Article 142 of the Constitution of India: A Tool for Complete Justice

Article 142 of the Constitution of India: Scope, Application, and Evolving Jurisprudence

Introduction

Article 142 of the Constitution of India confers upon the Supreme Court a unique and extraordinary power to pass such decree or make such order as is necessary for doing "complete justice" in any cause or matter pending before it. This provision, enshrined in clause (1) of Article 142, represents a significant instrument in the hands of the apex judiciary, enabling it to transcend procedural and, at times, substantive legal constraints to achieve equitable outcomes. Clause (2) further empowers the Supreme Court, subject to parliamentary law, to make orders for securing the attendance of persons, discovery or production of documents, or the investigation or punishment of any contempt of itself. This article seeks to provide a comprehensive analysis of Article 142, examining its evolution through judicial interpretation, its scope and application in diverse legal contexts, its intricate relationship with other constitutional provisions, particularly Article 141, and the self-imposed and constitutionally mandated limitations on its exercise. The analysis will draw heavily upon landmark judgments and legal principles pertinent to Indian constitutional law.

The Constitutional Mandate of Article 142

Article 142(1) states: "The Supreme Court in the exercise of its jurisdiction may pass such decree or make such order as is necessary for doing complete justice in any cause or matter pending before it, and any decree so passed or order so made shall be enforceable throughout the territory of India in such manner as may be prescribed by or under any law made by Parliament and, until provision in that behalf is so made, in such manner as the President may by order prescribe."

This provision is a testament to the framers' intent to arm the highest court of the land with plenary powers to ensure that justice is not defeated by technicalities or lacunae in the law. It is often described as a reservoir of power, allowing the Supreme Court to mould relief and issue directions that may not be strictly available under existing statutes but are deemed essential for achieving a just resolution. The phrase "complete justice" is the cornerstone of this power, granting the Court a wide, equitable jurisdiction.

Evolution and Judicial Interpretation of Article 142

The scope and application of Article 142 have been shaped significantly by judicial pronouncements over several decades. The Supreme Court has navigated the delicate balance between exercising this extraordinary power and respecting the confines of the constitutional and statutory framework.

Early Interpretations and Foundational Limitations

One of the earliest and most significant elucidations of the limits of Article 142 came in Prem Chand Garg And Another v. The Excise Commissioner, U.P And Others (1963 AIR SC 996). The Supreme Court, while acknowledging the wide sweep of Article 142(1), held that this power cannot be exercised in a manner that contravenes the fundamental rights guaranteed under Part III of the Constitution. The Court observed that an order which is inconsistent with the express statutory provisions of substantive law, if such law is itself constitutional, cannot be said to be an order necessary for doing complete justice. This judgment established a crucial principle: the pursuit of "complete justice" under Article 142 must remain subservient to fundamental rights and constitutional statutory provisions.

This principle was reiterated in Supreme Court Bar Association v. Union Of India And Another (1998 SCC 4 409), where the Court held that its powers under Article 142 are not to be exercised in conflict with substantive law. The Court stated, "Indeed, these constitutional powers cannot, in any way, be controlled by any statutory provisions but at the same time these powers are not meant to be exercised when their exercise may come directly in conflict with what has been expressly provided for in a statute dealing expressly with the subject." (as quoted in A.B Bhaskara Rao v. Inspector Of Police, CBI Vishakapatnam (2011)).

Expansion and Application in Diverse Contexts

Despite these limitations, the Supreme Court has invoked Article 142 in a wide array of situations to render complete justice.

In the context of the Bhopal Gas Leak Disaster, the Supreme Court in Union Carbide Corporation v. Union Of India And Others (1989 JT 1) and the subsequent review in Union Carbide Corporation And Others v. Union Of India And Others (1991 SCC 4 584), utilized its powers under Article 142 to approve a settlement aimed at providing relief to victims. The Court emphasized that its powers under Article 142 were invoked to ensure a final resolution and "complete justice" for the multitude of victims, even to the extent of quashing pending criminal proceedings as part of the overall settlement. The 1991 judgment clarified that Article 142 powers cannot be overridden by statutory provisions unless those provisions are themselves rooted in fundamental public policy concerns.

Article 142 has also been instrumental in matrimonial disputes. In cases like Swati Verma (Smt) v. Rajan Verma And Others (2004 SCC 1 123) and Anil Kumar Jain v. Maya Jain (2009 SCC 10 415), the Supreme Court exercised its extraordinary jurisdiction to grant decrees of divorce by mutual consent, sometimes waiving the statutory waiting period prescribed under Section 13-B of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955, when it was satisfied that the marriage had irretrievably broken down and that prolonging the legal process would only add to the misery of the parties. This was done to "put a quietus to all litigations" and allow parties to move on.

