The Presidential Power of Specification (Article 341(1))

Clause (1) of Article 341 vests the authority in the President of India to specify Scheduled Castes. It states:

"(1) The President may with respect to any State or Union Territory, and where it is a State, after consultation with the Governor thereof, by public notification, specify the castes, races or tribes or parts of or groups within castes, races or tribes which shall for the purposes of this Constitution be deemed to be Scheduled Castes in relation to that State or Union Territory, as the case may be." (Text from Subhash Chandra And Another v. Delhi Subordinate Services Selection Board And Others, SC 2009; M. Chandra v. M. Thangamuthu And Another, SC 2010; B. Basavalingappa v. D. Munichinnappa, SC 1964; JARNAIL SINGH v. LACHHMI NARAIN GUPTA ., SC 2018; S. Swvigaradoss v. Zonal Manager, F.C.I ., SC 1996).

This provision underscores several key elements: the President's primary role, the consultative process with the Governor in respect of a State, the requirement of a public notification, and the crucial phrase "in relation to that State or Union Territory." The object of this provision is to avoid disputes as to whether a particular caste is a Scheduled Caste or not, ensuring that only those castes notified by the President are recognized as such (B. Basavalingappa v. D. Munichinnappa, SC 1964).

Parliamentary Power of Modification (Article 341(2))

Clause (2) of Article 341 confers upon Parliament the exclusive power to modify the list of Scheduled Castes initially notified by the President. It reads:

"(2) Parliament may by law include in or exclude from the list of Scheduled Castes specified in a notification issued under clause (1) any caste, race or tribe or part of or group within any caste, race or tribe, but save as aforesaid a notification issued under the said clause shall not be varied by any subsequent notification." (Text from Subhash Chandra And Another v. Delhi Subordinate Services Selection Board And Others, SC 2009; M. Chandra v. M. Thangamuthu And Another, SC 2010; S. Swvigaradoss v. Zonal Manager, F.C.I ., SC 1996).

This clause establishes that once a Presidential notification under Article 341(1) is issued, it can only be amended by an Act of Parliament. No subsequent Presidential notification or any other executive or judicial action can vary the list.

Definition of Scheduled Castes (Article 366(24))

The term "Scheduled Castes" is defined in Article 366(24) of the Constitution as:

"‘Scheduled Caste’ means such castes, races or tribes or parts of or groups within such castes, races or tribes as are deemed under Article 341 to be Scheduled Castes for the purposes of this Constitution." (S. Swvigaradoss v. Zonal Manager, F.C.I ., SC 1996; Pankaj Kumar Saha v. Sub-Divisional Officer, Islampur And Others, SC 1996; Mohammad Sadique v. Darbara Singh Guru ., SC 2016).

This definition intrinsically links the identity of Scheduled Castes to the Presidential notification issued under Article 341.

Finality and Conclusiveness of the Presidential Order

A consistent line of judicial pronouncements has affirmed that the list of Scheduled Castes notified by the President under Article 341(1) is final and conclusive. State governments do not possess the authority to alter, amend, or modify this list (Palghat Jilla Thandan Samudhaya Samrakshna Samithi And Another v. State Of Kerala And Another, 1994 SCC 1 359). The power to include or exclude castes from the list is vested exclusively with Parliament, as stipulated in Article 341(2) (John Ayyathurai Devendrar v. The Secretary, Madras HC 2006, citing State Of Maharashtra v. Milind And Others, 2001 SCC 1 4). Courts, too, are precluded from adding to or subtracting from the notified list (State Of Maharashtra v. Milind And Others, 2001, applied by analogy from Scheduled Tribes jurisprudence; Dr. Jaishri Laxmanrao Patil (S) v. Chief Minister And Others (S)., SC 2021, citing Bir Singh v. Delhi Jal Board, 2018; ROHIT NANDAN v. POSTAL, CAT 2022, citing Bir Singh). The Presidential declarations are considered conclusive and resist judicial alteration unless an error of law is evident (Kumari Madhuri Patil And Another v. Addl. Commissioner, Tribal Development And Others, 1994 SCC 6 241, by analogy from STs).

Scope of Inquiry by Courts

While the Presidential Order is generally treated as final, the judiciary has carved out a limited scope for inquiry in specific circumstances. The general rule is that courts cannot embark on an inquiry to determine whether a caste *should be* included or excluded if it is not explicitly mentioned in the Order (Bhaiya Lal v. Harikishan Singh ., 1965 AIR SC 1557). However, an exception was recognized in B. Basavalingappa v. D. Munichinnappa (1965 AIR SC 1269), where the Supreme Court held that if a caste name mentioned in the Presidential Order is ambiguous, or if no caste by that specific name was recognized in the particular region at the time of the notification, evidence could be adduced to ascertain which caste the President intended to include. This inquiry is aimed at identifying the caste already notified, not at adding a new caste or synonym to the list.

The distinction was highlighted in Bhaiya Lal v. Harikishan Singh, where the claim that 'Dohar' was a sub-caste of 'Chamar' (a notified SC) was rejected, as 'Dohar' was found to be distinct and not merely an ambiguous term for 'Chamar'. The Supreme Court, in State Of Maharashtra v. Milind And Others (2001), further clarified (in the context of Scheduled Tribes, but with principles applicable to Scheduled Castes) that evidence cannot be led to effectively amend the list by including synonyms, sub-tribes, or parts of tribes not explicitly mentioned, thereby reinforcing the limited nature of judicial inquiry. Entries in Presidential Orders must be taken as final and interpreted strictly, as demonstrated in Pankaj Kumar Saha v. Sub-Divisional Officer, Islampur And Others (1996 SCC 8 264), where the entry "Sunri (excluding Saha)" was applied rigorously.

