Article 323A of the Constitution of India

Revisiting Article 323A of the Constitution of India: Scope, Judicial Review, and the Evolution of Administrative Tribunals

Introduction

Inserted by the Constitution (Forty-second Amendment) Act, 1976, Article 323A empowers Parliament to establish Administrative Tribunals for service-related disputes. Conceived as a structural response to mounting arrears in constitutional courts, the provision has since occupied a contested space at the intersection of access to justice, separation of powers, and the basic structure doctrine. This article critically analyses Article 323A, its legislative implementation, and the rich corpus of judicial interpretation that has shaped the contemporary tribunal framework in India.

Constitutional Genesis and Textual Framework

Clause 5 of the Statement of Objects and Reasons to the Forty-second Amendment emphasised the need “to reduce the mounting arrears in High Courts and to secure the speedy disposal of service matters” by creating specialised tribunals while preserving the Supreme Court’s jurisdiction under Article 136.[1]

Article 323A(1) authorises Parliament to enact a law for “the adjudication or trial by administrative tribunals of disputes and complaints with respect to recruitment and conditions of service” concerning persons in the service of the Union, a State, local authorities, or Government-controlled corporations.[2] Clause (2) permits Parliament to:

  • establish Central and State-level tribunals;
  • define their jurisdiction, powers (including contempt powers) and authority;
  • prescribe procedure, limitation, and evidentiary rules; and
  • exclude the jurisdiction of all courts except that of the Supreme Court under Article 136 in respect of matters within the tribunal’s purview.

Legislative Implementation: The Administrative Tribunals Act, 1985

Pursuant to Article 323A, Parliament enacted the Administrative Tribunals Act, 1985 (“ATA”). Sections 14 and 28 confer exclusive jurisdiction on the Central and State Administrative Tribunals over specified “service matters” and correspondingly bar all other courts (except the Supreme Court under Article 136).[3]

The Act aims at swifter adjudication unencumbered by “tradition-bound civil courts gripped with rules of pleading” and multiple appellate layers.[4] Its wide definition of “service matters,” later amplified by the 1986 amendment to include employees of Government-controlled societies, has been a recurrent focal point of constitutional scrutiny.

Judicial Scrutiny and the Basic Structure Doctrine

S.P. Sampath Kumar (1987): Conditional Endorsement

The Supreme Court in S.P. Sampath Kumar v. Union of India upheld the ATA but stressed that tribunals must be a “real and efficacious” substitute for High Courts, thereby infusing Article 323A with an implicit requirement of judicial independence.[5]

L. Chandra Kumar (1997): Restoration of High Court Jurisdiction

A seven-judge Bench in L. Chandra Kumar v. Union of India overruled the exclusionary clauses that had ousted High Court jurisdiction under Articles 226/227, holding that judicial review by constitutional courts is part of the basic structure.[6] While tribunals remain courts of first instance in service matters, their decisions are now subject to scrutiny by a Division Bench of the relevant High Court, thus converting tribunals into supplementary, not substitutive, adjudicatory bodies.

Post-L. Chandra Kumar Jurisprudence

  • Union of India v. R. Gandhi (2010) upheld the creation of specialised company law tribunals under Articles 323A/323B but mandated amendments to secure judicial independence.[7]
  • Rojer Mathew v. South Indian Bank (2019) revisited tribunal appointments under the Finance Act, 2017. The majority accepted broad executive rule-making power, while dissenting opinions warned against excessive delegation threatening independence.[8]
  • High Court decisions—Sonali Bodraj Moon (2016) and Li Singh (2015)—clarify that tribunals can test the validity of subordinate legislation, though challenges to their parent statute remain reserved for constitutional courts.[11][12]
  • Earlier, in Durgaprasad Shukla (1988), the Bombay High Court reaffirmed that Section 28 of the ATA bars supervisory jurisdiction under Article 227.[13]

Functional Efficacy: Experience from Tribunal Practice

Tribunals have demonstrably provided expeditious relief. In Ex Sgt K.C. Dutta v. Union of India, the Armed Forces Tribunal granted monetary benefits under the Modified Assured Career Progression (MACP) Scheme, illustrating the welfare-oriented, specialist adjudication envisioned by Article 323A.[10]

Nonetheless, empirical studies reveal persistent vacancies, frequent executive interference in appointments, and limited infrastructural support—concerns underscored in R. Gandhi and Rojer Mathew.

