Parliament's Power to Reorganise States: An Analysis of Article 3 of the Constitution of India
Introduction
Article 3 of the Constitution of India endows the Parliament with extensive powers to reorganise the political map of India by altering the boundaries of existing States or creating new States. This provision underscores a unique feature of Indian federalism, often described as an "indestructible Union of destructible units."[1] Unlike many federations where the territorial integrity of constituent units is sacrosanct, the Indian Constitution grants Parliament the authority to unilaterally effect territorial changes, subject to certain procedural requirements. This article undertakes a comprehensive analysis of Article 3, examining its substantive provisions, judicial interpretations, and its interplay with other constitutional articles, drawing significantly from landmark case law.
The Constitutional Mandate of Article 3
Article 3 of the Constitution, as amended by the Constitution (Fifth Amendment) Act, 1955, stipulates that Parliament may by law:
- (a) form a new State by separation of territory from any State or by uniting two or more States or parts of States or by uniting any territory to a part of any State;
- (b) increase the area of any State;
- (c) diminish the area of any State;
- (d) alter the boundaries of any State;
- (e) alter the name of any State.
The exercise of this power is, however, subject to a crucial proviso:
"Provided that no Bill for the purpose shall be introduced in either House of Parliament except on the recommendation of the President and unless, where the proposal contained in the Bill affects the area, boundaries or name of any of the States[*] the Bill has been referred by the President to the Legislature of that State for expressing its views thereon within such period as may be specified in the reference or within such further period as the President may allow and the period so specified or allowed has expired."[2]
The asterisk clarifies that "State" in clauses (a) to (e) includes a Union territory, but in the proviso, "State" does not include a Union territory. This distinction was introduced by the Constitution (Eighteenth Amendment) Act, 1966.
Judicial Interpretation of Parliament's Power under Article 3
Supremacy of Parliament and the Nature of State Consent
The Supreme Court, in the seminal case of Babulal Parate v. State Of Bombay And Another, meticulously examined the scope of Parliament's power under Article 3 and the nature of the consultation with State Legislatures.[2] The Court unequivocally held that the views expressed by the State Legislature are not binding on Parliament. The purpose of the proviso is to provide an opportunity for the State Legislature to express its views; however, Parliament is free to accept or reject them. The Court observed:
"Unlike some other federal legislatures, Parliament, representing the people of India as a whole, has been vested with the exclusive power of admitting or establishing new States, increasing or diminishing the area of an existing State or altering its boundaries, the Legislature or Legislatures of the States concerned having only the right to an expression of views on the proposals."[2]
Furthermore, Babulal Parate clarified that if Parliament introduces amendments to the Bill after it has been referred to the State Legislature, there is no constitutional requirement for a fresh reference of these amendments, provided the amendments are "germane to the subject matter of the original proposal" and not a direct negation of it.[2] This principle underscores the plenary nature of Parliament's legislative authority in matters of state reorganisation. The Andhra Pradesh High Court in A. Srinath Reddy v. The Union Of India reiterated this stance, emphasizing that the Constituent Assembly vested Parliament with such exclusive power, unfettered by any previous commitments.[3]
Meaning of "State" in Article 3
The term "State" as used in Article 3 refers to the States specified in the First Schedule of the Constitution. The Supreme Court in Babulal Parate rejected arguments for an extended meaning of "State" based on doctrinaire considerations of state sanctity, noting that "None of the constituent units of the Indian Union was sovereign and independent in the sense the American colonies or the Swiss Cantons were before they formed their federal unions."[2] This interpretation was also affirmed in A. Srinath Reddy.[3]
Interplay with Article 4: Supplemental Provisions and Non-Amendment
Article 4(1) of the Constitution provides that any law made under Article 2 (admission or establishment of new States) or Article 3 shall contain such provisions for the amendment of the First Schedule (names of States and their territories) and the Fourth Schedule (allocation of seats in the Council of States) as may be necessary to give effect to the provisions of the law. It may also contain such supplemental, incidental, and consequential provisions (including provisions as to representation in Parliament and in the Legislature(s) of the affected State(s)) as Parliament may deem necessary.
