale remains forbidden until confirmation.[6]
  • Labourers and Domestic Servants: The Kerala High Court in Vasanthakumari v. Raichal Banitta reiterated that huts of a prawn-peeling worker are insulated from execution, resting the policy on continuity of livelihood.[7]
  • Partial Commercial Use: The Supreme Court in State of Punjab v. Dina Nath clarified that where a building is partly residential and partly commercial (liquor shop), only the residential portion enjoys exemption under clause (ccc).[8]

4.3 Tools of Artisans

In Ahmad Sayeed v. Kaniz Zohra sewing machines used by a tailor were held to be “tools of artisans,” irrespective of quantity, underscoring that the statute does not condition exemption on economic necessity.[9]

4.4 Salary

Sasidharan Nair v. Trivandrum Co-op Urban Bank clarified that Rule 77 of the Kerala Co-operative Societies Rules merely incorporates Section 60 for attachment of salary; the limitation on quantum (first ₹1,000 plus two-thirds balance) applies only in that narrow context.[10]

4.5 Privy Purse and Political Pensions

In Nawab Usman Ali Khan v. Sagarmal the Court accepted a privy purse as a “political pension” protected under clause (g), reflecting that historic entitlements analogous to pension share the immunity.[11]

4.6 Flat in a Co-operative Housing Society

Rejecting claim of immunity, the Supreme Court in Ramesh Himmatlal Shah v. Harsukh Jadhavji Joshi held that a member’s interest in a tenant co-partnership co-operative society (Maharashtra) constitutes saleable property; neither Section 60 nor the Co-operative Societies Act exempts it.[12]

5 . Attachment vis-à-vis Mortgage Decrees

Section 60 applies only where execution proceeds by attachment and sale. A mortgage decree for sale is self-executing: the decree itself directs sale of the hypotheca without prior attachment. The Madras High Court in A. Nabisa Beevi v. Canara Bank and the Full Bench decision in Allah Bakhsh v. Chet Ram (Lahore) affirm that Section 60 (and its exemptions) do not bar sale of mortgaged properties.[13] Consequently, an agriculturist’s mortgaged house can be sold under a final mortgage decree notwithstanding clause (c). Kerala High Court in Kochumariam v. Kshema Vilasam further reasoned that entering a mortgage amounts to waiver—an argument later neutralised by the 1976 insertion of sub-section (1A) rendering waiver void.[14]

6 . Interface with Special Recovery Statutes

6.1 State Financial Corporations Act, 1951

In Maharashtra State Financial Corporation v. Jaycee Drugs the Supreme Court upheld High Court jurisdiction to enforce personal guarantees under Sections 31–32. Although Section 60 exemptions were not directly litigated, the judgment underscores that sureties’ assets—once within the court’s reach—remain subject to CPC execution norms unless the special statute overrides them.[15]

6.2 SARFAESI Act, 2002

Section 31(g) SARFAESI excludes from its ambit properties “not liable to attachment … under the first proviso to Section 60 CPC unless specifically charged with the debt.” The Punjab & Haryana High Court in M/s Tushar Telcom dismissed a plea that a sole residential house could not be enforced under SARFAESI because the property had been expressly mortgaged—thus bringing it outside the exemption.[16]

6.3 Co-operative Societies Legislation

Section 39 of the Andhra Pradesh Co-operative Societies Act shields a member’s share capital from attachment. In Valaparla Bhaskara Rao the High Court held that, by virtue of Section 4 CPC, the local law prevails over the general provisions of Section 60.[17]

7 Procedural Dimensions

Order XXI Rules 58–63 permit objections to attachment. Pokhar Singh illustrates that the right to contest saleability subsists until sale is confirmed. Mt. Naraini Devi v. Durga Devi clarifies that statutory amendments granting new exemptions (e.g., clause (ccc)) have prospective effect; properties attached before amendment may still benefit if attachment is deemed fresh upon execution rather than at pre-decree stage.[18]

8 Waiver, Estoppel and Void Agreements

Pre-1976 authorities allowed waiver of exemptions by contract or conduct (Kochumariam). Parliament, concerned about bargaining power asymmetry, inserted sub-section (1A) declaring all agreements waiving exemptions void. Post-1976, any contractual clause permitting attachment of protected assets is unenforceable, aligning statutory policy with constitutional ideals of socio-economic security.

9 Contemporary Challenges and Reform Prospects

  • Digital Assets: Cryptocurrency and dematerialised securities test the boundaries of “saleable property” and the logistics of attachment; legislative clarification is desirable.
  • Uniformity across Welfare Statutes: Pension reforms and contributory schemes (NPS) necessitate harmonisation to ensure immunity extends to analogous retirement benefits.
  • Balance with Credit Culture: Excessive exemptions may impede recovery and inflate lending costs. A calibrated approach—periodic review of monetary thresholds (e.g., salary exemption ceilings fixed in 1960s terms)—is imperative.

10 Conclusion

Section 60 CPC epitomises the juridical tension between debt enforcement and human dignity. Judicial exposition—from Ahmad Sayeed protecting artisan tools to Radhey Shyam Gupta safeguarding retirees—has progressively enriched the protective mantle, while simultaneously recognising creditor rights in situations of express charge or mortgage. The provision’s continuing vitality depends on nuanced statutory updating and judicious application that respects both economic realities and the constitutional promise of social justice.

Footnotes

  1. Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, s. 60(1) & proviso.
  2. Pokhar Singh v. Tula Ram, AIR 1935 All 398.
  3. Radhey Shyam Gupta v. Punjab National Bank, (2009) 1 SCC 376.
  4. Union of India v. Jyoti Chit Fund, (1976) 3 SCC 607.
  5. A. Saidulu v. GM, South Central Railways, CAT Hyderabad, 2009.
  6. Supra n. 2.
  7. Vasanthakumari v. Raichal Banitta, 2009 (3) KLT 745.
  8. State of Punjab v. Dina Nath, (1983) 4 SCC 334.
  9. Ahmad Sayeed v. Kaniz Zohra, 1940 SCC OnLine All 131.
  10. Sasidharan Nair v. Trivandrum Co-op Urban Bank, 2009 (3) KLT 294.
  11. Nawab Usman Ali Khan v. Sagarmal, AIR 1965 SC 1798.
  12. Ramesh Himmatlal Shah v. Harsukh Jadhavji Joshi, (1975) 2 SCC 105.
  13. A. Nabisa Beevi v. Canara Bank, 1984 Mad LJ 87.
  14. Kochumariam v. Kshema Vilasam, AIR 1973 Ker 288.
  15. Maharashtra State Financial Corporation v. Jaycee Drugs, (1991) 2 SCC 637.
  16. M/s Tushar Telcom v. ADM Jalandhar, 2023 PHHC 160751.
  17. Valaparla Bhaskara Rao v. Chegu Madhava Rao, 1992 (1) APLJ 195.
  18. Mt. Naraini Devi v. Durga Devi, AIR 1959 P&H 324.