Article 106 of the Limitation Act, 1963: Suits for Legacies and Distributive Shares

Article 106 of the Limitation Act, 1963: A Comprehensive Analysis of Suits for Legacies and Distributive Shares

Introduction

The Limitation Act, 1963 (hereinafter "the Act") is a cornerstone of procedural law in India, prescribing specific time limits within which legal remedies can be sought. Its primary objective is to ensure that disputes are brought before courts within a reasonable timeframe, thereby preventing stale claims and ensuring that evidence remains credible. Article 106 of the Act holds particular significance in the realm of succession law, as it delineates the period of limitation for suits concerning legacies and the distribution of an intestate's estate. This article aims to provide a comprehensive analysis of Article 106, examining its scope, the critical trigger for the commencement of the limitation period, and its interpretation by the Indian judiciary, drawing upon relevant case law and statutory provisions.

The Scope and Ambit of Article 106

Article 106 of the Limitation Act, 1963, is structured as follows:

Description of suit: For a legacy or for a share of a residue bequeathed by a testator or for a distributive share of the property of an intestate against an executor or an administrator or some other person legally charged with the duty of distributing the estate.

Period of limitation: Twelve years.

Time from which period begins to run: When the legacy or share becomes payable or deliverable.[1]

This provision specifically addresses claims made by beneficiaries under a will (legatees) or heirs of an intestate individual. The suit must be directed against the person responsible for the administration and distribution of the deceased's estate, typically an executor (appointed under a will) or an administrator (appointed by a court for an intestate estate or where no executor is named/willing). The phrase "some other person legally charged with the duty of distributing the estate" broadens the scope to include individuals who, though not formally appointed as executors or administrators, bear the legal responsibility for such distribution.

A "legacy" refers to a gift of personal property by will. A "share of a residue bequeathed by a testator" pertains to the remaining part of the testator's estate after all debts, expenses, and specific bequests have been settled. A "distributive share of the property of an intestate" refers to the portion of an intestate deceased's estate to which an heir is entitled under the applicable laws of succession (e.g., the Hindu Succession Act, 1956, or the Indian Succession Act, 1925 for other communities).

The period of limitation prescribed is a significant twelve years, reflecting the often complex and time-consuming nature of estate administration.

Commencement of Limitation: "When the Legacy or Share Becomes Payable or Deliverable"

The most crucial aspect of Article 106 is the determination of the starting point for the limitation period: "When the legacy or share becomes payable or deliverable." This phrase necessitates a careful examination of the factual circumstances of each case and the relevant provisions of succession law.

For a legacy, it generally becomes payable or deliverable when the executor has assented to the legacy, or after the expiry of one year from the testator's death, by which time the executor is typically expected to have cleared debts and ascertained the assets available for distribution (see Section 337, Indian Succession Act, 1925). The executor's assent is crucial; once given, the legatee's title to the legacy becomes complete and the legacy is considered deliverable.

For a distributive share of an intestate's property, it becomes payable or deliverable when the administrator has completed the administration of the estate, paid off all debts and liabilities, and the net residue available for distribution among the heirs has been ascertained. The right to receive the share crystallizes at this point.

The general principle, as articulated in other contexts but relevant by analogy, is that "there is no right to sue until there is an accrual of the right asserted in the suit, and its infringement, or at least a clear and unequivocal threat to infringe that right by the defendant against whom the suit is instituted."[2] Thus, the cause of action under Article 106 accrues only when the claimant can legally demand their share or legacy and such demand is implicitly or explicitly refused, or the duty to pay/deliver is not discharged.

Judicial Interpretation of Article 106

Suits Against Executors and Administrators

The Bombay High Court, in Sajanbir Singh Anand v. Raminder Kaur Anand, explicitly referenced Article 106 in the context of an administration suit where reliefs were claimed concerning the property of a deceased individual. The court noted that the applicability of a specific article of limitation in an administration suit depends on the nature of the reliefs claimed.[1] In a related pronouncement, it was affirmed that a suit filed against an executor or administrator for a share in a legacy is governed by Article 106 of the Limitation Act, 1963, which corresponds to Article 123 of the erstwhile Limitation Act, 1908. The period of limitation is twelve years from when the legacy or share becomes payable or deliverable.[3] This underscores that the identity of the defendant as an executor, administrator, or a similarly charged person is key to invoking Article 106.

Administration Suits

As observed in Sajanbir Singh Anand, an administration suit is not governed by a single, fixed article of limitation. Instead, "the Article to be applied for determining the period of limitation would depend entirely on the nature of the reliefs claimed therein."[1] When the relief sought is specifically for a legacy or a distributive share from an executor or administrator, Article 106 becomes the pertinent provision. The court in Sajanbir Singh Anand reproduced Articles 106, 110 (concerning exclusion from joint family property), and 113 (the residuary article), illustrating that the choice depends on the precise claim.[1]

Distinction from the Residuary Article (Article 113)

Article 113 of the Limitation Act, 1963, is the residuary article, providing a three-year limitation period for "Any suit for which no period of limitation is provided elsewhere in this Schedule," with time running from "When the right to sue accrues."[4] This article is often termed an "omnibus" provision.[5] However, Article 106 is a specific provision tailored for suits claiming legacies or distributive shares. Where a suit falls squarely within the description provided in Article 106, this specific article will apply, and recourse to the general residuary Article 113 is precluded. The specificity of Article 106—detailing the nature of the claim, the defendants, and the specific trigger for limitation—takes precedence over the general terms of Article 113.