Doctrinal and Structural Issues

Exclusion of Judicial Review

The attempt to insulate tribunal decisions from High Court scrutiny was curtailed in L. Chandra Kumar; yet the tension between efficiency and constitutional oversight endures. The restoration of Articles 226/227 jurisdiction preserves the basic structure but arguably attenuates the objective of docket reduction.

Independence and Separation of Powers

Selection, tenure, and removal of tribunal members remain executive-centric. The Supreme Court has repeatedly insisted on judicial involvement—mandatory consultation with the Chief Justice of India (Sampath Kumar), judicial‐majority search-cum-selection committees (R. Gandhi), and adherence to the “policy and guidelines” test (Rojer Mathew). Yet statutory compliance is uneven, prompting fresh constitutional challenges.

Expansion Beyond “Public Services”

The 1986 amendment extended ATA coverage to employees of Government-controlled societies, provoking challenges that Parliament had exceeded the textual limits of Article 323A, which refers to “public services and posts.”[19] While courts have generally upheld the extension, the debate illustrates the elasticity—and potential overreach—of Parliament’s Article 323A power.

Contemporary Challenges and the Way Forward

  • Vacancies & Infrastructure: Chronic staffing shortages undermine expeditious disposal, frustrating the constitutional promise of speedy justice.
  • Standard-Setting: Uniform service conditions, security of tenure, and parity in emoluments with High Court judges are essential to attract judicial talent and ensure independence.
  • Appellate Structure: A National Tribunal Appellate Court, as mooted by various commissions, could provide specialised appellate oversight, thereby balancing efficiency with constitutional fidelity.
  • Legislative Clarity: The Finance Act, 2017 episode signals the need for precise primary legislation rather than skeletal delegations.

Conclusion

Article 323A epitomises constitutional experimentation with specialised adjudication. While tribunals have alleviated some systemic bottlenecks, sustained constitutional vigilance has been indispensable to safeguard judicial review and independence. The jurisprudential journey from Sampath Kumar to Rojer Mathew reveals an iterative calibration between efficiency and the basic structure. Strengthening tribunal autonomy, ensuring robust appellate mechanisms, and adhering to constitutional mandates in legislative drafting remain pivotal to realising the original objectives of Article 323A without compromising the core values of the Constitution.

Footnotes

  1. Kendriya Vidyalaya Sangathan v. Prem Narayan Pandey, 2011 SCC OnLine Cal 1162 (Cal HC).
  2. Constitution of India, Art. 323A.
  3. Tamil Nadu Pollution Control Board v. Sterlite Industries, 2019 SCC OnLine SC 221 (SC).
  4. Deep Kumar v. Union of India, 2017 SCC OnLine J&K — (J&K HC).
  5. S.P. Sampath Kumar v. Union of India, (1987) 1 SCC 124.
  6. L. Chandra Kumar v. Union of India, (1997) 3 SCC 261.
  7. Union of India v. R. Gandhi, (2010) 11 SCC 1.
  8. Rojer Mathew v. South Indian Bank Ltd., 2019 SCC OnLine SC 1456.
  9. State of West Bengal v. Kamal Sengupta, (2008) 8 SCC 612.
  10. Ex Sgt K.C. Dutta v. Union of India, Armed Forces Tribunal, 2023.
  11. Sonali Bodraj Moon v. Chief Secretary, 2016 SCC OnLine Bom — (Bom HC).
  12. Li Singh v. Union of India, 2015 SCC OnLine Del — (Del HC).
  13. Durgaprasad Parmatamadin Shukla v. Union of India, 1988 SCC OnLine Bom 134.
  14. R.K. Jain v. Union of India, (1993) 4 SCC 119.
  15. Tamil Nadu Pollution Control Board v. Sterlite Industries, supra (for Sections 14 & 28 quoted).
  16. Hanuman Prasad v. State of U.P., 1987 SCC OnLine All — (All HC).
  17. Deep Kumar, supra note 4.
  18. Pradip Dasthakur v. State of West Bengal, 2020 SCC OnLine Cal 1715.
  19. Kendriya Vidyalaya Sangathan (jurisdiction over societies), supra note 1.