The spirit of Article 142, aimed at ensuring justice and accountability, can also be seen in public interest litigations. In Vineet Narain And Others v. Union Of India And Another (1998 SCC 1 226), the Supreme Court, through the mechanism of "continuing mandamus," issued extensive directions to reform investigative agencies like the CBI and ensure their operational autonomy. While not explicitly invoking Article 142 for every direction, the overarching objective was to uphold the rule of law and ensure that investigations into high-level corruption were conducted effectively, thereby doing complete justice.

Furthermore, in A.R Antulay v. R.S Nayak And Another (1988 SCC 2 602), the Supreme Court, exercising its inherent powers (which resonate with the spirit of Article 142), recalled its own earlier directions that had transferred a case from a Special Judge to the High Court, finding that such directions were issued *per incuriam* and violated the appellant's fundamental rights under Articles 14 and 21, as well as the exclusive jurisdiction conferred by the Criminal Law (Amendment) Act, 1952. This demonstrated the Court's commitment to rectifying its own errors to prevent a miscarriage of justice.

The "Supplementary" Nature: Cannot Supplant Substantive Law

A consistent theme in the jurisprudence surrounding Article 142 is its characterization as a power that is supplementary in nature and cannot be used to supplant or override substantive provisions of law.

The Supreme Court in State Of Punjab And Others v. Rafiq Masih (White Washer) And Others (2015 SCC 4 334; also see 2014 SCC 8 883 extracts), extensively discussed the nature of Article 142. It was reiterated that "Article 142 of the Constitution of India is supplementary in nature and cannot supplant the substantive provisions, though they are not limited by the substantive provisions in the statute. It is a power that gives preference to equity over law. It is a justice oriented approach as against the strict rigors of the law." This perspective was also echoed by various High Courts, such as the Kerala High Court in Reliance General Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Ambika Kumari K. And Others (2020) and the Himachal Pradesh High Court in ROOP LAL v. STATE OF HP (2022).

The Supreme Court Bar Association (1998) case is a cornerstone in this regard. The Court overruled its earlier decision in *Vinay Chandra Mishra, Re ((1995) 2 SCC 584)*, holding that the power to punish for contempt under Articles 129 and 142 did not extend to suspending an advocate's license to practice, as this was a matter exclusively governed by the Advocates Act, 1961. The Court firmly stated that Article 142 could not be used to create a jurisdiction that was not vested in it by statute. As quoted by the Allahabad High Court in Chandrapal Singh v. State Of U.P. And Another (2023), the Supreme Court in *SCBA* clarified that "this Court cannot in exercise of its jurisdiction under Article 142 read with Article 129 of the Constitution, while punishing a contemner for committing contempt of court, also impose a punishment of suspending his licence to practice... Such a punishment cannot even be imposed by taking recourse to the appellate powers under Section 38 [of the Advocates Act]."

The Supreme Court in National Insurance Company Limited v. Parvathneni And Another (2009 SCC 8 785) expressed reservations about compelling an insurance company to pay compensation under Article 142 when it had no statutory liability, even with the liberty to recover the amount later. The matter was referred to a larger bench to decide if Article 142 permits the Court to create a liability where there is none. This indicates a cautious approach towards expanding Article 142 into areas governed by specific statutory liabilities.

Article 142 vis-à-vis Article 141: Precedential Value of Directions

A complex issue is the relationship between directions issued under Article 142 and the declaration of law under Article 141, which makes the law declared by the Supreme Court binding on all courts within India.

The Supreme Court in State Of Punjab And Others v. Rafiq Masih (White Washer) (2014 SCC 8 883 and related extracts), drawing upon cases like Indian Bank v. ABS Marine Products (P) Ltd. (2006) 5 SCC 72, Ram Pravesh Singh v. State of Bihar (2006) 8 SCC 381, and State of U.P. v. Neeraj Awasthi (2006) 1 SCC 667, clarified that directions issued under Article 142, particularly those "in the nature of moulding of relief" that "relax the application of law or exempt the case in hand from the rigour of the law in view of the peculiar facts and circumstances do not comprise the ratio decidendi and therefore lose its basic premise of making it a binding precedent" under Article 141. These are seen as justice-oriented directions for a specific case, distinct from a "declaration of law." This view was followed in cases like State Of Punjab And Others v. Rafiq Masih (White Washer) And Others (2015 SCC 4 334) where observations not to recover excess salary payments made without fault of the employee were considered exercises of Article 142 power for equitable relief in specific circumstances.