Consideration of Pre-1963 Jurisprudence (Old Article 123)

Article 106 of the 1963 Act is substantially similar to Article 123 of the Limitation Act, 1908, which also prescribed a twelve-year limitation period for a suit for a legacy or a share of a residue bequeathed by a testator, or for a distributive share of the property of an intestate, running from when the legacy or share became payable or deliverable. Consequently, judicial pronouncements interpreting Article 123 of the 1908 Act may continue to hold persuasive value in understanding the nuances of Article 106 of the current Act, particularly regarding the determination of when a legacy or share becomes "payable or deliverable."[3]

Clarification on Other Statutory Provisions Named "Section 106" or "Article 106"

It is pertinent to clarify that several other statutory provisions bear the number "106" but are distinct from Article 106 of the Limitation Act, 1963, and govern entirely different subject matters. Confusion can arise from the provided reference materials which allude to these distinct provisions:

  • Article 106 of the Limitation Act, 1908: The old Limitation Act contained an Article 106 which prescribed a three-year limitation period for "an account and a share of the profits of a dissolved partnership," with time running from "the date of the dissolution." This is distinct from the current Article 106 (related to legacies and distributive shares) and also distinct from the old Article 123 (which corresponds to the current Article 106). Cases discussing partnership dissolution accounts under "Article 106" (e.g., Gopi Nath v. Satish Chandra[6], P.S. Nagarunjan v. Robert Hotz[7], Banarsi Das v. Kanshi Ram[8]) refer to this provision of the 1908 Act concerning partnerships, not the current Article 106 concerning succession.
  • Section 106 of the Income Tax Act: As seen in Commissioner Of Income-Tax v. Jodhan Real Estate Development Corporation P. Ltd., there is a Section 106 within income tax legislation concerning the period of limitation for making orders under Section 104 of that Act.[9] This is unrelated to the Limitation Act, 1963.
  • Section 106 of the Railways Act, 1989: The Supreme Court in UNION OF INDIA v. M/S INDIAN OIL CORPORATION LTD discussed Section 106 of the Railways Act, 1989, which deals with the notice for claims of compensation and refund of overcharge against a railway administration.[10] This, too, is entirely separate from Article 106 of the Limitation Act, 1963.

These distinctions are crucial for the correct application and understanding of Article 106 of the Limitation Act, 1963, which is the sole focus of this analysis.

Conclusion

Article 106 of the Limitation Act, 1963, provides a specific and substantial period of twelve years for claimants to pursue their rights to legacies or distributive shares from an estate. The critical determinant for the commencement of this period is the point at which such legacy or share becomes "payable or deliverable." This requires a careful assessment of the administration of the estate and the fulfillment of legal prerequisites by the executor or administrator. The judiciary has consistently applied this article to suits that fall within its precise terms, distinguishing it from the general residuary article. A clear understanding of Article 106 is essential for legal practitioners and individuals involved in succession matters to ensure that rightful claims are asserted in a timely manner, upholding the principles of fairness and finality in the administration of justice.

References

  1. Sajanbir Singh Anand v. Raminder Kaur Anand (Bombay High Court, 2018) (as per Reference Material 11, discussing Articles 106, 110, and 113 of the Limitation Act, 1963).
  2. Gannon Dunkerley And Co., Ltd. v. Union Of India, AIR 1970 SC 1433, (1969) 3 SCC 607 (discussing accrual of right to sue under Article 120 of the Limitation Act, 1908, a principle of general applicability).
  3. SAJNBIR SINGH ANAND AND 2 ORS. v. RAMINDER KAUR ANAND AND 8 ORS. (Bombay High Court, 2018) (as per Reference Material 21, confirming Article 106 of the Limitation Act, 1963, corresponds to Article 123 of the 1908 Act for suits against executors for legacies).
  4. Article 113, The Limitation Act, 1963.
  5. State Of Kerala And Another v. V.K Ramunni Panicker And Others, AIR 1978 Ker 39 (referring to Article 113 as the "omnibus" article).
  6. Gopi Nath v. Satish Chandra (1962 SCC ONLINE ALL 245, Allahabad High Court, 1962) (discussing Article 106 of the Limitation Act, 1908, concerning partnership accounts).
  7. P.S. Nagaranjan v. Robert Hotz (1954 SCC ONLINE P&H 78, Punjab & Haryana High Court, 1954) (discussing Article 106 of the Limitation Act, 1908, concerning partnership accounts).
  8. Banarsi Das v. Kanshi Ram (1963 SCC 0 1165, Supreme Court Of India, 1962) (discussing Article 106 of the Limitation Act, 1908, concerning partnership accounts).
  9. Commissioner Of Income-Tax v. Jodhan Real Estate Development Corporation P. Ltd. (Rajasthan High Court, 2004) (referring to Section 106 of the Income Tax Act).
  10. UNION OF INDIA v. M/S INDIAN OIL CORPORATION LTD (Supreme Court Of India, 2024, as per Civil Appeal No. 1602 of 2024) (discussing Section 106 of the Railways Act, 1989).