Crucially, Article 4(2) declares that no such law "shall be deemed to be an amendment of this Constitution for the purposes of article 368." This means that laws reorganising states can be passed by Parliament by a simple majority, unlike constitutional amendments which require a special majority under Article 368. The Supreme Court in Mangal Singh And Another v. Union Of India affirmed this, holding that Article 4 grants Parliament expansive authority to enact laws for state reorganisation, including making temporary or transitional provisions necessary for effective governance, even if they deviate from other constitutional provisions like Article 170 (composition of Legislative Assemblies), without such laws being considered constitutional amendments.[4] This was also noted in Babulal Parate, highlighting that for territorial adjustments under Article 3, "it is not necessary even to invoke the provisions governing constitutional amendments."[2]
Scope and Limitations of Article 3
Internal Reorganisation v. Cession of Territory
A significant limitation on the scope of Article 3 pertains to the cession of Indian territory to a foreign State. In Special Reference No. 1 of 1959 (re Berubari Union and Exchange of Enclaves), the Supreme Court opined that the power to diminish the area of a State under Article 3(c) refers to inter-State adjustments within the territory of India and does not extend to ceding Indian territory to a foreign power.[5] The Court held that such cession requires a constitutional amendment under Article 368. This principle was reiterated in Ram Kishore Sen And Others v. Union Of India And Others, which dealt with the transfer of territories to Pakistan under the Constitution (Ninth Amendment) Act, 1960.[6] The Court noted that the Ninth Amendment Act was enacted following the Supreme Court's earlier opinion that any territorial exchange (cession) required either a parliamentary law under Article 368 or both Article 368 and Article 3.[6] Thus, Article 3 primarily governs the internal reorganisation of states within the Union.
Procedural Safeguards: The Proviso to Article 3
While the views of the State Legislatures are not binding, the procedural requirement of referring the Bill to them, if it affects their area, boundaries, or name, is mandatory. The President must recommend the introduction of such a Bill, and the State Legislatures must be given a specified time to express their views. The Andhra Pradesh High Court in P.V. Krishnaiah v. Union Of India characterized this proviso as a "safeguard measure" intended "to avoid any complaint of exercise of unbridled power of Parliament" and to ensure "collective participation of Constitutional Authorities."[7] This suggests that while Parliament's power is supreme, the process is designed to incorporate a consultative element, ensuring that state perspectives are formally solicited and considered, even if not ultimately determinative.
Article 3 and the Federal Structure of India
Article 3 is central to understanding the nature of Indian federalism. The power vested in Parliament to unilaterally alter state boundaries has led to the characterization of India as a federation with a strong unitary bias, or an "indestructible Union of destructible units."[1] This was explicitly noted by the Supreme Court in ANDHRA PRADESH STATE COUNCIL OF HIGHER EDUCATION v. UNION OF INDIA AND ORS. ETC., quoting Raja Ram Pal v. Hon'ble Speaker, Lok Sabha: "India is an indestructible Union of destructible units. Article 3 and Article 4 of the Constitution together empower Parliament to make laws to form a new State..."[1]
The power under Article 3 reflects the intent of the Constitution framers to provide flexibility in adjusting state boundaries for administrative convenience, linguistic reorganisation, or other national interests, without the cumbersome process of constitutional amendments typically required in rigid federations. While this power is vast, its exercise is situated within a constitutional framework that also seeks to balance Union authority with State interests. The broader context of Union legislative supremacy in matters of national importance, even if they affect states, can be seen in cases like State Of W.B. v. Union Of India, which upheld Parliament's power to acquire State-owned property for a public purpose under Entry 42 of List III, emphasizing the Union's capacity to address national priorities.[8]
Conclusion
Article 3 of the Constitution of India grants Parliament significant and largely exclusive power to reorganise states, a power that has been instrumental in shaping the political map of India since its independence. Judicial interpretations, particularly in Babulal Parate and the Berubari Union Reference, have clarified the scope and limitations of this power. While State Legislatures are consulted, their views are not binding, reinforcing the parliamentary supremacy in such matters. The non-applicability of Article 368 procedures for laws made under Article 3, as facilitated by Article 4, further streamlines the process of state reorganisation. However, this power is primarily for internal adjustments and does not extend to the cession of Indian territory to foreign nations without a constitutional amendment. Article 3 thus embodies a pragmatic approach to federalism, allowing for territorial flexibility to meet evolving administrative and political needs while maintaining the integrity of the Union.
References
- [1] ANDHRA PRADESH STATE COUNCIL OF HIGHER EDUCATION v. UNION OF INDIA AND ORS. ETC (Supreme Court Of India, 2016), citing Raja Ram Pal v. Hon'ble Speaker, Lok Sabha (2007) 3 SCC 184.
- [2] Babulal Parate v. State Of Bombay And Another (1960 AIR SC 51, Supreme Court Of India, 1959).
- [3] A. Srinath Reddy v. The Union Of India, Rep. By Cabinet Secretary, New Delhi (Andhra Pradesh High Court, 2009).
- [4] Mangal Singh And Another v. Union Of India (1967 AIR SC 944, Supreme Court Of India, 1966).
- [5] President Of India v. Berubari Union Exchange Of Enclaves (Special Reference No. 1 of 1959, AIR 1960 SC 845, Supreme Court Of India, 1959).
- [6] Ram Kishore Sen And Others v. Union Of India And Others (1966 AIR SC 644, Supreme Court Of India, 1965).
- [7] P.V. Krishnaiah v. Union Of India, Rep. By Its Cabinet Secretary, Central Secretariat, New Delhi And Others (Andhra Pradesh High Court, 2013 / Telangana High Court, 2013).
- [8] State Of W.B. v. Union Of India (1963 AIR SC 1241, Supreme Court Of India, 1962).