However, this distinction is not always sharply defined. The Allahabad High Court in Constable Cp 201 Vinod Kumar v. State Of U.P & Ors. (2010), referring to directions in *Prakash Singh (2006 AIR SCW 5233)* (which aimed at police reforms), noted that directions issued under Article 142 (or similar inherent powers) would be binding on all authorities until legislation is enacted. This suggests that directions of a general, systemic, or law-making nature, especially those filling a legislative vacuum or aimed at public good, may carry precedential weight.

The Delhi High Court in NATIONAL HIGHWAY AUTHORITY OF INDIA v. M/S GMR POCHANPALLI EXPRESSWAYS LTD (2022), citing Madras Bar Association v. U.O.I. ((2022) 1 SCC 131 / (2021) 7 SCC 369), observed that "the directions issued under Article 142 of the Constitution, are binding on every Court in terms of Article 141 of the Constitution," and cautioned against lower courts desisting from following Supreme Court decisions by deeming them rendered under Article 142 unless the precedent unmistakably so indicates. This suggests that the nature and context of the direction under Article 142 are crucial. If a direction under Article 142 lays down a principle of general application or interprets law, it may well be binding under Article 141. The nuanced position appears to be that while equity-driven, fact-specific reliefs under Article 142 may not set binding legal precedents, directions that articulate general principles or fill statutory gaps can have such effect.

Limitations and Self-Imposed Restraints on Article 142 Powers

The exercise of power under Article 142, while vast, is not unbridled. The Supreme Court has itself articulated several limitations:

  • Cannot Violate Fundamental Rights: As established in Prem Chand Garg (1963), Article 142 cannot be used to pass orders that infringe upon fundamental rights.
  • Cannot Contravene Substantive Statutory Provisions: The power is supplementary and cannot supplant existing substantive law that is otherwise constitutional (Supreme Court Bar Association, 1998; Rafiq Masih, 2014/2015; A.B. Bhaskara Rao, 2011). The Gujarat High Court in Anupam Industries Ltd. v. The State Level Industry Facilitation Council (2022) and Harsh Dipak Shah v. Union Of India (2022) reiterated that even Article 142 requires bearing in mind legislative intent and not rendering statutory provisions otiose.
  • Not Available to High Courts or Tribunals: The power under Article 142 is exclusive to the Supreme Court. High Courts, while possessing wide powers under Article 226, do not have powers akin to Article 142 (Asha Sharma v. Chandigarh Administration And Others, 2011, citing *Guruvayoor Devaswom Managing Committee v. C.K Rajan (2003) 7 SCC 546*). This was also noted in Anil Kumar Jain v. Maya Jain (2009) and by the Bombay High Court in Bajaj Allianz General Insurance Company Ltd. v. Smt. Sundari Krishna Naik (2014).
  • Judicial Propriety and Restraint: The Court exercises this power with caution, ensuring it is used to "iron out the creases" (A.B. Bhaskara Rao, 2011) rather than to rewrite laws or usurp legislative or executive functions. The power is for doing "complete justice" in a "cause or matter pending before it," implying a nexus with the dispute at hand.
  • Correction of its Own Errors: The Supreme Court can use its inherent powers, including those under Article 137 (review) and in the spirit of Article 142, to rectify its own errors if an order was passed inadvertently or resulted in injustice, as seen in A.R. Antulay (1988) and discussed in Rupa Ashok Hurra v. Ashok Hurra And Another (2002).

Conclusion

Article 142 of the Constitution of India stands as a powerful testament to the judiciary's role in ensuring not just legality but also justice in its fullest sense. It provides the Supreme Court with an extraordinary and flexible tool to address unique situations where strict adherence to procedural or even substantive law might lead to inequitable outcomes. However, this potent power is carefully circumscribed by constitutional limitations, primarily the supremacy of fundamental rights and the integrity of valid statutory provisions.

The jurisprudence evolved by the Supreme Court reflects a continuous endeavor to balance the imperative of "complete justice" with the principles of rule of law, separation of powers, and judicial restraint. While directions issued to mould relief in specific factual matrices under Article 142 may not always constitute binding precedents under Article 141, the Court's pronouncements that lay down general principles or fill legislative voids often carry significant precedential authority. Ultimately, Article 142 remains a vital instrument for the Supreme Court to act as the ultimate guardian of justice, ensuring that equity prevails and the constitutional promise of justice is realized for all. Its application continues to be dynamic, adapting to the evolving complexities of legal disputes and societal needs while striving to remain within the constitutional contours.