Case: Vikash Kumar v. Union Public Service Commission
The decision issued by the Supreme Court stated that, its decision in V Surendra Mohan v. State of Tamil Nadu would not be a binding precedent following the implementation of the Rights of Persons with Disabilities Act 2016.
A two-judge bench of the Supreme Court ruled in Surendra Mohan that a limit of 50% disability in hearing impairment or visual impairment as a condition for being eligible for the post of a judicial officer is a legitimate restriction. The court dismissed an appeal filed by V. Surendra Mohan, who was found to be ineligible for the post of judicial officer (civil judge) due to his 70% disability caused by blindness.
In the present case, a three-judge bench comprising Justices D Y Chandrachud, Indira Banerjee, and Sanjiv Khanna criticised Surendra Mohan's decision for failing to take into account relevant concepts under the 2016 Act as well as the "principle of reasonable accommodation."
"This Court issued this decision after India became a party to the UNCRPD and the RPwD Act 2016 went into effect. This Court's aforementioned point of view violates the principle of reasonable accommodation. This Court did not consider whether the Tamil Nadu Public Service Commission's failure to provide reasonable accommodation to a judge with a disability that exceeded the impugned ceiling was statutorily or constitutionally tenable. There is no mention in this Court's decision of whether the appellant could have performed the duties of a Civil Judge (Junior Division) after being provided with the reasonable accommodations required by his disability ", the three-judge panel stated.
The bench noted while considering an appeal filed by a UPSC candidate against the rejection of his request for a scribe, that under Section 20, every government establishment is required to provide "reasonable accommodation" and a conducive environment to employees with disabilities.
As defined in Section 2(y), "reasonable accommodation" means necessary and appropriate modifications and adjustments to ensure that people with disabilities have the same rights as everyone else.
"The principle of reasonable accommodation captures the positive obligation of the State and private parties to provide additional support to persons with disabilities to facilitate their full and effective participation in society. The concept of reasonable accommodation is developed in section (H) below. For the present, suffice it to say that, for a person with a disability, the constitutionally guaranteed fundamental rights to equality, the six freedoms and the right to life under Article 21 will ring hollow if they are not given this additional support that helps make these rights real and meaningful for them. A reasonable accommodation is an instrumentality – an obligation as a society – to enable the disabled to enjoy the constitutional guarantee of equality and non-discrimination," the bench observed in the judgment.
Because the view of this court in Mohan was rendered in a case under the 1995 Act which has now been replaced by the RPwD Act 2016 and in light of the absence of a reasonable accommodation analysis by this Court, the Mohan judgment stands on a legally vulnerable footing. It would not be a binding precedent, after the enforcement of the RPwD Act 2016.