The "In Relation to that State or Union Territory" Clause: State-Specific Nature

The phrase "in relation to that State or Union Territory, as the case may be" in Article 341(1) is of paramount importance. The judiciary has consistently interpreted this to mean that the status of a Scheduled Caste is specific to the State or Union Territory for which it has been notified (Marri Chandra Shekhar Rao v. Dean, Seth G.S Medical College And Others, 1990 SCC 3 130, a landmark case concerning Scheduled Tribes, the principles of which have been widely applied to Scheduled Castes). Consequently, an individual recognized as a Scheduled Caste in one state cannot automatically claim Scheduled Caste status and associated benefits in another state unless their caste is also notified as a Scheduled Caste in relation to that other state (State Of Uttaranchal v. Sandeep Kumar Singh And Others, 2010 SCC 12 794; M.S. Malathi v. Commissioner, Bombay HC 1988; The Registrar, Karnataka Veterinary, Animal, And Fisheries Sciences University, Bidar v. Dr. Mahendran K And Others, Karnataka HC 2010, citing Action Committee on Issue of Caste Certificate to SCs/STs v. Union of India, 1994).

The specificity is further underscored by Presidential Orders for certain Union Territories, such as the Constitution (Pondicherry) Scheduled Castes Order, 1964, which explicitly mentions "members thereof resident in that Union Territory" (Puducherry Scheduled Caste People Welfare Association v. Chief Secretary To Government, Union Territory Of Pondicherry And Others, 2014 SCC 9 236). While the state-specific nature is well-established, the issue of portability of reservation benefits for migrants remains a subject of ongoing legal and policy discourse, as evidenced by cases like S. Pushpa And Others v. Sivachanmugavelu And Others (2004 SCC 3 132) and the referral to a larger bench in the State of Uttaranchal case.

Prohibition on Variation by Subsequent Notification (Except by Parliament)

Article 341(2) explicitly mandates that a Presidential notification issued under Article 341(1) "shall not be varied by any subsequent notification" except by a law made by Parliament. This principle has been consistently upheld, emphasizing that the power to amend the Scheduled Castes list, whether by inclusion or exclusion, rests solely with Parliament (S. Swvigaradoss v. Zonal Manager, F.C.I ., SC 1996; M. Chandra v. M. Thangamuthu And Another, SC 2010).

Sub-classification within the Scheduled Castes List

A significant area of contention has been the permissibility of sub-classification within the Scheduled Castes list for the purpose of apportioning reservation benefits. In E.V Chinnaiah v. State Of A.P And Others (2005 SCC 1 394), a Constitution Bench of the Supreme Court held that once various castes are included in the Presidential list under Article 341, they form a single, homogenous class of Scheduled Castes. State legislatures, therefore, lack the competence to sub-classify this group for providing differential reservation quotas, as such an action would amount to tinkering with the Presidential list and would violate Article 14 of the Constitution.

However, this position has been revisited. In State Of Punjab And Others v. Davinder Singh And Others (2020 SCC ONLINE SC 677), another Constitution Bench expressed doubts about the correctness of the decision in E.V. Chinnaiah. The Bench opined that States might possess the legislative competence under Article 16(4) of the Constitution to make provisions for preferential treatment or apportionment of reservations for more backward groups within the Scheduled Castes list, provided such measures do not involve "tinkering" with the Presidential list (i.e., by adding to or subtracting from it). The matter was referred to a larger bench for an authoritative pronouncement, signaling a potentially significant evolution in this aspect of Scheduled Caste jurisprudence (also see ALL INDIA BANJARA SEVA SANGH v. THE UNION OF INDIA, Karnataka HC 2020; THE STATE OF PUNJAB v. DAVINDER SINGH, SC 2024).

Verification and Prevention of Fraudulent Claims

The integrity of the benefits system under Article 341 hinges on accurate identification and verification of Scheduled Caste status. While the landmark case of Kumari Madhuri Patil And Another v. Addl. Commissioner, Tribal Development And Others (1994) primarily concerned Scheduled Tribes, its strong emphasis on the need for robust and streamlined scrutiny mechanisms by competent committees to verify caste claims and prevent fraudulent usurpation of benefits is equally pertinent to Scheduled Castes. Ensuring that affirmative action measures reach the genuinely deserving individuals is crucial for upholding the constitutional mandate.

The Issue of Religion and Scheduled Caste Status

An integral aspect of the operationalization of Article 341 is the religious criteria stipulated in the Constitution (Scheduled Castes) Order, 1950. Paragraph 3 of this Order, as amended, generally restricts Scheduled Caste status to individuals professing the Hindu, Sikh, or Buddhist religions. This provision has been noted by the Supreme Court (Mohammad Sadique v. Darbara Singh Guru ., SC 2016, citing Guntur Medical College v. Y. Mohan Rao, 1976). This religious criterion adds another layer to the determination of Scheduled Caste status under the constitutional scheme.